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An election manifesto for the status quo on Japanese agriculture

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In Brief

Only one party contesting this week’s Japanese election is advocating agricultural reform and it is not the LDP.

The party in question is the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). Its manifesto contains a series of measures that amount to a textbook prescription for agricultural reform.

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These include abolishing rice acreage reduction, limiting the payment of direct income subsidies to ‘business farmers’ (shugyō nōka), carrying out fundamental reforms to the agricultural cooperatives (JA) along the lines of the recommendations of the government’s Regulatory Reform Council, amending the Agricultural Land Law to permit joint-stock companies to own farmland and reforming the agricultural committee system to prevent abuse of the farmland zoning system. More broadly, JIP advocates proactively engaging in economic partnerships such as the TPP, RCEP and the Japan–China–South Korea FTA.

Of course, JIP will not win government. The LDP is set to return to office. The only dispute is over the size of its majority.

On agriculture, the LDP’s manifesto repeats the customary platitudes about ‘establishing strong agricultural, forestry and fisheries industries’ and ‘improving the food self-sufficiency rate’. The bulk of its manifesto is given over to restating existing agricultural policies, particularly the goals incorporated into the Action Plan for the Revival of the Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Industries of December 2013, which fell well short of what is needed for structural reform of the farm industry. They include long-term goals such as doubling agricultural, forestry, fisheries and food exports by 2020 (from ¥550 billion [US$4.6 billion] to ¥1 trillion [US$8.3 billion]). But given the likely term of office of a post-election Abe administration, such goals are meaningless.

The manifesto also contains promises designed to attract farmers’ votes because they will impact directly on farm incomes, such as ‘implementing thorough measures in response to the drop in the rice price’, ‘considering the introduction of an income insurance system as a safety net against falls in income caused by declining prices’ and ‘enhancing measures in relation to direct payment systems for hilly and mountainous areas’. This is pork-barrelling, nothing more.

On agricultural reform issues more recently tackled by the Abe administration, the language of the manifesto is cautious and measured. On JA reform, for example, the manifesto states that ‘we will deepen discussion based on “Concerning the Promotion of Reforms relating to the JA, Agricultural Committees etc”, which the ruling parties put together in June this year, and steadily promote reforms’. There is no reference to implementing the recommendations of the Regulatory Reform Council, which targeted JA for a radical shake-up.

Despite Abe’s recent assurances for an early conclusion of the TPP, the manifesto reiterates long-standing LDP policy on preferential trade agreements, namely, that it will ‘protect what we need to protect and attack where we need to attack’. The manifesto pledges to abide by resolutions on the TPP negotiations adopted by the LDP and the Diet. These demand that rice, wheat, beef and pork, dairy products and sugar be treated as exceptions to tariff abolition and that the government be prepared to withdraw from the TPP negotiations if that cannot be realised.

When campaigning in Hokkaido, Abe made a personal commitment not to negotiate the TPP agreement in a way that would hurt farmers’ interests. It has been estimated that Hokkaido will suffer more than any other Japanese prefecture from Japan’s signing on to the TPP — particularly its livestock, dairy and sugar industries.

The disconnect between Abe and his own party’s manifesto reveals, once again, the dual structure of Japanese policymaking, encompassing party and government.

Under this system, policy initiated by the government (primarily Abe and his office, the Kantei, backed by government-appointed committees) is modified by ruling party actors, primarily LDP policy committee executives, supported by ordinary backbenchers who lend their weight of numbers and who also mobilise in informal intra-party lobby groups. This structure is particularly salient in the case of reforms impacting on strongly entrenched vested interests, such as agriculture.

Agricultural reforms under the Abe administration are very much seen as led by the Kantei rather than the LDP. The party–government divide is as strong as ever in this area of policymaking. The results of the election might influence the balance of power between the two, which is essentially politically rather than institutionally determined. If the Abe cabinet’s power is diminished by a poor showing in the polls, it will reduce the effectiveness of Kantei-led policymaking against the LDP.

Alternatively, if the LDP wins a resounding victory with large numbers of regional MPs recommended by JA’s political groups winning seats after signing agreements not to support the TPP unless the five ‘sensitive’ products are protected, and to align themselves with the JA group’s self-reform plan, this will just add more to the party’s weight vis-a-vis the Kantei.

Abe’s current Agriculture Minister Koya Nishikawa, who suppressed opposition from within the LDP to Japan’s participation in the TPP negotiations, is on shaky electoral ground in his constituency despite being recommended by the JA’s national political organisation, Zenkoku Noseiren. In recent days, he has distanced himself from the Kantei on the issue of JA reform.

Another variable in the equation is the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) itself. The 29 November issue of the weekly magazine Shūkan Daiyamondo reported a division between reformists, who are regarded as following the Abe–Kantei line, and the moderates, who represent the conservative mainstream of the ministry and who have close relations with industry organisations, such as JA. Which group will gain the ascendancy will be essentially determined by who is chosen as the next MAFF administrative vice-minister, and whether he represents the reformist or moderate faction within the ministry.

In order to cut through on agricultural reform, Abe needs to bring under his control both the party and the bureaucracy.

Aurelia George Mulgan is Professor at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.

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