Under the nationalist Trisakti doctrine, the new policy will focus on bolstering greater security capabilities in the conflict-prone outermost areas of Indonesia, such as Papua.

The two Papuan provinces significantly contributed to Jokowi’s victory in the 2014 presidential election. Owing to the trust that Papuans have shown in him, Jokowi has scheduled three visits a year to that region, which are seen as largely symbolic and intended to win the hearts of Papuans. The scheduled visit on 1 May 2015 coincided with the anniversary of Papua’s integration with Indonesia, which some Papuans derisively term ‘annexation day’. The trip was postponed, reportedly due to strong resistance from one of the armed criminal groups, which had threatened to spread chaos if the president proceeded with the visit.

Jokowi is aware that Papua is of strategic importance to Indonesia and it cannot afford to lose the region, like it did Timor-Leste in 1999. Papua is one of Indonesia’s richest regions in natural resources. Its forests are the largest in Indonesia, at more than 32 million hectares, while as much as 45 per cent of national copper reserves are located in Papua. It also has huge strategic value for Indonesia’s defence. It is perceived as a buffer against both foreign intrusion by countries such as Australia and the United States, which have increased their presence in the Southwest Pacific, and also potential intrusion from the north, such as illegal fishing boats coming from the Philippines.

Security-wise, threats posed by Armed Criminal Groups (KKB) are growing. According to data from the regional police of Papua, in 2009–2014, there were 166 cases of violence involving these groups. A common threat to the economy is the extortion by the KKB of special autonomy funds that then are distributed to the local government, especially in the mountain areas such as Puncak Jaya, Paniai, and Ilaga.

The threat from separatists referred to as Political Criminal Groups (KKP) is equally, if not more, worrying. The authorities have forbidden the use of the separatists’ insignia, but in democratic Indonesia it is increasingly difficult to curb the political movement. Press releases to the media and religious activities are the most common methods used by domestic activists. Their main goal is to create popular momentum toward independence, while overseas lobby groups simultaneously seek to generate international support for the separatists.

The Jokowi administration has sought to combine two strategies: building welfare and building a military presence. Jokowi plans to establish three Ocean Toll Roads in Sorong, Jayapura, and Merauke. Sorong has been selected as the first location for a deep sea port facility as the gateway to Papua and is expected to reduce the cost of developing infrastructure in the region. Jokowi’s other approach is to build Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Indonesia, including in Papua, in Merauke and Sorong, as well as developing the industrial region at Teluk Bintuni and a tourism region at Raja Ampat.

These economic measures will be accompanied by the expansion of the territorial military structure into the region. The Indonesian Army has confirmed that the establishment of military district command (Kodam) in Manokwari, West Papua will be accelerated in 2015. The Eastern Region Fleet command base is being shifted to Sorong. The military also plans to set up a Third Division of the Army Strategic Command as well as the Third Division of Air Force Operational Command in Sorong. Although the territorial structure has been criticised as potentially bringing back New Order-style military intervention, it is expected to help maintain Indonesia’s sovereignty over the restive region.

Currently, the rules of engagement are not balanced: the KKBs have the ability to sporadically attack the security apparatus whenever they want, but the security apparatus must play by democratic rules. In this asymmetric setting, the Jokowi administration is aware that winning the hearts of the locals and building domestic resilience is the most important approach. To achieve this, a new program called serbuan teritorial or ‘territorial invasion’ is to be intensified. Although the name sounds hostile, the core of the program is to increase the military’s social functions and to improve its image among locals.

Thirteen memoranda of understanding have been secured with various ministries, such as agriculture and transportation. Various community projects to empower the locals are set to be implemented, led by the Kodam in collaboration with local government, related state agencies and leaders of various ethnic groups. Some activities have already been implemented such as the planting of paddy fields in early 2015.

A potential peril of the project is that it could easily turn into a paternalistic state project that, lacking consultation, would further aggravate animosity toward the national government. Upholding democratic principles, therefore, is of crucial importance. One of the potential fault lines that require special attention is cultural misunderstanding of the complexities of Papuan culture. A lack of cultural sensitivity could lead to resistance toward transmigrants and foreign immigrants, or as feuds and attacks on the local inhabitants.

Therefore, exposure to Papuan culture is needed to promote better understanding and hinder ethnocentrism and stereotyping of Papuans. The Jokowi government should give Papuans the attention they desperately need by properly developing the region for the greater good of the Papuan people in particular, and a united Indonesian nation-state more generally.

Emirza Adi Syailendra is a Research Analyst at the Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

A version of this article was first published here by RSIS.