In Taiwan’s electoral process, there is a period of more than three months between the beginning of the new legislature and the inauguration of the next president. This transition period can be turbulent, with both the introduction of a new mandate and the possibility of semi-presidential political paralysis.

Perhaps the most likely election outcome is that Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, will win an absolute majority of votes and the DPP will become the ruling party with more than half of the seats in the new parliament.

Another strong possibility is that Tsai could win more than 50 per cent of presidential votes while the DPP falls short of absolute control in the Legislative Yuan. But, with the help of ideologically-aligned small parties like the New Power Party and Taiwan Solidarity Union, the ‘pan-green coalition’ would still have sufficient seats to support Tsai’s political agenda in the parliament.

Should Eric Chu of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) turn the tide and score an upset win, two other scenarios may occur that would lead to a divided government. Chu could win the presidency while the DPP receives an absolute majority of seats. Or a Chu presidential victory could come alongside a parliament dominated by a pan-green coalition.

If Chu wins the presidency but not a legislative majority for the KMT, he will have to nominate a premier that enjoys the confidence of a parliament that is not under KMT control. In both cases, this would mean that a semi-presidential system of co-habitation — where a president must appoint a premier from a different party — would become a new political reality for Taiwan. Chu would then be in charge of foreign relations, cross-Strait ties and national defence, while the DPP and its allies would handle the economy and other domestic issues.

The possibility of Tsai winning the presidency and a Chinese nationalist ‘pan-blue coalition’ controlling parliament in 2016 is very remote, as is the possibility of Chu becoming president with a pan-green coalition dominating the Legislative Yuan. Since new members of parliament will assume office on 1 February and the inauguration of the new president won’t take place until 20 May, months of political uncertainty lie ahead.

Before 2012, Taiwan’s voters went to separate elections to choose their legislators and president. In order to save time and money, the two elections were combined four years ago. This did not lead to any problems in 2012, as Ma won re-election and the KMT maintained a comfortable majority in the Legislative Yuan. 2016 is shaping up to be a different story.

The lengthy transition period raises the key question of whether the KMT cabinet under Premier Mao Chi-kuo should continue to rule until 20 May even though the party will likely lose its majority in parliament. Fortunately, President Ma has previously indicated, before the 2012 elections, that he intends to respect the majority of the legislature when nominating the premier.

With the polls quickly approaching, there have been reports that Ma is willing to work with DPP leadership to find a candidate for premier that is acceptable to the likely pan-green legislative majority for this transition period. In other words, a reshuffle of the cabinet with the DPP running the government could happen in the last 100 days of Ma’s presidency. Though there is no constitutional provision for such an arrangement, Ma should be lauded for creating the precedent for one if he chooses to do so.

It is remarkable that Tsai Ing-wen did not respond favourably to this overture. Instead the DPP deemed it a campaign ploy adopted by the KMT to appeal to its core supporters and mobilise voters. Politically, Tsai’s response is hard to fathom. If the DPP is sure of its victory and considers KMT rule to be disastrous for Taiwan, the party should assume political responsibility and appoint a premier from its own ranks. After all, how can a KMT premier continue to govern when his own party loses the majority in the parliament and is rejected by the electorate?

There are some possible political reasons for the DPP’s unusual position on this issue. The party may not want to be perceived as arrogant by openly arranging a transfer of power before securing the presidential election. If the DPP say yes to Ma’s proposal, this could prompt a slew of questions surrounding the appointment of the premier and whether Tsai already has a candidate in mind for each cabinet post.

In the likely event of a DPP victory, the party should take the helm of government as soon as possible, with Tsai assuming the position of premier as a warm-up for the presidency. In this role, Tsai could shape her own cabinet before finding someone to succeed her in May. Then, Tsai can retain the heads of the three ministries considered to be the political realm of the president — the Minister of National Defense, the head of the Mainland Affairs Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

It seems that Ma is willing to learn from François Mitterrand of France in introducing the principle of cohabitation to Taiwan’s political framework. He should be applauded for setting up such a constitutional precedent. Tsai should follow the footstep of Jacques Chirac in assuming the position of premier. Such an experience would be immensely valuable for Tsai when she appoints the succeeding premier and would help ensure good working relations into the future.

Chen-shen Yen is a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan.