Southeast Asia is now undoubtedly at a unique moment in its history. ASEAN is nothing like its predecessor, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which was essentially an effort to regionalise a collective defence NATO-like mechanism in the context of the Cold War. Today, the Association is a respectable, ten-country regional organisation that occupies the driver’s seat of an amalgamated network of regional frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asian Summit. Following the end of the Six-Party Talks in 2009, ASEAN has drawn attention as the most promising venue left for regionalism and security cooperation.
Yet ASEAN members have been struggling to find areas of agreement when it comes to the increasing tensions over the SCS dispute. To start with, only four ASEAN member states — the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia (and possibly now Indonesia) — have ongoing territorial disputes with China over the SCS. But none of the ASEAN claimants with overlapping claims have recognised each other’s claims. Nor is there is any ad hoc approach or an ASEAN Troika to resolve this matter.
Meanwhile, China remains ASEAN’s largest trading partner and the largest trading entity of many of its member states. Those without a direct stake in the SCS maritime disputes are therefore opposed to antagonising China over such an issue which, in their view, does not concern them. This is quite clearly the position China wants its neighbours to adopt. China has been eager to downplay the role of ASEAN, and multilateral mechanisms on the whole, in containing the dispute.
ASEAN’s overall weakness in addressing the SCS dispute also lies in the fact that this organisation lacks an enforcement court or tribunal. The ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism is, for all intents and purposes, redundant since it is subject to parties’ consent on such measures; an opposed party can thus prevent the ASEAN High Council from being formed.
To date, ASEAN’s standard rhetoric is that ‘ASEAN leaders will not internationalise the SCS dispute’, since it wishes to remain neutral in this dispute. But for ASEAN to remain aloof from the SCS issue is illogical and impossible. Very recently, the meeting of regional defence ministers on 4 November 2015 — in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Malaysia — failed to issue a joint declaration as scheduled for the first time. This is allegedly due to an attempt by China to block mentions of its assertiveness in the SCS.
ASEAN is handling the conflict in line with regional objectives and also as its normative and pragmatic interests dictate. The customary ‘ASEAN Way’ and its ‘slow but sure’ approach might hinder the Association from offering a decisive response to a series of post-Cold War issues that member states have not encountered before.
ASEAN should enhance the adoption of the official Code of Conduct as an extension from the non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. And it should make use of China’s official advocacy of a ‘dual track approach’. This approach envisages firstly the handling of bilateral disputes by the countries directly concerned through negotiation; and secondly the maintenance of peace and stability in the SCS though the efforts of China and ASEAN as a whole. In practice, though, the conceptual dichotomy of the dual tracks is less clear-cut.
In economic terms, with a combined population of over 600 million, ASEAN has the potential to become the fourth biggest economy by 2030. The current Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks include just four ASEAN member states: Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Some ASEAN members have shown reluctance in joining the talks because of the demanding requirements for regulatory convergence in areas such as intellectual property rights, state-owned enterprises and competition. With the escalation of SCS disputes, divergent interests and deteriorating diplomatic relations have put a strain on ASEAN and China’s joint efforts toward economic integration.
ASEAN’s position on the SCS issue so far has been somewhat ambiguous. Security and stability in the SCS is critical for both Southeast Asia and for ASEAN as an organisation, yet ASEAN has failed to take the initiative in resolving tensions. While the territorial dispute in the SCS is highly complex, a piecemeal approach would be a pragmatic first step towards a long-term solution.
With potential security threats arising across the region, it is vital that ASEAN further its dispute settlement capacity, in order to serve the region’s core interests — namely regional peace and stability, as well as multilateralism.
Chau Bao Nguyen is a PhD candidate in Politics at University of East Anglia (UK), and a lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
A great analysis but a little bit biased.
In case, the nuance escapes anyone, the
conundrum in the current disputes in the South China Sea surfaced when Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei ignored the Treaty of Peace of 28 April 1952, when Japan returned the Spratly and Paracel islands to the ROC, by extension, China, under the one-China policy, which was even recognized by president Nixon in 1972, in the ‘Three Communiques’in which he signed in Beijing.
The facts to note first are that none of the Asian or European states challenged or objected to the Treaty of Peace in 1952.
Vietnam was still a colony of France, Malaya and Brunei were colonies of Britain in 1952, but the Philippines had her indepdencence in 1946 and she did not object to the Treaty of Peace.
After independence, these four Asean states started to grab China’s territories, when the propspect of crude oil was “suddenly” announced by the UN survey team circa 1970 (without China’s participation) to deliberatrly cause chaos and a mad rush for oil stakes in the South China Sea.
It was akin to shouting “Fire!” in a cinema.
Vietnam grabbed 29 features and produced over 1 billion barrels of oil in the last 40 years. But she wants more.
The Philippines grabbed many features in 1978 via an illegal presidential decree issued by the corrupt President Ferdinand Marcos.
Malaysia grabbed 6 features (which the Philippines disagree to some) as its continental shelf territory which has no basis under Unlos as it does not grants sovereignty after it came into force circa 1992.
Brunei grabbed only one, the Louisa reef.
The Philippines has brazenly taken China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration to
sanctify its illegal claims. But that will come to nothing as under Unclos China does not have to attend such a proceeding.
Despite of that China has consistently reiterated its readiness to solve the disputes in the SCS bilaterally, in a peaceful way.
This was reiterated many times and especially at the EAS only yesterday in Kuala Lumpur, at the Apec summit on 19 Nov and in Singapore on 7 Nov.
China even proposed to explore joint developments. But the four recalcitrant refused to budge. It fell on deaf ears.
To show why bilateral negotiations worked, the China-Vietnam Land Border Delimitation Treaty‟ was signed on 30 December 1999, based largely on the 1887 and 1895 Sino-Franco Conventions.
And on 30 June 2004, China and Vietnam ratified the Maritime Boundary Agreement for the Tonkin Gulf (Beibu Gulf) and a Fisheries Cooperation Agreement for the said Gulf, signed on 25 December 2000.
Initially there was a 11-dash line but two dashes were removed when China and Vietnam agreed on the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin.
In the future it is foreseeable that when Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei come to their senses and sign a Maritime Delimitation Agreement each with China, there will be no need for the 9-dash line which is a loose boundary line.
Bilateral negotiation is ONLY the way to go.
Angst and legal disputes are a waste of energy time and they only benefit those, like Uncle Sam, who wants to divide and rule and create chaos in the South China Sea.
China is about to launch the ‘One Belt and One Road’ mega projects and it’s time for Asean to get its act together or else it will miss the proverbial boat.
It seems to me that this analysis is biased in favor of China.
Of course it prefers bilateral negotiations with the ASEAN countries objecting to its policies and actions in the SCS because it is clearly the larger and more powerful country. Ie, it believes it can force its will onto the smaller, weaker countries in a bilateral situation. Thus, a smaller, weaker country like the Philippines seeks redress through an international body as a way to shore up its efforts to gain what it believes is a fair resolution.
Claiming that the UN discovered the oil ‘to create chaos’ in the region is a bit paranoid, don’t you think? Wasn’t the oil discovered in the context of technological advances which made this possible? I doubt that the UN or any other body or government deliberately held back this information from 1945-1970, for example. It is much more likely that the info only became known in the 1960’s as geological technology advanced.
I am not sure it is a ‘mad rush to get oil stakes’ if the oil has been known about for 45 years. Rather this situation has been evolving into its current state of dispute.
Say what you like, Richard but you have to face the fact that in “the Treaty of Peace of 28 April 1952, Japan returned the Spratly and Paracel islands to the ROC, by extension, China, under the one-China policy, which was even recognized by president Nixon in 1972, in the ‘Three Communiques’ in which he signed in Beijing.”
The Philippines is the thief and yet China had proposed to negotiate with it for a joint development and though President Gloria Magapagal agreed, this was reversed by the Aquino administration. She is now in jail.
How could the UN survey the SCS without China’s approval? (Read US survey).
To unilaterally announce the oil find had only one objective — to cause a rush for islands by the littoral states so that US and UK oil companies could fund them and loot China’s resources in the SCS.
There is no dispute. The islands belong to China and were returned to China by Japan in the Treaty of Peace in 1952. .
The overall problem in the SCS is the lack of leadership by Barack Obama. While ASEAN is an alliance of countries, the United States is the backbone of the alliance and it takes direction from the US.
I expect the 2016 election in the US will be a major factor in the direction disputes in the SCS are settled and the alliance will once again find itself properly led.
Not only does China need to be challenged on its overly aggressive activities in the SCS, the US needs to hold China responsible for cyber activities and copyright violations… we have dealt with China for too long with kid gloves.
1 “Not only does China need to be challenged on its overly aggressive activities in the SCS”
The only party that is overly aggressive is the US for flying two B52 bombers and sailing a warship to China’s territorial space and water.
2 “the US needs to hold China responsible for cyber activities and copyright violations… ”
According to Edward Snowden the US is the king of cyber spying all over the world.
3 “we have dealt with China for too long with kid gloves.”
What do you propose? WW3? It’s MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction.