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The case for Japan’s new security strategy

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US General Robert B. Neller, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pose for photographers prior to a meeting at Abe's official residence in Tokyo, 25 November 2015. (Photo AAP)

In Brief

On 27 April 2015 the Japanese and US governments approved the revised Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation. Subsequently, on 19 September 2015, the Japanese Diet passed a package of security legislation aimed at enhancing Japan’s role in maintaining international security.

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The Guidelines and the defence bills will move Japan towards a robust and functioning security posture that is better able to cope with complicated international situations.

The Guidelines enable many new initiatives that will enhance cooperation between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and US Forces (USF). The most important among them is the establishment of a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). This body, comprised of senior officials from Japan and the US, is tasked with both sharing information during peacetime and coordinating bilateral crisis management.

While there have been organisations similar to the ACM before, most were established on an ad hoc or case-by-case basis. Continuous coordination is essential for establishing a functioning bilateral security posture. The ACM elevates the Japan–US alliance to NATO’s level, where all necessary coordination is maintained on a 24/7 basis.

Another significant tenet of the Guidelines is the elimination of geographical constraints on SDF–USF operations. During the execution of operations, an objective area such as ‘the region surrounding Japan’ is usually set for practical purposes. But removing geographical constraints makes particular sense when taking into account the increasingly global nature of Japan’s national interests. The elimination of geographical constraints will provide the Japanese government with more flexibility to make vital security decisions.

But there is still room for future improvement in SDF–USF relations. For one, the Guidelines seem to over-emphasise Japanese territorial defence. How Japan and the US will jointly respond to other features of Japan’s defence, such as economic survival and the safe arrival of USF reinforcements in the area, remains ambiguous. It is also unclear whether strategic mission sharing and force posture between the SDF and USF will be firmly maintained.

A second area of concern is the weak consideration given to China’s anti-access/area denial (A2AD) strategy. It is appropriate not to single out China or A2AD, but this strategy is a major cause of instability in East Asia. The Guidelines should therefore have incorporated some provisions regarding how the Japan–US alliance will approach it.

The Japanese government’s new security legislation also seeks to realise new defence initiatives that will improve Japan’s future security environment.

The new security legislation has sparked controversy both within Japan and internationally. But the scope of the change that the Japanese government introduced is not as radical as has been widely reported. Some newspapers in Japan suggest that the government has made thoroughgoing changes to the long-standing policy of ‘individual self-defence’ by fully introducing ‘collective self-defence’. In reality this is not true as collective self-defence will only be exercised in limited forms.

Several new initiatives in the defence legislation have nothing to do with collective self-defence. They simply expand the scope and range of the SDF’s operations in order to better contribute to the international community. Such operations remain within the current security framework. One noteworthy initiative is new standing legislation that enables the Japanese government to deploy the SDF for international peace-keeping operations during contingencies. Due to an absence of related standing laws, the government has previously had to pass new legislation to cope with crises in a case-by-case manner. The new legislation will enable the SDF to participate in international security efforts far more promptly and effectively than before.

Another significant issue that the legislation addressed was that of logistic support provided by the SDF to foreign forces — both to the US and others. The legislation allows Japan to provide rear-area logistic support to foreign forces that are engaged in military operations not involving a direct attack on Japan, but where there is a great potential for serious impact on Japan’s security.

The most significant, and controversial, issue in the defence bills is the recognition of Japan’s right to exercise limited forms of collective self-defence under the conditions defined by the UN Charter. The most important prerequisites for employing forces for collective self-defence under the new security legislation are either a direct armed attack against Japan or an armed attack against a nation with close relations to Japan, such as the US. In the latter case, there must be a clear indication that an attack on friendly forces could eventually threaten Japanese lives or impinge on their right to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’. Because of this condition, cases where the SDF could realistically exercise collective self-defence will be limited.

What is important for Japan and the US is that the right to exercise collective self-defence — even in a limited manner — will open the way to more robust SDF–USF bilateral operations. In this context, real enhancement of bilateral operations will depend upon the Japanese government soundly evaluating whether situations warrant collective self-defence or not.

Even though the new security legislation has been passed, SDF–USF relations still require further improvements. The US and Japan must resolve further difficulties, including how to respond to so-called grey zone scenarios, Japan’s limited ability to pursue collective self-defence and its prohibitively high threshold for individual self-defence. As the SDF gains operational experience, the Japanese government should take necessary corrective actions.

To realise the objectives of the renewed Guideline and security legislation the Japanese government must immediately increase Japan’s defence budget. From the late 1990s to 2012, Japan’s defence budget was slightly but continuously reduced by 0.5–1 per cent each year. While this reduction looked small annually, the cumulative effects undermined the capabilities of the SDF substantially.

The Abe government should also act to transform the current SDF–USF bilateral planning mechanism. Japan and the US should work together to develop functioning operation plans to fully meet real national and regional security situations. Previously, bilateral operational planning has been rather perfunctory and bureaucratic, and has overly focused on avoiding political disputes in Japan to the detriment of developing practical operational plans. Unless this is changed, Japan will be unable to establish a more functional security posture.

Despite the remaining challenges, these two significant defence policy initiatives are steps in the right direction. They will surely send the right signals to potential adversaries, and will help Japan and the US develop new and functional deterrence mechanisms.

Yoji Koda is the former Commander in Chief of Japan’s Self-Defence Fleet and is currently an advisor to the National Security Secretariat of the Japanese government.

An earlier version of this article was first published here by the Association of Japanese Institutions of Strategic Studies.

One response to “The case for Japan’s new security strategy”

  1. The notions that collective self defense operations will be’limited’and based on a thorough analysis are not something that history would support. The road to larger and potentially open ended, complex, and dangerous operations based on hysteria rather than careful and thorough analysis is all too common over the last 50+ years. The decision making that would determine that Japan’s interests were at stake is anything but objective. Pressures from the USA would all too easily lead Japan into problematic joint operations. All one has to do is look at the wars in Vietnam or Iraq/Afghanistan or the one now going on in Syria to see where this kind of thinking can lead.

    Mr. Yoda’s employment as a military man explains his readiness to put such a positive spin on Abe’s CSD. Those outside of the military/security establishment in Japan offer a very different, more sober perspective.

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