The post-Cold War world has compelled India to reshape relations with important countries, such as the US and Japan. India’s increasing economic clout has also meant that the outside world has paid greater attention to it.
Since the 1990s, India has moved from being a sectoral partner of ASEAN to being a dialogue partner. Trade between India and ASEAN is tipped at US$76 billion (as of 2013–2014), which — while far below its potential — is up more than 20 per cent compared to a decade ago. This has been facilitated by the India–ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA) in goods. Bilateral trade is likely to increase further, with both sides setting a target of US$100 billion by this year.
In the strategic sphere too, India has strengthened ties with Vietnam and Singapore. India has been carrying out joint naval exercises with Singapore near the Andaman Islands for two decades. India signed a military agreement in 2003, which includes joint exercises and training. And in September 2014 the two countries decided to strengthen cooperation in the context of counterterrorism.
India has extensive strategic ties to Vietnam, which include interactions between defence services and assistance in the maintenance of defence equipment. During Indian President Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Vietnam, a US$100 million line of credit was signed between the EXIM Bank of India and Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance, specifically for defence procurement.
India is also no longer ambivalent about its role in Southeast Asia, especially in regards to the South China Sea dispute. This was evident in Modi and US President Barack Obama’s joint statement. Modi also stated: ‘We have a shared interest in maritime security, including freedom of navigation and commerce, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law’.
India has begun to place special emphasis on Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. It has ramped up financial aid and development assistance, and has set up a special desk at the Ministry of External Affairs. India is now assisting these countries in areas like information technology as well as English-language training.
Steps are also being taken to enhance both land and sea connectivity with Southeast Asia. Myanmar is the only gateway through land to South East Asia. A trade zone connecting Behiang in Manipur with Myanmar’s Chin province is being discussed, while a land customs station at Zawkhatar in Mizoram is also likely to be inaugurated soon. Chief ministers of north Indian states are involved as key stakeholders, not just in the context of ties with Myanmar but the overall Act East policy.
India is also seeking to build closer maritime links with Southeast Asia. The Shipping Corporation of India initiated a bi-weekly container shipping service to Myanmar in October 2014. It is likely that similar services will also be launched to Vietnam and Cambodia.
But if India wants its Act East policy to be successful it needs to take a number of further steps.
First, India must strengthen important infrastructure projects such as the trilateral highway linking India–Myanmar–Thailand and infrastructure on land borders with Myanmar.
Second, India needs to utilise its diaspora more effectively. So far, it has engaged only with the Indian diaspora in Singapore, Malaysia and to some extent Thailand. India needs to pay greater attention to the Indian community in Myanmar.
Third, there is scope for greater engagement with countries like Indonesia and the Philippines. There is immense potential for strengthening India–Indonesia relations not just due to their common past, but also due to the similar backgrounds of Modi and Indonesian President Joko Widodo, who were both strong regional leaders before becoming heads of state.
Finally, a large number of Indian states are beginning to engage with Southeast Asian countries, especially Singapore and Malaysia. While it is logical to make northeastern states key stakeholders in the Act East policy, it is also important to rekindle ties between other Indian states and ASEAN countries.
Indian cities that share a common history and heritage with countries in ASEAN can deepen relations on the basis of religious history. For instance, the Buddhist site of Sarnath near Varanasi receives a large number of tourists, many from Thailand. There are a number of sites in Madhya Pradesh such as Mahurijhari that can similarly be linked with ASEAN countries. Links between cities in states such as Kerala, which were part of the Spice route, can also be built. Already, UNESCO and the government of Kerala signed an agreement in 2014 to revive the Spice Route Project.
There is immense potential for India finally to play a greater role not just in South Asia but in Asia as a whole.
Tridivesh Singh Maini is a Senior Research Associate with the Jindal School of International Affairs, Sonepat, India.
A version of this article was first published here on Global Asia Forum.
Narendra Modi is a very dynamic politician but even he hasn’t yet found a way of converting India to a presidential system in which he would be head of state rather than just head of government.
Modi was chief minister of Gujarat for over a decade before becoming prime minister. His identity as a Gujarati has been so strong that even President Obama welcomed him in Washington as prime minister by asking him “kam cho?” (“how are you?”).
By contrast, Jokowi was governor of Jakarta for just two years before his election,and that included time in which he was campaigning for the presidency. He had earlier been mayor of Solo in Central Java for seven years. He was a very popular politician, but not a ‘strong regional leader’. Though Jokowi’s Javanese, that is less uncommon among Indonesian presidents than being Gujarati is among Indian prime ministers. When Jokowi visits Washington shortly, Obama will no doubt be content to welcome him with a few Indonesian words rather than have somebody coach him in Javanese.
Modi and Jokowi will need to find other common ground than their respective regional backgrounds as a base for developing bilateral relations.
The following points should be kept in mind in any discussion on India’s role in East Asia :
1.India can play a role in the region only to the extent that countries of the region and countries that exercise influence in the region perceive that India’s involvement in or with the region is relevant to their needs and concerns. Therefore, these ‘challenges’ materially circumscribe the scope of India’s ability to take initiatives; it is much more up to countries of the region and countries playing roles in the region to involve India.
2.India’s sudden withdrawal from joint oil exploration with Vietnam in the South China Sea, after previously boldly asserting its legal claims there, has certainly raised questions about the credibility and sustainability of her role as a major balancing power in the area.
3.Through the East Asia dialogue, the US and India discussed issues relating to China and beyond, while India and South Asia are the subjects of discussion with China in the South Asia dialogue. From mid-2013, sources said the US has been stalling all attempts to hold the East Asia dialogue. Indian officials have even offered to meet in a third country but the new assistant secretary of state Daniel Russell, who took over from Kurt Campbell, met them with stony silence. Many in the Indian system describe this as “strategic inattention” by the Obama administration. It is most strongly manifested in the lack of engagement about Asia.The US and India still have a trilateral discussion going with Japan. That too would have sunk were it not for the efforts of Japan and India to keep it afloat. “Some in the US, looking for a way to kick-start relations with India, have toyed with the idea of a trilateral dialogue with China. But Beijing ,it is believed, has torpedoed it, deeming it unworthy. But Beijing has not been averse to holding a trilateral with India and Russia on Afghanistan.”