There are five main actors: the military (or Tatmadaw); the Union of Solidarity and Development Party (USDP); the National League for Democracy (NLD); a number of well-organised ethnic parties; and the Buddhist nationalist organisation, Ma Ba Tha. Their actions and interactions will determine the outcome of the election and the post-election political environment.

The Tatmadaw has resisted pressures to retrench politically, retaining significant representation in parliament and the executive. This has made it an indispensable actor in the functioning of the polity. While the commander in chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, has stated that the military will respect the results of the election, he has cautioned those in uniform and their families (a voting bloc of over 1 million people) to vote for the ‘correct candidates’.

Still the military does not seem willing to support overt force or large-scale electoral manipulation tactics to ensure a victory of the ruling USDP, which is run by their retired brethren. The involvement of the security services in the ouster of former USDP chairman Thura Shwe Mann (though it is unclear who exactly ordered his removal) demonstrates the military’s determination to keep the USDP a close surrogate, but not a willingness to preserve their parliamentary majority at all costs.

The USDP has struggled to portray themselves as an autonomous political actor with their own platform. Given Shwe Mann’s removal and that President Thein Sein is not seeking re-election (but has indicated a willingness to stand a second presidential term if elected by parliament), the USDP has no high-profile leader to promote its message during the campaign. The suspected coordination between the USDP leadership, the president’s office and the military in the removal of Thura Shwe Mann has left the USDP with an ‘electoral handicap’. These actions not only demonstrate the military’s pervasive influence over the party but harken images back to the junta era where political change was adjudicated via force and intimidation.

Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi is running on one simple message to voters: the NLD is the only entity capable of ensuring the state moves towards democracy. While the NLD is hugely popular, winning two-thirds of the available seats to secure an absolute majority in the parliament (to offset the 25 per cent allotted to the military) is a tall order. Throughout the campaign Suu Kyi has been careful not to alienate two powerful entities: the Tatmadaw and the Bamar Buddhist majority. She has avoided criticising those in uniform, promising to focus on national reconciliation rather than seeking ‘revenge’ for past grudges. This is because gaining the levers of power and governance depends not only on an electoral victory but on accommodation with the military.

The USDP is the primary electoral rival of the NLD in the seat-rich centre of the country, an area overwhelmingly populated by the Bamar. To deflect focus away from their relationship with the military, the USDP has employed identity political strategies targeting the Muslim minority. These have been promoted and supported by Ma Ba Tha, with many of its prominent leaders having officially endorsed the USDP.

Ma Ba Tha has become an influential political organisation that accuses Muslims of threatening Buddhism’s privileged position and affiliation with the state as a whole. Discrimination against Muslims (specifically Rohingya Muslims) has mobilised popular support amongst Bamar Buddhists, intimidating the NLD from speaking out for fear of alienating them. With ethnic minority electorates accounting for approximately one-third of the contested seats, ethnic parties may hold the balance of power if there is no clear majority winner in the election. A number of ethnic parties are undertaking formal arrangements to become a pseudo-parliamentary bloc, which would aggregate their individually small seat shares into a significant voting group.

The upcoming election may be a ‘lose-lose’ affair for all involved. The next parliament will most likely be comprised of members outside the regime, making it increasingly difficult for the military to protect their privileged position and powers. The USDP may end up with a trivial lump of seats, which may question their relevancy as a political entity. The NLD may not be able to win an absolute majority. With Suu Kyi remaining barred from the presidency, the NLD may have to negotiate the election of another presidential candidate (such as Thein Sein or Thura Shwe Mann, whom remains a powerful political figure) acceptable to the military. Ethnic parties may not get the seat numbers desired and have no real influence over the main Bamar-dominated political entities.

But if Myanmar is moving towards a more competitive system — not a fully functioning democratic polity but one where there exists the real possibility of power being transferred to those outside the ruling regime — one would expected a messy post-electoral landscape. The growing number and diversification of various political actors will most likely result in a confusing array of shifting alliances and short-term agreements that necessitate political compromises from all involved.

Such an environment would erase characterisations of the political arena as a contest between the monolithic groupings of democrats and reformers on one side and the military and their allies on the other. The development of new interests, relationships and perhaps even identities in this evolving political dynamic may be signalling slow progress towards a system capable of addressing Myanmar’s decades of conflict, economic stagnation, and virulent social and ethnic tensions.

Adam P. MacDonald is an independent researcher based in Halifax, Canada.