To this end, Japan, under the Abe government, is pursuing three security policy reforms. First, Japan is strengthening its defence capabilities, even as it experiences fiscal difficulties. As such, it has instead undertaken initiatives such as establishing a National Security Council as a system for quick and effective national security decisions. It has loosened restrictions on arms export and participation in international joint arms development programs, which will open the door for the purchase of high-capability military equipment at reasonable prices. And it has recognised the right to exercise collective self-defence through the July 2014 cabinet decision in order to improve the efficiency of Japan Self-Defense Forces operations. Put simply, the aim of Japanese policy is to improve defence capabilities in real terms without a significant increase in defence spending.

Second, Japan is strengthening its cooperation with the United States — including through the recent revision of the US–Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines. In response to China’s anti-access/area denial strategy, the United States is developing an ‘Air-Sea Battle’ doctrine. Japan, for its part, is paying particular attention to the defence of the ‘first island chain’, which represents the inner perimeter of China’s defence doctrine. Japan is also in the process of drafting response options to defend against local, limited and so called ‘grey area’ incursions, such as those near isolated islands, notably the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Chinese defence spending grew by a remarkable 167 per cent from 2005 to 2014. During the same period, US and Japanese defence spending decreased by 0.4 and 3.7 per cent respectively.

If one considers the absolute amount spent on defence for 2014, the United States remained indisputably in first place globally, with US$610 billion spent. In second place, China spent US$216 billion, and — in ninth place — Japan spent US$45.8 billion. But when one considers the long-term trends, it is clear that in the future it will be difficult for the United States and Japan to compete with China on military spending, regardless of how closely the two allies cooperate.

Because of this, the third aspect of national security strategy that Japan is undertaking is security collaboration with other countries in the region. South Korea, Australia, Southeast Asia, and India are all security partners which Japan is seeking to expand cooperation. The plan is to develop the US–Japan alliance into a broader regional common defence framework, with the aforementioned countries as strategic partners.

Unlike during the Cold War, the countries of Asia are coming to possess considerable military capabilities of their own. According to the previously mentioned SIPRI data, India’s defence spending increased by 39 per cent over the last decade, to a total of US$50 billion in 2014, making India the world’s seventh biggest spender on defence. In tenth place globally, South Korea’s spending on defence increased by 34 per cent over the same time, for a total of US$36.7 billion. Australia is in 13th place in defence outlays; its spending went up by 27 per cent, to US$25.4 billion.

In this context, Japan’s ability to exercise the right to collective self-defence has a level of importance that is difficult to exaggerate. Collective self-defence affords the opportunity to conduct more robust joint training and exercises with security partners. Furthermore, if the countries of the region including Japan can work closely together to conduct patrol and surveillance, as well as intelligence gathering missions, unilateral actions to change the status quo can be more effectively deterred over a vast area

There remains a lack of frameworks in the Asia Pacific region to effectively deal with crisis management. In May 2014, China deployed a deep-water oilrig near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Vietnam claimed that this area was inside its exclusive economic zone and sent patrol boats in protest. The two sides got into a ramming contest as a result, with a Chinese fishing ship allegedly capsising a Vietnamese fishing boat with 10 fishermen on board near the oilrig. On 24 May 2014, two Chinese Su-27 fighters flew as close as 30–50 metres from Japanese OP-3C and YS-11EB intelligence-gathering aircrafts. In August, a Chinese fighter came as close as 9 metres to US P-8 patrol aircraft.

These actions may lead to misperceptions and escalations. Since skirmishes are likely to continue, effective crisis management is all the more important to prevent escalation and confrontation. As per the joint statement in November 2014, the Japanese and Chinese governments believe they can work together through dialogue and consultation to prevent the situation from deteriorating further and by establishing a crisis management mechanism and avert the rise of unforeseen circumstances.

Narushige Michishita is professor of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo.