Peer reviewed analysis from world leading experts

What might a new Asian order look like?

Reading Time: 6 mins
US President Barack Obama, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other world leaders pose for a photograph at the end of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington, DC, United States, 1 April 2016. (Photo: AAP).

In Brief

In numerous essays, Hugh White has argued that the US-led Asia Pacific order, which he rightly views as a source of peace and growing prosperity over the past seventy years, is increasingly outmoded.

Share

  • A
  • A
  • A

Share

  • A
  • A
  • A

As daily events in the South China Sea attest, the current order is increasingly contested. White fears an Asia caught in the middle of a dangerous US–China rivalry that could spark conflict between the two nuclear powers.

White argues that ‘It is too easy to assume that the only alternative to US primacy in Asia is Chinese primacy’. Instead, Asian leaders need to think creatively as ‘there are many other possible foundations for a new Asian order, which would serve the interests of all of us, including the United States and China’.

Perhaps. On the economic order, it is not difficult to envision an accommodation of US and Chinese interests. China has worked within the WTO system. The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership are not incompatible and over time hold the prospect for integration.

China is not challenging the IMF. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which some feared Beijing would push as an alternative to the Bretton Woods system, appears to be on a trajectory to define its structure, governance and transparency as being compatible with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (with whom it is already pursuing co-financing). Clearly the ‘win–win’ vision of an integrated, inclusive Asia Pacific economic order is feasible, if not already taking shape.

But even as regional economic integration continues apace, the regional security situation is marked by increasing defence budgets, confrontation and rising nationalistic territorial disputes. It is here that the competing US and Chinese visions of the regional order are sharply defined with no resolution in sight. No one has yet offered a viable middle ground between the current US-centric architecture and Xi Jinping’s call for a new security architecture of ‘Asia for Asians’.

As for the present security architecture in the region, we are witnessing an evolution of the alliance structure from the Cold War ‘hub and spokes’ model to a more open architecture fostering bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with US allies and partners as well as between them. Within the partnership construct, the United States, Japan and Australia are working with countries bordering the South China Sea on initiatives aimed at maritime capacity building, enhanced maritime domain awareness, joint training, exercising and port calls.

Why is this happening? In effect China’s assertive nationalist behaviour, both military and diplomatic, after the global financial crisis has sparked a bandwagon effect among Asian states, pushing them toward the United States and each other. Take for example the behaviour of then Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi in 2010, after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered US assistance to resolve South China Sea disputes. After his walk out in response to the Secretary’s presentation, Yang returned later to remind the Southeast Asian nations that ‘China is big. You’re small. That’s a fact’.

There is a growing recognition that when China pushes against US and Asian interests, the latter will push back. In effect what’s been driving the evolution of the region’s security architecture is a combination of China’s Middle Kingdom efforts to reverse 160 years of ‘humiliation’ and signals from the region that they’re not necessarily interested in that reversal.

But White’s call is for creative alternatives to the present order. So what are these alternatives? Let’s start with a 21st century Treaty of Tordesillas. This would divide the Pacific between the United States and China. But where do you draw the line? Who gets what? Does a democratic South Korea wind up under Chinese suzerainty? Is Taiwan to be the price for regional stability?

The ‘Congress of Vienna’ option, which would formalise a concert of powers, presents similar problems. Can the United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea agree on a status quo? Are we to expect a resolution of the Taiwan issue and Korean unification? This is doubtful. And where do the lesser actors, such as Australia and the ASEAN states, fit in? Do they simply trust the great powers to get it right?

Another model is based on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but for the Asia-Pacific region. For US allies this could be a leap of faith, trading alliance-based security for something toothless. In Europe, OSCE has been a useful adjunct to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It is employed for monitoring elections and observing ceasefires, but lacks any real enforcement power. When push comes to shove, where are the sinews of security?

Finally we have the sphere of influence model. Imagine that under President Trump the United States issues a proclamation ending all entangling alliances. The United States gets the Western Hemisphere, China gets Asia and Russia gets Eastern Europe. How would the region respond? The likely consequences are a nuclear North Korea, a nuclear South Korea and a nuclear Japan. Not exactly a sphere of stability.

None of the above models are particularly appealing to either the United States or Asia. And it is difficult to envision a collective security model that includes both the United States and China.

The reality is that the current architecture continues to provide the region’s security and is proving flexible and adaptive to meet emerging challenges. White has a point in that no one has offered a viable answer to the question: what is an acceptable role for China in an Asia Pacific security architecture? Until disputes over Taiwan, the Korean peninsula and the South China Sea are resolved, perhaps the best that can be attained is a framework for strategic stability between the United States and China. In the meantime, to paraphrase Winston Churchill: the existing security architecture is the worst possible system — except for all the others.

Robert A. Manning is a senior fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council.

James Przystup is a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Security Studies. His views are his alone and do not represent the views or policies of the US government.

9 responses to “What might a new Asian order look like?”

  1. The reunification China impresses upon Taiwan is not a sacrifice by any means. Any respectable nation will pursue the same. An independent Taiwan is neither in the interest of the world – one additional problem really. If China grants Taiwan independence, there is a great possibility that Taiwan is more likely to embrace China more tightly than ever. US has too many client states to entertain Western Europeans, Japanese and Australians so where will Taiwan rank? Another example – trading USD is nothing new but trading RMB that’s a new horizon.

    Clearly China is eager to ride the existing world order than create new ones. Its US that keeps changing the goal post everytime China scores according to the rules. The world doesn’t need a new world order designed by China but should guide China into the existing one.

    A China-Australian strategic partnership and alliance is actually vital but so far no one has really given a serious thought to it.

  2. This article is really lacking of imagination, to say the least, because its real aim was probably to maintain the continued dominance of the US which they seem to have a strong interest.
    The rise of the US following Britain may serve as a path if the US and the authors will try to do what the British did when it faced challenges from the US.
    Could Britain in any way to stop the rise of the US and the change in the world order, given the economic power of the latter and its strengths in military or the ability to transform part of its economic power into military power if and when it was needed?
    Could there have been an alternative and better trajectory than what was then? Could Britain have possibly been able to contain the USA forever?
    Further, did all the former masters of former colonies adopted the best and fair strategies when their former colonies began to ask for independence? Were they really all caring the interests of those colonies instead of leaving some tricky and divisive legacies behind?
    Would that have always been justified to maintain the status quo at those times?
    One may like the certainty of the present time, but future will definitely be different from the present, although sometimes it is harder to predict what it will be exactly.

  3. The authors seem to think Asian people cannot come up with an Asian order that benefit all Asians. If that is true, they run the serious risk of being significantly under-estimating the intelligence and creativity of Asians.
    What might a new Asian order look like?
    Firstly, a simplest answer would be if the Americans are wise enough to not interfere with Asian affairs, that would be a big part of a new Asian order. Asians can live well by themselves without their interference. The US can do a rebalance back to its own country in America!
    Secondly, a new Asian order would be that where all Asian countries are proud members of their regional organisation and being respected not by each other themselves but by other interregional plays, big and small.
    Thirdly, a new Asian order would be where the Chinese, the Indians, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Russians, and ASEAN people and all other Asian people are masters of Asia and work together toward the rise of Asia, beyond the rise of of any single or small group of countries in Asia.
    Fourthly, the Americans, the Europeans are no longer able to arrogantly regard themselves as the first and second world and treat Asians as the third world people. They will not be able to monopoly that status for themselves.
    The above are elements of a new Asian order and of an Asian dream.
    It would be a proud Asian dream similar to but more that what King’s dream was, because Asians have shown some of that already.
    Yes, there are some Asians who like to beg their uncle Sam because it is now still the superpower but they don’t have true Asian characters.

  4. It is counter-productive to proclaim “Let’s start with a 21st century Treaty of Tordesillas”, the latter of which was set up by Pope Alexander VI to demarcate the New World, freshly “discovered” by Columbus in 1492, into Eastern and Western hemispheres, to be exploited by Spain and Portugal, for which the Vatican City allegedly was rewarded with 10% of the treasures “found”.

    Today, why would any nation want to ask the Pope to officiate a similar treaty in Asia?

    In the interest of a peaceful settlement of the South China Sea (SCS) disputes, why not start with the Treaty of Peace, signed between Japan and the Republic of China on 28 April 1952.

    Article 2 stated clearly:

    “It is recognised that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands.”

    http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm

    After all, it was ex-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton who pontificated on 23 July 2010 that “Legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features” never mind that the meddling Uncle Sam has persistently refused to ratify the UN Convention on the law of the sea, since it came into force in 1994.

    Since the US, Japan, Australia and all 10 Asean nations abide by the one-China policy, that Taiwan is a part of China, then by extension, the Spratly and Paracel islands have been denounced by Japan and returned to their rightly owner, China, on 28 April 1952.

    On 4 Sept 1958, China issued a Declaration that henceforth her territorial seas would be 12 nm, and that included the territorial seas in the Spratly and Paracel islands.

    The US, Japan, Australia, North Vietnam, France, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei did not raise any objection.

    In fact, on 14 Sept, Mr Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister of North Vietnam, wrote a letter to Premier Zhou En Lai and stated unequivocally “We have the honour to bring to your knowledge that the Government of the DRVN recognizes and supports the declaration dated 4th September, 1958 of the Government of the PRC fixing the width of the Chinese territorial waters…”.

    Later, he tried to vitiate his actions in the 16 March 1979 issue of the now defunct, Dow Jones-owned, Far Eastern Economic Review, by stating that he did what he did because it was ‘wartime’.

    But it was already on record that Mr Pham had stated on *15 June 1956*, to wit: “From (a) historical point of view, these islands (Spratlys and Paracels) are Chinese territories”, as disclosed in the same issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review.

    On 15 June 1956, North Vietnam’s Vice Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem also said “according to Vietnamese data, Xisha (Paracel) and Nansha (Spratly) Islands are historically part of Chinese territory”.

    The Acting Director of the Asian Department, Le Loc added, “judging from history, these islands were already part of China at the time of the Song Dynasty.

    When oil was discovered in the SCS by ECAFE in the late 1960s, Vietnam grabbed 29 features and today it is the third largest crude oil producer in the SCS, behind Malaysia, which grabbed 6 features and Brunei, one. China has yet to produce a single drop of oil in the SCS.

    President Ferdinand Marcos grabbed 9 features in the SCS on *11 June 1978*, using Presidential Decree 1596. Was that legal and rule-based? No.

    Despite of the above alienation of China’s territories in the SCS, China is willing to negotiate with each claimant in a peaceful manner, to the satisfaction of both sides.

    Why is Uncle Sam still not satisfied?

  5. The authors of this post states in its concluding paragraph the following: ‘The reality is that the current architecture continues to provide the region’s security and is proving flexible and adaptive to meet emerging challenges.’
    One should not forget the Korean war, the Vietnam war and more recently the Iraq war. They were all brought about by the then dominant power or powers . Were they waged for a justinternational cause for peace? Who were the victors? Did Asia gain or suffer from those wars?
    This history should serve as a caution whenever circles within a dominant power tries to justify the continuation of the current security regime in Asia.

  6. What might a new Asian order look like under China’s leadership?

    1 For a start, China will put to an end to the so-called ‘endless wars’, hatched and executed by Uncle Sam and the Neo-cons since 9/11.

    2 A Chinese leadership could do away with nuclear weapons from Planet Earth for good, as has been proposed by China, ad nauseum.

    3 There will be peaceful settlements in the disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea, as President Xi Jinping has pledged on 7 Nov last year that ‘a strong China will never bully any weak nation and a rich China will never humiliate any poor nation’.

    (Can President Obama or Prime Minister Abe make the same pledge to bring peace to Planet Earth, when the former is now bombing 7 nations and the later has persistently denied Japan’s wartime atrocities and horrible crimes against humanity against the ‘Comfort Women’ and continues to worship at the Yasukuni shrine, where 14 Class A Japanese war criminals were buried? No.)

    4 China is, by far, the biggest beneficiary of 70 years of Peace in Asia and Freedom of Navigation (FON) in the SCS. Why would China rock the boat now, when FON in the SCS is an absolute must if the Maritime Silk Road, initiated by China, to create wealth from China to the 10 Asean nations, India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Greece and the EU, is to be successful?

    5 China plans to double her GDP, from the year 2010 to 2020, to 93 trillion RMB, using the mathematical rule of 72. To achieve its 2020 GDP objective, China only needs a GDP growth of a minimum of 6.5per cent from now onward.

    In sharp contrast, by 2030, the US National Debt could soar past US$30 trillion, if the current debt-trend and Uncle Sam’s endless wars continue unabated..

    6 A successful China will bring positive benefits for all commodity-producing nations like Australia, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Iran, Canada, South Africa and other Opec nations.

    (Other the other hand, a hard landing in China’s economy will topple the 1.5 quadrillion dollar ‘Derivatives Monster’ in the West and ALL the big banks in the US, UK and the EU will fall like a ton of bricks, ushering in the next Great Depression.)

    7 China has launched the multi-trillion dollar OBOR inclusive projects that will create a new economic Renaissance and untold wealth in all the nations in Eurasia, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and the EU.

    Can the US-led TPP create wealth in the Asia Pacific? No, as the Pacific Ocean is dying, due to the toxic after-effects of Fukushima, unless that is solved. Please see my comments here:

    http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/03/02/japan-still-coming-to-terms-with-3-11/

    (Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is smart enough to capitalize on the FTA signed with China, last year, after 10 years of challenging negotiations and he is, today, leading a large business delegation to visit China to open up more trade and investments.)

    8 The China-led AIIB will bring a burgeoning infrastructure development to Asia, which needs trillions of dollars to upgrade its infrastructures, into the future. Can the Japanese-led ADB do the same? No.

    (Today, China has almost completed the 656km electric railway linking Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to the Red Sea Port of Djibouti, while, in sharp contrast, Uncle Sam is bombing Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Soon China will be building a fast-speed rail linking Nairobi, Kenya to the interior to open up the trade corridors.)

    9 A Chinese leadership could bring to an end to the egregious currency and precious metal manipulation as the RMB could be backed by gold and silver after 2020.

    10 A Chinese leadership could bring to an end the sale of GMO grains, which are poisoning the whole world.

    Take your pick, folks: Wealth creation and world peace, if led by China, or endless wars and chaos on Planet Earth, if led by Uncle Sam.

  7. This is the 21st Century and warring to gain territory is a last ditch alternative. Better yet an Economic Commons Community (or Greater Asian Union) could well be in the offing.
    Already half of China’s natural gas arrives overland from central Asia, thanks to strategy to cut dependence on seaborne imports.

    One Belt One Road is just the first step. Once the infrastructure is built and the trade pipes up, the natural next step is the Greater Asia Union 大亚邦联 (Economic Commons Union 经济命运共同体). Open borders, free movement of people and investments, integrated economies, joint/shared development of natural resources, mayhap even joint defense, etc., even as polities remain independent.

    Mongolia would be a natural – they found out that you cannot really ship ore by air. All five Central Asian ex-USSR nations stand high on the list for this possibility. Kazakhstan stands out especially, with its recently depreciated currency (the Tenge dropped by half to now 270 per US$), and the September policy change re land management to encourage ownership. Kazak wheat is very high quality (high in gluten and proteins) but low yield (this Winter the harvest in some fields were only 1.5 tons/hectare). With investments and technology from China, Kazakhstan can easily double its grain exports (expcted June to June, 2015 to 16, about 8 million tons, out of total grain production of 17.7 million tons). Kazak grains and meat production can be a safety valve for Chinese food security. Same goes for much of SE Asia. Myanmar rice exports can literally double in 5 years with Chinese investments and technology – not the least the market for the increased production.

    We are talking about the integration of economies. Think increasing the total trade volume amongst the OBOR nations by 10 times over 10 years. We are talking about making profitable use of the very low marginal cost excess industrial capacities of China. Instead of shutting down the plants and letting the capital go to waste, do projects and earn back the initial investments several times over. Then who knows what might happen – the “excess” might turn out to be not enough, if all goes to plan and the OBOR nations need even more infrastructure.

    • @Bajie Zhu

      Well written. There is a saying that whoever controls the Eurasia land-mass controls the world.

      This means that the US pivot to Asia (aka encirclement and containment of China) is an enigma wrapped round a riddle and is bound to fail, as the US wants to control the Pacific Ocean, which, unfortunately, is dying because of the massive contamination by 300 ton of cesium137 and Tritium-laden water leakage daily from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster.

      http://www.rense.com/Datapages/japanquakedat.htm

      http://www.rense.com/Datapages/radiationdat.htm

      Australia, as an obedient US ally, risks losing 26% of its global export to China, when push turns to shove.

      This comment is by James O’Neill, an Australian Barrister at law:

      Quote:

      “Australian prosperity for at least the past four decades has been heavily reliant upon digging holes in the ground and exporting the products thereof to China. Iron ore, coal, and liquefied natural gas are by far the largest of these exports, both in volume and by value.

      It is scarcely recognised in Australia that several of the countries that are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and are participating in the New Silk Roads projects are themselves producers of the same minerals that Australia has exported to China to Australia’s immense benefit.

      Those countries will be linked by high-speed rail and other infrastructure developments with China. China will increasingly look to those countries as friendly, reliable and more easily accessible alternatives for resources than Australia. The same is true to a similar extent with African countries and their resources, which are also part of Mr Xi’s infrastructure and development plans.
      Huge contracts have also been signed between China and Russia who both have a mutual interest in resisting western attacks upon their economic and political viability.

      Russia alone is capable of replacing Australia as a source of raw materials and also has little reason to look favourably upon Australia given Australia’s recent history over Ukraine and elsewhere.

      Iran’s likely accession to the SCO will add another dimension to these developments.

      Given a choice between sourcing its raw materials from fellow SCO and BRICS members, let alone the African countries that have been the focus of much Chinese investment in recent years, and Australia, whose foreign policy stance is inimical to Chinese interests, it is not difficult to infer where China’s trade preferences would lie.

      This reality has been recognised by Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull before he became Prime Minister. That he has now changed his tune and echoes the hegemonic assertions of the United States may reflect on his part recognition of the dangers of crossing the Americans.

      But it is hardly going to be in Australia’s interests to try and help maintain the old order when a new reality is obviously taking shape.” Unquote. More below:

      http://journal-neo.org/2016/04/26/what-is-really-happening-in-the-south-china-sea/

  8. Where would Taiwan fit into all this? A demilitarized Taiwan (with China to bear the cost of defense) can continue with its own polity, and the colorful corrupt elections.

Support Quality Analysis

Donate
The East Asia Forum office is based in Australia and EAF acknowledges the First Peoples of this land — in Canberra the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people — and recognises their continuous connection to culture, community and Country.

Article printed from East Asia Forum (https://www.eastasiaforum.org)

Copyright ©2024 East Asia Forum. All rights reserved.