Both Chinese and Koreans experienced the brunt of the brutality of Japanese colonialism and imperialism. They have deep reservations concerning any move away from the strictest interpretation of the Article 9 ‘peace clause’ of the constitution. At the same time, both nations are cognisant of Japan’s post-World War II pacifist culture, behaviour and significant commitment to international law and norms. They are also aware that Japan has been incrementally changing its security policy over the past 25 years to play a more proactive role in not only its own security but also in international peacekeeping.
Stoking fears over Japan’s remilitarisation is nothing new to the region’s political machinations and competition for influence. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 3 September 2015 speech marking the 70th anniversary of World War II repeatedly reminded listeners of Japan’s militarist past and the need to protect against future aggression targeted at China. Similarly, South Korean President Park in her speech on 15 August chastised Prime Minister Abe for not directly upholding previous apologies by Japanese governments in his speech marking the anniversary. She called upon Japan to ‘win the trust of its neighbours and the international community’.
Implicit in this rhetoric is the idea that Japan remains a threat, and that changes to its security policy are a manifestation of that threat. This is a false narrative, but it serves the political constituencies in both countries who represent the core supporters for both Park and Xi, and it is a useful diversion from domestic political shortcomings.
In Japan, opposition parties effectively outmanoeuvred Prime Minister Abe in controlling the narrative around the new security bill. By framing the reforms as a ‘War Bill’ enabling militarism through an undemocratic process, they skilfully mobilised support for their opposition to the bill. Opposition parties thus created the conditions for other grassroots organisations to propagate even more misleading narratives that the government was ‘fascist’ and ‘war mongering’.
Opposition parties have seized upon widespread pacifist norms to weaken the Abe government and to try to gain some momentum to bolster their own political prospects. In spite of the narrative the limitations of the security bill are strict. There are several prerequisites that must be met before the collective self-defence provisions in the new legislation can be invoked. The first is ‘an armed attack against a foreign country that is in close relationship with Japan’ which ‘threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’. Second, there are no other appropriate means available to repel the attack. Third, the use of force is kept to the minimum level necessary. Clearly, a country bent on militarism or war would not create a law with so many inherent limitations.
The opposition has argued that this is a shift away from Japan’s post-World War II pacifist ideals. The new law stipulates that Japan can help allies in conflicts that have direct ramifications for Japan, such as on the Korean peninsula, through the provision of supplies and logistics. But this does not necessarily mean troops on the ground in a combat position. The key word is can. Given Japan’s pacifist norms, alongside its ageing and shrinking population, it is difficult to conceive of a crisis (barring an attack on the Japanese archipelago) that would garner the support of ordinary citizens. Further limiting a radical shift from pacifism is the supplementary resolution negotiated with three minor parties which requires that any exercise of collective self-defence will be subject to prior Diet approval.
The opposition seems to be suffering from selective amnesia. Under the previous Democratic Party of Japan administration in April 2012, Japan and the United States agreed to strengthen ‘bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, including timely and effective joint training, joint surveillance and reconnaissance activities’. Also in 2012, Japan and Australia agreed to promote security cooperation at the bilateral, trilateral (with the US) and international level. There has also been an incremental expansion of Japan Self-Defense Forces’ activities as well as a loosening of geographic limits.
The so-called ‘undemocratic’ bill itself was crafted in consultation with the Liberal Democratic Party’s junior coalition partner, the Komeito. It was passed with the support of three additional minor parties, for a final count of 148 in favour and 90 against. The current government, has now been through two elections in which they won a majority of the seats. This is hardly undemocratic; yet the undemocratic narrative still prevails.
The passage of Abe’s security policy underlines how regional and domestic political narratives are employed to consolidate political support. The Japanese government must now explain the content of the security bills to the Japanese people in a straight-forward manner to empower grassroots organisations with knowledge, to enable citizens to participate in the policymaking process in a more informed manner, and to avoid misleading narratives.
Stephen Nagy is associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the International Christian University (ICU), Tokyo.
Prof Nagy is correct in noting how Japan’s demographics might prevent any significant shift in its actual security activities in the years to come. But this piece ignores some very important facts.
First, Japan may have apologized to China and Korea in words for its misdeeds during WW II. But it has never really done much, if anything, to make amends. It has not compensated victims, has not built memorials or museums, has not told the whole truth in its history textbooks, etc. In not having made amends it has not truly reconciled with China, Korea, or other former victims of its military aggression.
Second, the manner in which the Constitution was ‘reinterpreted’ WAS clearly undemocratic. Abe did not call for a referendum in which the electorate would vote for these changes because he knew it would never pass. He won two elections by not focusing on these security issues and because the opposition was so poorly organized.
Third, there may be ‘stringent’ conditions which must be met before the SDF is supposed to be called into action. But history is replete with examples of a nation’s elected leader misleading the public into military misadventures with false claims of ‘threats to security,’ etc. Abe or his successors could all too easily do this.
If anyone’s narratives have been misleading, it has been Abe’s. He is so invested in creating what he calls ‘a beautiful’ and more powerful Japan that he has ignored basic principles of democracy domestically and the need to truly reconcile with Japan’s neighbors over the unresolved aspects of WW II.
Richard,
Thank you for interacting with the article.
The article wasn’t written to assuage PM Abe’s own narrative. It’s focus was on how the opposition clearly succeeded in creating the narrative over the security bill.
With regards to your point about Japan not apologizing, I beg to differ. There have been many apologies, compensation paid, agreements made. I don’t need to rehash this here. That being said, apologies and efforts by many in Japanese society to reconcile with their neighbours are diluted if not made meaningless by politicians in power who visit Yasukuni one day after their PM gives a speech “apologizing” for Japan’s imperial past. Rather than the idea that the Japanese have never apologized, I would say it is a problem of mixed messages, domestic politics and segments of Japanese society that are revisionists.
With regards to how the bill was pasted, Japan is a parliamentary democracy and PM Abe and team used parliamentary procedures to pass the law.
A referendum is used to change the Constitution and requires 2/3 suppport. Re-interpretation of the Constitution, a process that has been occurring throughout the post-WW 2 period has become common practice and in that sense was not illegal or undemocratic.
In terms of the stringent conditions and your point about a slippery slope towards military adventurism, the same arguments were made about Germany when they started sending troops abroad again in multilateral/ international missions. Like Japan, they have many limitations and have been able to not fall into the trap of military misadventures.
Concerning Mr Abe’s narrative, I would absolutely agree. That being said, Japan’s security environment has changed tremendously and the new security bill represents another incremental change in Japan’s security posture that has been occurring over the past 30 years.
Again, the piece was not about all the issues you raised, it was about how politicians manipulate narratives.
Thank you, Stephen, for taking the time to reply to my comments so promptly and thoroughly. I disagree with some things you note and agree with others.
Re apologies and making amends: the Japanese government itself has never paid reparations to Comfort Women, POW’s, and other victims of its wartime activities. A private fund was set up but, as I recall, it did not pay very many of the victims.
I agree that making trips to Yasukuni has undermined whatever verbal apologies various PM’s have made.
I agree that Abe did use parliamentary procedures to pass the security legislation. A few hundred Japanese and foreign scholars of Japanese law, etc believe his actions in this regard have been unconstitutional, however. The Supreme Court in Japan does not function like the one here in the USA: it has a history of avoiding cases that have a ‘political’ tone to them. So, it is likely that the laws will stand….unless the DPJ, et al can gain a majority in the Diet and reverse these laws. A very unlikely event.
I have much less faith in Japan’s ability to avoid the slippery slope leading to military (mis)adventures than Germany. The latter truly has made amends to its neighbors so France, England, etc are on better terms with it. And Germany is much more integrated into Europe than Japan is with its neighbors in Asia.
I agree that the security environment for Japan has changed significantly in the last few years. I also agree that it needs to change its posture and positions with China, S Korea, N Korea, et al. But I would not agree that these new security laws represent ‘incremental change.’ Clearly neither does the significant majority of the electorate which are opposed to these new laws. It seems that the electorate, as well as me, see these new laws as having crossed a line in respect to democracy as well as Japan’s post WW II pacificism.
IF Abe wanted to gain the cooperation of his own populace, let alone the trust of the neighboring countries, he has ‘manipulated’ the narrative very poorly. He did not lay the groundwork domestically effectively at all. He did not do anything to pave the way for neighboring countries to be prepared for these changes. In fact, his ambivalent comments leading up his statement at the 70th anniversary in August made things worse rather than better. He has failed to realize that his actions serve to give his opponents more, rather than less, ammunition in their struggles with him. At the very least, he has bungled all of this badly. More possibly, he is leading the country down a road that could cause more problems than he purports to solve.
Richard,
Thank you again for your constructive engagement.
Japan could do much more in terms of financial compensation for the comfort women and in terms of public education about Japan’s imperial behaviour. Books, magazines, academic articles are plentiful on the topics but they are not consumed by everyone and thus the divergent views on the matter.
The current government but also former governments of all political strips could/could have significantly improved relations with South Korea by unequivocally putting to rest the Comfort women issue through compensation, public education and a one time apology.
The passing of the security legislation in some ways reminds me of the passing of the Health Care act in te US. Both had large segments of society against it and both Abe and Obama used their respective political systems to pass legislation.
I totally agree with your view about the DPJ. Mr Abe’s popularity or at least the public’s sense that he can get things done has rebounded with the TPP agreement.
I think Canada, France, Germany and other countries with military relationships with the US have shown the way for Japan to stay out of unnecessary wars. They all said no to the second Iraq war despite very close relations.
Your correct, Japan could do more to make ammends with China and Korea. This is not a one way process though. Both other parties have been very manipulative in the reconcilation process.
What I mean by incremental change is that Japan has over the pass 30 years expanded the geographic limits and scope of its SDF activities. It has acquired various different kinds weapon systems, in has engaged in PKO in Sudan and other countries, it has participated in missions in Iraq (building water treatment facilties) and in refueling activities in the Afganistan war amoungst a host of other incremental changes. I think Christopher Hughes new book by palgrave details the plethora of changes.
The electorate will have their chance to send a message to the government next summer. Unfortunately, I don’t think there will be a big change.
I think the contrast in Korea’s reaction to the new law and China’s reflect part of what you said in your last paragraph but also shed light on different positions in the region.
Park asked for transparency and dialogue but wasn’t an absolutist in terms of rejecting the law. She knew it was coming and the koreans understand that the change is not directed at them. They are also sensitive to security issues in the region such as N.Korea and a neighbour that is assertive.
China’s reaction was expected.
Southeast Asian countries by in large welcome the changes.
I absolutely agree with your views about not laying the ground work for the bill, mixed messaging etc.
At the same time, the highly polarized views in Japan about security policy and Article 9 lead me to believe that he would only be preaching to the converted.
Again, I really appreciate your thoughtful viewpoints and engagement.
Stephen