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Middle-power multilateralism bringing China into the fold

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Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-Se in Seoul in May 2015. Middle-power cooperation could provide the basis for productive coexistence with China. (Photo: AAP).

In Brief

China is a central concern in the evolving East Asian order, and its aggressive behaviour toward disputed islands in the South and East China Seas is attracting growing concern. China’s uncompromising attitudes reflect growing confidence in its ability to create or re-create a China-centred order in Asia commensurate with its power and interests.

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But this aspiration does not necessarily imply that China wishes to compete with the United States over global or Asian leadership. For Chinese leaders, as President Xi Jinping has said, the Pacific Ocean is wide enough to accommodate both China and the US. But China remains unhappy with the dominant role of the United States in Asia and wishes to see the eventual withdrawal of the American presence from the Asian part of the Asia Pacific.

This is amply demonstrated by China’s concept of a new model of major-power relations. While  envisaging coexistence with the US across the Pacific and on the global stage, China also wants the US to leave the destiny of Asia in the hands of the Chinese. The new model of major-power relations helps China realise its dream of creating a China-centred Asia.

The process is bound to be a long-term one. The central players in this transformation of a regional order should be the countries in East Asia that are most directly and seriously affected by the rise of China and shifting American strategy. If East Asian countries’ choice is simply to react to the larger trends of evolving US–China relations, this should signify the demise of an autonomous strategy on their part.

Against this backdrop, the concept of middle-power strategy can provide an important theoretical perspective for a new logic of cooperation among East Asian countries. A middle-power strategy is characterised by the absence of unilateralism, which is a defining trait of the thinking and behaviour of a great power. It cannot be executed by any single country alone. Crafting effective mechanisms of cooperation are the key to its ability to exert effective influence in the middle ground between great powers.

Middle-power cooperation in East Asia can give rise to a solid multilateralism, conducive to the  harmony of the regional order. The more effective this multilateral cooperation is, the greater the cost is for China of smashing it. The ultimate goal of such endeavours for East Asian countries is to coexist with a strong China in a democratic and stable Asian context, without necessarily being co-opted by it. A strong China is welcome, but the modern version of a Sino-centric order is not.

Non-traditional security cooperation among middle powers is a natural first step towards building a regional infrastructure based on a middle-power strategy. An example is the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, signed in March 2007. South Korea and Australia also signed a similar, but much more comprehensive, agreement in 2009, the Joint Statement on Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation. A similar initiative was begun between Tokyo and Seoul towards the end of the Lee Myung-bak administration, with the two governments almost completing a bilateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Trilateral, non-traditional security cooperation among the three middle powers of Japan, Australia, and South Korea, and also possibly ASEAN, would constitute an important step toward multilateral security cooperation in the region.

Whether and how regional middle powers can cooperate in setting the agenda and providing the drive towards regional integration will remain critically important in working with China and shaping the region in the years ahead. The challenge, in the short to medium term, is for middle powers to find a survival strategy amid the shifting power balance between the United States and China. In the long run, middle-power cooperation should strengthen their common ground and provide a basis for them to coexist with a strong China.

The foundation for this cooperation would be the shared values of the post-modern civil societies in many middle powers in East Asia. In this sense, the hope for the long term lies with Chinese liberal-internationalists. After all, China’s economic success is the result of Chinese engagement with the post-war liberal international order. In order for China to continue to grow, let alone tackle the problems that will arise in the years ahead, it has to remain within the system. Therefore, middle powers in East Asia will need to construct a long-term strategy to build communications and relations with Chinese civil society.

Ideally, Japan should take the initiative in promoting cooperation among East Asian middle powers. China would certainly take Japan’s involvement as a ploy to constrain China’s rise. This is probably inevitable given the current situation of the bilateral relationship, but persistence is important and may eventually convince the Chinese — and sceptics throughout East Asia — otherwise. To repeat, the ultimate goal of such middle power cooperation as a new form of East Asian multilateralism is to coexist with a strong China. Persistence in highlighting this central point is the surest way to rebuild the Japan–China relationship that is so critical for the stability and prosperity of Asia.

Yoshihide Soeya is professor of political science at Keio University.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Leadership in the region‘.

One response to “Middle-power multilateralism bringing China into the fold”

  1. “China is a central concern in the evolving East Asian order, and its aggressive behaviour toward disputed islands in the South and East China Seas is attracting growing concern.” The writer’s opening words are entirely Japanese jingoism. How can we trust that what you propose is a fair hope for good? You have said some great principles which was what China, against the history of heinous crimes by the Japanese, graciously treated the Japanese in bilateral relations. The ruckus of Diaoyu Island was kicked up by Noda and worsened by Abe in an entirely dispeakable to deny that there ever was a “gentlemen’s agreement between Zhou and Tanaka, and between Deng and Nakasone to set aside any action on the islands.

    You have simply lectured China on what should be her behaviour without alluding to the aggressive truculance of the Japanese militarists. And at this date of Abe having spent two years in 50 trips bad-mouthing China and trying to encircle China, you have been lacking in scholarship in your ignoring this massive agggressive campaign of Abe. This forum is full of great scholarly analyses that are factual, inclusive and balanced. Yours puts this foum to shame.

    The comedy of it is that this professor was correct three years back before Japan tried to kickthe shin of the Giant Panda. This professor just neede to cut off the first China-bashing paragraph and it describes China’s behavor towards multilateral relations in Asia and all other trading partners, give and take, give and give.

    Also Japanese-centric scholars also just woke up to China after-burner-ing past Japan and speak of cooperation when China is already twice the size and running away in influence.

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