In the United States, Congress passed almost unanimously (with 96–0 in the Senate and 418–2 in the House of Representatives) a bill mandating new economic and financial sanctions on North Korea as well as on third-country entities that support Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. US Secretary of State John Kerry initiated a high profile campaign to convince China to support muscular sanctions against the North Korea in a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR).
Japan has tightened its policies, banning DPRK ships from its ports and further constraining remittances to North Korea. And South Korea has closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the last high profile symbol of the Sunshine Policy era. Despite Chinese complaints and foot-dragging, it appears that the UNSC will pass its first new sanctions resolution against North Korea in several years.
There are, of course, good reasons to impose additional costs on Pyongyang for its nuclear and missile programs. Its recent tests are in direct violation of existing UNSCRs and such violations of international law cannot be treated with impunity. It is important for other proliferators to see that the costs for violating key non-proliferation agreements are high. And sanctions should be used to prevent Pyongyang from obtaining outside technology or material for its nuclear weapons.
Inaction appears more dangerous than it did before. Experts now believe that North Korea is within reach of a viable nuclear arsenal. A recent study by the US–Korea Institute predicts that by 2020 the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal will grow from its current 10 warheads to somewhere between 20 and 100 warheads. A small number of those warheads mounted on delivery vehicles would be capable of reaching distant targets, including the United States mainland. This will create strategic strains on US allies in Asia.
While something needs to be done, acceptable actions are hard to come by in Washington. Negotiations with Pyongyang are anathema to the right and politically damaging to the sitting administration, which would face attacks for ‘appeasing’ North Korea during a presidential election year. South Korean President Park’s recent speech to the ROK Congress forcefully closed the door on dialogue on that front as well. Military measures to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program look both infeasible and risky to all parties. Sanctions alone enjoy bipartisan support in Washington.
But is it realistic to expect sanctions to compel North Korea to give up its nuclear and missile programs, or are we in a position equivalent to a carpenter with a hammer but no nails? If so sanctions would be able to make a lot of noise and do a bit of damage, but produce no useful outcome.
There are a number of factors that make it very difficult to rely primarily on sanctions in the North Korean case. The Kim regime can shift the pain of broad-based sanctions away from the elite; already vulnerable ordinary North Koreans are most hurt. And, unlike Iran, North Korea already has a nuclear arsenal and a nuclear strategy. Sanctions at this stage cannot prevent a nuclear North Korea.
China is the only country with real sanctions leverage on the North Korea as 75 per cent of all its foreign trade is with China. But China is hesitant to use this leverage. Even if China did agree to use its leverage, the response of the Kim regime (or its collapse) could precipitate a severe international crisis. Coercing China to pressure North Korea through US unilateral sanctions poses serious risks to the global economy and stability in Asia.
Until Beijing can be persuaded to use its leverage against Pyongyang, it seems very unlikely that sanctions can be sufficiently strong to force the Kim regime to halt its build-up of nuclear weapons. It may be necessary to respond to North Korea’s tests with sanctions, but we should not expect a fundamental change of course in Pyongyang. Instead the current round of sanctions, and the new allied military deployments in the region, should be used as a basis for the broader international community to persuade China to use its leverage with North Korea in the future. That future might appear after the US elections, when a new administration might be willing to revive negotiations.
Ambassador Joseph DeThomas is a Professor of International Affairs at the Pennsylvania State University. He previously served as US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation from 1999–2001 and as an advisor for sanctions in the US Department of State from 2010–2013.
Mr DeThomas gives us several reasons why “strategic patience” has failed, and tells us that “inaction appears more dangerous than it did before” but at the end tells us to wait for China to take action. And after 22 years of failed negotiations the latest a month ago when North Korea would not allow nuclear weapons even to be discussed. Mr DeThomas hopes that “a new administration might be willing to revive negotiations.” Then he tells us that doing anything might endanger the world economy or stability in Asia. I don’t think any financial action North Korea might take with it’s 15 billion dollar economy could effect the world. So he must be referring to North Korean terrorism or war. If North Korea is forced to choose between regime survival and nuclear weapons, they will choose survival. Now all the world needs is some leaders with a little courage a little decency and some common sense, and as Granny used to say good luck with that.
I would underscore Dennis’ points by noting the following. Unless it is willing to ‘go to the mat’ China may not have that much leverage with N Korea. Ie, it must be willing to shut off almost all trade and then keep its borders closed so NK residents cannot flood into China. Even then it would take some time before NK might see the writing on the wall and give up its nuclear capabilities. This is admittedly a high risk strategy. NK might decide to use its weapons against SK, Japan, or the US if it feels backed up against a wall like this. Is the world ready to risk this?!?
Richard, something bad might happen if pressure is applied to North Korea, however every year the risk of something bad goes up, so it is better to take action now. China has absolute power over North Korea, they supply almost all their oil and are more than 80% of their trade. If China were to stop aid and trade with the North, they would survive a matter of weeks or a few months. China should not return North Koreans fleeing but allow them to go to South Korea. Returning these refugees to North Korea where they face murder, torture, rape and imprisonment is a crime against humanity and the Chinese officials who do this should be sent to the Hague for trail. It appears that China has agreed to stronger sanctions in the UN, however I believe they might talk a good game but in the end they will not apply real pressure on the North. With new US sanctions and the closure of Kaesong and Japanese actions the pressure on the North is increasing. Kim will be under pressure to do something, it is not in his nature to back down but taking action will only make matters worse. Look for some major cyber attacks coming out of North Korea or should I say the Chinese hotel the North Korean hackers work out of.
Dennis
The game changer should come from US, not China. You say NK leadership will choose survival over nuclear weapons, but it is past decades of US actions effectively boxed NK into the situation that the Nuke IS survival.
The truth of the matter is that the US has been way too aggressive overseas over the decades its viewed as THREAT, not deterrent. As we speak US is arming “moderate rebels” in Syria violating basic tenants of sovereignty. In an alternative universe NK leadership could have been convinced they are safe within their sovereignty and if they do pursue nuclear weapons or overt militarization they would be deemed a threat and whole world community will be up in arms. However what the US has done actually makes NK look rational and somewhat reasonable under the circumstances.
How convenient it is for people to point out China’s economic leverage over NK and ask China to do more, but this is a mixing of issues; the fundamental cause of the problem on the Korean peninsula is security issue, and its the US that should do its part to lower security tensions. Why should China spend its resources in a way that does not even solve the fundamental issue, but just covers for US policy failure?