, Japan has only managed an average growth rate of 1 per cent since the early 1990s. This declining trend has been driven by Japan’s considerable demographic challenges.
Japan’s dependency ratio — that is, the proportion of non-working-age to working-age people in the total population — was in decline up until the 1970s, which led to a ‘population bonus’ or demographic dividend and high GDP growth. It eventually stabilised in the 1980s, as did GDP growth. But since the 1990s the dependency ratio has been on the rise again, leading to a period of ‘population onus’ and economic stagnation.
Population ageing is a significant demographic issue for Japan and a common feature among developed economies. With high GDP per capita, people live longer and choose to invest more in their children’s education. Often this results in couples’ deciding to have fewer children and, therefore, a decline in the fertility ratio. As the share of elderly people to the total population increases so does the social security burden on the working generation, which can discourage investment.
There are several factors that exacerbate the negative impacts of population ageing in Japan, compared to other developed countries.
One factor is the age-specific nature of Japanese workplaces. In large companies, employees are promoted based on their years of service to a particular firm and wages are set based on their seniority. This system has become increasingly costly due to the increasing share of senior employees in firms. Combined with the commitment to long-term employment, this means that Japanese firms have heavy fixed employment costs that gradually squeeze profits.
Although the labour force participation rate of the elderly is particularly high in Japan, employees are still required to retire at 60 years in most large firms. This not only constitutes age-based discrimination, but is also a waste of human resources. Most elderly workers are re-employed in a fixed term contract at least to age 65 in the same firm, but they are generally not assigned to responsible positions in the firm. The increase in elderly workers compounds the high ratio of non-regular workers.
Japanese women are similarly poorly utilised in the labour market, despite their high education levels. In 2015, the female labour force participation rate of 25–44 year olds was 74.4 per cent compared with 95.3 per cent for males. This reflects a typical lifecycle pattern where women leave the labour force to rear children. The gap in human capital investment in women, compared with men, is a major reason for why just 10 per cent of managers in Japanese companies are female.
On top of this, Japan still maintains a negative attitude towards foreign workers despite its sharply diminishing labour force. The basic immigration policy accepts professional workers but refuses to embrace unskilled workers. This policy is inconsistent with Japanese firms’ needs and has resulted in de facto unskilled foreign workers — who are employed as ‘trainees’ — having to return unwillingly to their home countries after 3–5 years. This is undesirable for both the foreign workers and the firms employing them.
Economic growth does not solely depend on demographic factors alone and long-term economic stagnation is avoidable. With appropriate structural reform, the declining labour force growth and ageing population can actually be harnessed as potential sources of future economic growth.
One useful reform would be to enforce equal pay for equal work. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has in fact has become an advocate of this. Of course, the adaptation of such a reform should be flexible. Mechanically applying the principle of wage equality is not necessarily the answer. Rather, it may be sufficient to simply ask the employer to justify the existence of wage differentiation, including, for example, across different age groups. This would shift the burden of proof from the employees to the employers and provide an important step towards pay equality.
Current immigration policy also needs to be revised. Unskilled foreign workers coming to Japan to undertake traineeships have to be accepted as skilled workers after the completion of their training period. Currently foreign trainees fall under the Official Development Aid program, which provides training to foreigners who will work for their own countries. Recently there has been some progress towards this reform; foreign workers are now allowed to undertake household activities within National Strategic Special Zones.
While Japanese growth is stalled, persistent economic stagnation is not a given. But breaking the upper income trap will require Japan to overcome entrenched institutional barriers and harness its ageing population. If Japan is to succeed strong political leadership is crucial.
Naohiro Yashiro is a visiting professor of economics at the Showa Women’s University, Tokyo.
This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Stuck in the middle?’.
So far Abe’s ‘advocacy’ for equal pay for equal work has been all talk and practically no real action. To ask companies to voluntarily pay women equal pay will accomplish little. They will be very adept at rationalizing their pay discrimination if ‘the burden is shifted onto’ them.
The ‘strong political leadership’ called for here could involve passing laws that REQUIRE equal pay for equal work. Or at least tax incentives which reward companies for doing this. Will Abe stand up to the criticism he would receive from large corporations for such leadership?
Allowing people to work past the age of 60 and modifying immigration policies would also be seen as ‘radical’ changes. Especially the immigration policy because the Japanese are extremely ethnocentric. Can Abe marshal the fortitude he would need to push these things through the Diet? He does have a large majority right now?
Thank you for your comment. The concept of “equal work” is not clear in the Japanese labor market which is not occupationally based. Regular workers are assigned various jobs in the large firm in exchange for their employment security. Large male-female wage gap arises from their job differences, not the wage differences in the same job. Thus, the new legislation would not be so effective. Actually, it is not only large corporations but large labor unions which oppose to any reform in the current Japanese employment practices.
As for immigration policy, the major opponent is the LDP, so that the large majority in the Diet does not promise any radical changes by PM Abe.
What about hiring the lost generation of Japan and put them to work?
Although demographic factors are important factors to unleash Japan’s aggregate productivity as a whole, there would be other important factors that are equally important if more so. For example, Japan seems to have fallen behind in the competition of contemporary technologies such as smart mobile phones, for example. Japan used to be very innovative, but it has lost much of its edge in the past two decades or so, it seems.
It would be important to understand the reasons behind those sort of issues.