Three key events — Victory Day in China, the Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok and the visit of Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to the disputed Kuril Islands — can help uncover the answer.
The military parade held in Beijing on 3 September was remarkable in many ways. From the Russian perspective what was most significant was the fact that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was given the privilege of sitting side-by-side with Chinese President Xi Jinping. In the discussions that followed, Xi and Putin also emphasised the leading role the two countries are considered to have played in defeating Nazism and Japanese imperialism.
Historical issues aside, during Putin’s time in Beijing the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to further deepening bilateral ties. Adding substance to these warm words, almost 30 documents were signed in such spheres as energy, industrial infrastructure and humanitarian cooperation. It was announced that China’s Sinopec is to buy a 10 per cent share of Sibur, the biggest gas processing and petrochemicals company in Russia. And a memorandum was signed between Gazprom and CNPC concerning a proposed third gas supply route from Russia to China.
Another point of interest is the agreement between the Russian Direct Investment Fund, the State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank) and China’s Silk Road Fund. Coming on top of the dozen contracts signed this May, 2015 has clearly demonstrated Russia’s eagerness to welcome Chinese investment in many sectors of its economy.
Part of the motive for Russia’s ‘turn to Asia’ is to develop its Eastern regions. Putin has boldly stated that development of the Russian Far East and Siberia is ‘our national priority for the entire 21st century’. It was to this end that Moscow selected Vladivostok as the location for the 2012 APEC Summit. As a follow-up to this major event, the East Russia Economic Forum was conducted in Vladivostok on 3–5 of September at the same venue. The main aim was to attract foreign investment in the region. The Forum was carried out according to a special presidential decree and Deputy Prime Minister Yurii Trutnev served as head of its organising committee, indicating its importance to the Russian government.
The largest delegation at the Forum was from China. This further demonstrates the tremendous interest that Chinese businesses currently have in investing in Russia. At the same time, the Forum organisers invited business representatives from the whole of East Asia and there was an eagerness to demonstrate that Russia wishes to develop economic ties with all interested parties. It is clear that the Kremlin realises that China will be the main investor in the Russian Far East, but it wishes to avoid becoming subject to Chinese dominance.
The Forum succeeded in gathering more than a thousand foreign guests from China, South Korea, Japan, ASEAN and even the Middle East. More than 60 agreements were signed at a value of 1.2 trillion rubles (US$18.3 billion).
As relations between Russia and China have strengthened, tensions between Russia and Japan have re-emerged. Most prominently, Tokyo expressed its deep concern over Prime Minister Medvedev’s visit to the disputed Kuril Islands/Northern Territories. The tensions were further exacerbated by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Morgulov who — much to the displeasure of the Japanese authorities — stated that Russia would not engage in any form of dialogue over the territorial dispute since, in his view, the problem was solved 70 years ago.
In an attempt to revive relations, Japan despatched Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida to Moscow on 20 September. This was followed on 28 September by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s meeting with Putin on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. This was the first time the leaders had met since November 2014. But despite these positive steps, further progress remains difficult due to Japan’s continuing sanctions against Russia and because of the enduring disagreement over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories. This being so, it remains deeply uncertain if the sides will be able to agree on a visit by Putin to Japan by the end of 2015.
Overall, this continued failure of Russia and Japan to create an atmosphere conducive to the realisation of President Putin’s visit to Japan stands in striking contrast to the frequent and friendly summit meetings between Xi and Putin. The Chinese and Russian leaders visited each other’s recent military parades and were the main guests. The Japanese leader came neither to the parade in Moscow, nor to the parade in Beijing. Despite Kishida’s trip to Moscow and Abe’s recent meeting with Putin, Japan does not look to be doing enough to counteract the development of an alliance between Russia and China, both in economic and political terms.
China will certainly make the most of investments in the Russian Far East and from Moscow’s general readiness to let Chinese businesses become more active in the Russian economy. This is set to enable China to secure access to more Russian energy resources, potentially at the expense of Japanese companies. The question is therefore whether Tokyo will become more active in terms of cooperation with Russia in order to counteract the development of Chinese economic and political hegemony in the region.
Andrei I. Kozinets is an assistant professor of international relations at Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok. James D. J. Brown is an assistant professor of political science at Temple University, Japan Campus.