With more than 600 million people, the ten-nation ASEAN is a major trading partner for Australia, China, the US, and beyond. ASEAN’s significance comes from its position astride strategic and economic choke points of vital concern to countries that rely on free and unfettered access for their security and prosperity.
Despite encompassing a wide range of differences in ethnicity, religion, political and economic systems, strategic orientation, geography, and levels of wealth, ASEAN has become a remarkably significant — albeit fragile — supra‐national body. The ‘ASEAN Way’ of avoiding contentious disagreements has facilitated the emergence of a number of forums that have helped shape the Asia Pacific.
In a sense, as South Asian and East Asian powers rise, ASEAN is becoming the fulcrum for engagement on shared economic and security concerns.
Critics would suggest many of these forums are nothing more than talk fests, but many — including Australia — persist with engagement, reckoning that ‘to jaw‐jaw is better than to war-war’.
Verbal ‘fights’ at such talk forums may appear problematic. But the exchange of views and the relationships formed can enhance mutual understanding and foster security and stability. From Australia’s point of view, its security and economic prosperity are increasingly linked with that of its immediate northern neighbours.
Those countries that engage with ASEAN witness progress that at times appears almost glacial in pace. But relying on unanimity for decision-making has helped avoid conflict between ASEAN’s strikingly varied member states, which many see as a strength in itself.
Today, ASEAN is being buffeted in particular by the re‐emergence of great power rivalry, with security challenges threatening to undermine ASEAN’s position.
Disputes over the South China Sea have revealed a fracture between ASEAN’s maritime claimant states and mainland states. Other bilateral border disputes and internal security challenges also have demonstrated ASEAN’s fragility, revealing how misunderstandings can quickly flare into confrontations.
China’s economic growth has been accompanied by a surge in defence spending and an interest in securing its territorial and maritime claims. By land reclamation on shallow reefs and the use of apparently non‐lethal force, China has incrementally asserted its claims over the so‐called nine‐dash line that encompasses the overwhelming majority of the South China Sea. Individual claimant states have sought to rally ASEAN support but so far China has been effective at dividing to rule.
In the meantime, the US rebalance has been welcomed by countries seeking support for their claims. But the US knows that most such claims remain legally contentious, and is understandably reluctant to take sides. There is little prospect of the direct deployment of US armed forces to resist China over these contested claims. But other collective steps can be taken.
ASEAN faces a precarious future unless member countries and regional partners exercise greater cohesion and integration. Divided, ASEAN is of marginal consequence. But when acting in concert, ASEAN matters.
Friends of ASEAN recognise both its inherent fragility and utility as a fulcrum for engagement, which enhances security, stability and prosperity. Its institutional mechanisms, including its secretariat and head, need to be better resourced and empowered. Countries like Australia and the United States have no direct say in such matters. But, where welcomed, they should help foster a stronger and more resilient ASEAN.
ASEAN matters enormously to Australia, and Australia’s long‐term engagement has paid dividends in the past, notably during the East Timor crisis in 1999. With decades of investment in relationships, scholarship programs and military exercises, Australia could draw on a reservoir of goodwill from countries like Thailand and the Philippines.
But Australia’s now lengthy engagement in the Middle East has taken much of the focus away from Southeast Asia. Few Australian military personnel have spent time in the region or learnt a regional language. Australia’s cachet in the region has dwindled.
Nonetheless, the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), which links Australia, New Zealand and Britain to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, has proven remarkably resilient. Yet for historical reasons, the FPDA excludes Australia’s most important neighbour: Indonesia.
Australia’s relations with Indonesia may have been soured by beef, boats, spies, and clemency. That is, Australia’s sudden cessation of live cattle exports to Indonesia, Australia stopping boats laden with people seeking unregulated entry into Australia, the Snowden eavesdropping revelations, and Indonesia’s unwillingness to offer clemency to Australians on death row. A circuit breaker is needed.
In Bahasa Indonesian, manis means sweet. Perhaps a regional security forum including Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Singapore (MANIS) could help sweeten regional security relations, facilitating closer, more trusted interaction between these states on transnational security issues of common concern.
United States policy makers should consider the utility of Australia’s military commitment in the Middle East compared to its stabilising impact in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. It cannot readily do both well. And since Australian governments find it hard to say no to US appeals for military support, such appeals should be made sparingly and judiciously.
In recent years Southeast Asia has not featured prominently in US defence and foreign policy. In light of its fragility, its centrality and its geo‐strategic significance, ASEAN should assume greater prominence in Washington’s strategic calculus.
John Blaxland is a Senior Fellow at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.
An earlier version of this article was originally in the Asia Pacific Bulletin by the East–West Center in Washington DC.