And the United States and South Korea continue to see little utility in returning to formal negotiations unless North Korea first shows a credible commitment to dismantling its nuclear program.
The international community has wielded a carrot-and-stick approach to persuade Pyongyang to denuclearise. In spite of international sanctions and the promise of compensation, including economic aid, there has been no positive change in North Korea’s position. Instead Pyongyang has further advanced the country’s nuclear program. The South Korean government estimates that North Korea has been operating around 2000 centrifuges since 2010, producing 40 kilograms of highly enriched uranium annually. In February, a report by the Institute for Science and International Security stated that by 2020 Pyongyang could have more than 20 actual nuclear weapons in its possession.
The North Korean regime’s byongjin policy stresses the necessity of pursuing economic development and nuclearisation concurrently. It is increasingly clear that the North Korean government does not regard nuclear weapons principally as a bargaining chip to extract economic concessions, but rather as an instrument of regime security and national prestige.
Pyongyang justifies nuclear weapons by pointing to what it calls the US’s ‘hostile policy’ approach. In particular, North Korea sees the annual joint US–ROK military exercises as a major threat, with the use of strategic bombers, nuclear submarines, and aircraft carriers in military exercises close to the Northern Limit Line (NLL) and the demilitarised zone (DMZ). It therefore demands that joint exercises cease. The US and South Korea point to the defensive nature of the joint exercises by highlighting North Korea’s military provocations, including frequent missile launches.
Regardless of whether each side’s actions are offensive or defensive, the unstable security environment on the Korean Peninsula is not conducive to resolving security tensions or the nuclear dilemma, and it casts a shadow over other avenues of cooperation.
Due to this stalemate it has become increasingly necessary for the US and North Korea to compromise so as to facilitate the restarting of meaningful discussions. This necessitates both sides understanding the limitations of previous agreements.
While Washington needs to better understand the importance of North Korea’s security concerns, Pyongyang should also realise that an immediate cessation of US–ROK military exercises is unfeasible, given that this demand would be interpreted as reducing South Korea’s own deterrence capabilities.
The focus should therefore be on limiting the level of joint military exercises rather than on an immediate termination. Accordingly, downscaling or moving joint military exercises — for example away from the NLL or DMZ — in exchange for a moratorium on nuclear testing could kick-start long-stalled negotiations. While such a compromise may constitute a convenient starting point, it is also clear that security building is integral to a longer-term process of resolving military, not just nuclear, tensions.
As such, resumed negotiations need to be underpinned by confidence and security-building measures. Reducing tensions will build confidence and allow negotiations in other areas, including those on denuclearisation, to proceed more smoothly. Steps could include establishing a direct hotline between the South and North Korean militaries; a consultation process for unusual military events; prior notification of military exercises, increased troop presence and major weapons deployment; and mutual commitments to renounce the use of nuclear weapons.
It would also be necessary to move gradually towards the actual reduction of threats. For example, the US could propose to cease landing operations and the deployment of strategic and sensitive weapons in return for North Korea agreeing to a moratorium on missile test firings.
Confidence and security-building measures could thus form part of a phased roadmap for the Korean Peninsula. Each party would need to define the value of reciprocal steps and their sequencing. Northeast Asia could learn from the example shown by the Helsinki Process and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which served to reduce tensions and prevent the escalation of conflicts between the Soviet and Western blocs. South Korea’s proposed ‘exploratory talks’ could be a good starting point to this process.
Given its security dilemma, Pyongyang will not abandon its nuclear program or missile launches unless it is provided with sufficient security assurances. But the US and South Korea deem North Korea’s behaviour and actions to be too unacceptable to warrant sitting down at the negotiating table and providing these assurances. Such a situation requires that both sides compromise to achieve an entry point to negotiations. Once official negotiations are resumed, the issue of regional security-building must be pursued to support denuclearisation negotiations. One cannot proceed without the other.
Sangsoo Lee is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP) in Sweden, and is a visiting researcher at the Northeast-Asia Institute, Peking University.
This article was first published here by ISDP.