But if Australia opts for a German or French partnership, the momentum in Australia–Japan security relations could be seriously eroded.
Already, such a possibility is creating debate, especially in Australia, about what the strategic partnership should appropriately be. Some analysts have suggested that the deal will lead to a much closer partnership and fear that this would generate a risk of entrapping Australia in Japan’s emerging strategic rivalry with China. Others have argued that Australia should make a decision only on the basis of cost and technical fit. Still others accept that wider strategic ramifications should be considered, but dispute that these would be purely negative. They cite the deal’s potential significance in underpinning the current security order led by the United States, an order which both countries support.
Continued growth in the Australia–Japan strategic partnership is, of course, not inevitable. Importantly, neither side officially proposes a deeper strategic partnership of this kind, even though some in Japanese policy circles and politics already view the relationship as moving towards a virtual or quasi-alliance.
But managing expectations and perceptions amongst the two countries’ policymakers and publics is becoming more difficult. The partnership has already likely run its course in terms of establishing policy coordination in ‘softer’ areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Without doubt, the relationship has deepened substantially since the historic 2007 Joint Declaration ‘affirming’ the partnership. Since then, the partnership has been upgraded, first to a ‘comprehensive’ partnership in 2008 and then to a ‘special’ partnership in 2014. The two countries now have an economic partnership agreement and also cooperate increasingly through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) they share with the US, which is an ally of both.
Japanese analyst Yusuke Ishihara identifies the security relationship’s increasing integration, along with a more competitive regional environment, as key factors making the management of expectations more difficult. But the problematic nature of the strategic partnership concept itself also complicates matters. Over the past decade, strategic partnerships have been a popular way for nations to protect or advance their security interests. They have multiplied due to their flexibility and adaptability (or ambiguity) as a form of diplomatic alignment. In the Asia Pacific, China, India, Japan, Australia and the United States have all been actively entering into these partnerships.
Yet, as Ian Hall and I have pointed out elsewhere, these partnerships can confuse as much as clarify. They can take multiple forms of commitment and can be established not only between friends and partners but also between rivals. Most importantly, they lack the clarity of formal alliances, which formally embody members’ commitments to mutual defence and deterrence. By contrast, the clearest summation of strategic partnerships is only that they involve ‘mutual expectations of some kind of policy coordination’.
This ambiguity has thus far allowed Australia and Japan to pursue an ‘ever closer union’ without having to explain fully the actual objectives of their partnership. But the utility of such an approach declines as new forms of cooperation, such as the potential submarine deal, create a sense of deepening partnership even without an accompanying rearticulation of the relationship. In turn, the scope for mutual misperception increases, raising the prospect of a misunderstanding as to what the partners are really promising.
Fears of entrapment are worrying, suggests Ishihara, because neither side has a desire to establish a formal alliance. But what does the idea of a ‘quasi-alliance’ imply about mutual defence commitments? How are this and other ambiguous terms, such as small ‘a’ alliance, understood in Tokyo and Canberra?
Entering an agreement on the submarine project without resolving such ambiguities, rather than strengthening the bilateral relationship in the future, may introduce new problems. Yet there is no clear solution. A properly ‘strategic’ partnership should be more like a formal alliance, with clear understandings as to the commitments involved. But this would constitute a major change in both countries’ strategic postures.
A limited but more transparent set of guidelines may reduce the risk of miscalculation within the partnership. Yet it is not obvious that such an approach would offset the impression of existing but hidden commitments implied by a long-term submarine agreement. Were Australia not to pursue the Japanese submarine option, these scenarios would be less pressing. Even so, such a decision would create new doubts as to whether the partnership had indeed stalled.
All this attests to the difficulty of trying to fill capability gaps while simultaneously solving broader strategic challenges. It also suggests that resolving such challenges on a bilateral basis will sharply tax policymakers’ patience and creativity. A deeper bilateral partnership makes greater sense within a more strategic trilateral framework with the US, through the TSD, although this entails further risks vis-à-vis China. Still, if Australia and Japan wish to extend their strategic partnership through the submarine deal and beyond, a more robust TSD may be unavoidable.
H. D. P. (David) Envall is Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University, and an honorary associate at La Trobe University.
I wrote a comment on 1 March 2016 on the Australian submarine deal here:
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/03/01/strategy-matters-in-australias-submarine-deal/
Quote:
“Dr Sam Bateman is a very well-respected commentator on Asian affairs and he could not make more sense than by stating that “While technical issues to establish the ‘best’ submarine remain important, strategic, political and economic factors are key to Australia’s decision. The deal could have a significant impact on Australia’s regional relations and its ability to act independently within the region.”
He also nailed it when he wrote “China is by far Australia’s biggest trading partner accounting for about 26 per cent of total foreign trade in 2014–5, compared with Japan’s 12 per cent. Australia’s trade with China has also continued to grow strongly over recent years, while trade with Japan has stagnated with relatively little growth.
He added that “Choosing Japan would be a solid affirmation of defence cooperation between Australia, Japan and the United States. This cooperation is actively promoted by both Tokyo and Washington as part of a broader balancing strategy against a rising China.”
But the paradox is that by containing China, Australia risks culling the goose that lays the golden eggs. The current Australia moribund economy, as a result of the collapse of commodity prices, portends a even far worse economic scenario for the ‘Lucky Country’ when China’s economy falters, as a result of the containment.
Dr Bateman stresses that “International submarine experts point out that a country operating a small fleet of submarines (12 boats or less) becomes locked into technical and logistic support from the country of origin of the submarines.
Can Australia rely on Japan to deliver long term logistical support when “According to 2014 estimates, 33.0% of the Japanese population are above age 60, 25.9% are aged 65 or above, 12.5% are aged 75 or above. The dramatic aging of Japanese society as a result of sub-replacement fertility rates and high life expectancy is expected to continue, and the population began to decline in 2011.
If the low 1.4 TFR persists (as it surely will) then by 2110, Japan’s population could fall by another 30% to 61 million. In polite terms, Japan is falling over a demographic cliff and its economy will continue to shrink into oblivion in the future.
On the other hand, by circa 2030, China will have the world’s largest economy…
Lastly, it is to Australia’s distinct advantage to remember that John D. Rockefeller once said “A friendship founded on business is better than a business founded on friendship”. Unquote.
ARTICLE 9 of Japan’s Constitution states unequivocally:
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”
Abe has trashed Article 9 and is set to repeal it.
Can Australia trust Abe who has also persistently refused to apologize for the WW2 atrocities in China, Korea, etc and the unconscionable crimes against humanity, committed against the ‘Comfort Women’ and he continues to worship at the Yasukuni shrine, where 14 Class A Japanese war criminals are buried?
Also Abe could be paving the way for a resurgence of Japanese militarism/war and Australia could be dragged into it, against China, Australia’s biggest trading partner.
More from my piece in the Eurasia Review here:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/15022016-is-abe-paving-the-way-for-a-resurgence-in-japanese-militarism/
This reminded me of the law of unintended consequences: one feels compelled to respond to changing circumstances but it can, and usually does, change the system in which one is functioning. As noted, at the very least expectations get altered. More likely, one’s behavior also changes.
With ‘the rise of China’ in the region both Japan and Australia feel the need to make these moves with each other. Where they will lead is open to anyone’s guess, as the expression goes. These two as well as the other countries in the Asia Pacific are making up the steps to their new dance as they go along. Makes for fascinating, albeit at times confusing and even occasionally worrisome, developments.
This reminded me of the law of unintended consequences: one feels compelled to respond to changing circumstances but it can, and usually does, change the system in which one is functioning. As noted, at the very least expectations get altered. More likely, one’s behavior also changes.
With ‘the rise of China’ in the region both Japan and Australia feel the need to make these moves with each other. Where they will lead is open to anyone’s guess, as the expression goes. These two as well as the other countries in the Asia Pacific are making up the steps to their new dance as they go along. Makes for fascinating, albeit at times confusing and even occasionally worrisome, developments.
I sense the undertone of this post is to strengthen the so called ‘trilateral alliance’ of the US, Australia and Japan to encircle or tackle China.
The author may benefit from reading the following by a respected Australian journalist or media commentator, Michael Pascoe: “Australia shouldn’t pay price for ‘pivot’, available on the Canberra Times website, April 18 2016 – 12:50PM, http://www.canberratimes.com.au/business/world-business/australia-shouldnt-pay-price-for-pivot-20160418-go8rat.html.
It presents facts as opposed to the often argued and hyped what is ‘right’ under existing security order in Asia.
Those hypocrites have been exposed as another version of Emperor’s new cloths story.