Trump has stated that he would not hesitate to reconsider America’s longstanding alliances with Japan and South Korea if they cease to be of benefit to the United States. He further adds that under his leadership, the United States would seek to renegotiate many one-sided yet fundamental treaties with American allies, including the one with Japan. So can the US–Japan alliance withstand this upshot in domestic criticism?

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has repeatedly stated that the US–Japan alliance will continue to be the cornerstone of Japan’s security policy. Strengthening the alliance is one of the three pillars of Japan’s new defence policy, alongside developing Japan’s own self-defence capabilities and actively promoting security cooperation with other countries to ensure international peace and security.

For the United States, the alliance serves as the basis for its Asian ‘pivot’ strategy. Former secretary of state, and Democratic presidential hopeful, Hillary Clinton asserted that the US ‘treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand are the fulcrum for the strategic turn to the Asia Pacific’. These alliances must be maintained in order to achieve the common vision of a stable regional order. And they likely will be.

Not only is the US–Japan alliance looking solid, but it appears that both countries are looking to further strengthen it. This sentiment gained momentum after the official visit of Abe to the United States in April 2015. Both leaders have also reaffirmed their commitment to the alliance by announcing the revised Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation. The revised document acknowledges the regional shifts in the balance of power, Japan’s altered defence posture, and the emerging transnational threats to Japan and the United States.

The outlook for the US–Japan alliance has also improved with the passage of Japan’s security-related bills in September 2015, which allows the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to play a greater role in maintaining international peace and stability under the banner of a ‘proactive contributions to peace’. The alliance is now explicitly global in scope and aims to be more balanced and effective.

But, as the alliance expands, the limitations faced by both Washington and Tokyo must be managed carefully. With the relative decline in US power, the future of global leadership is uncertain. As such, there is a risk that the United States could pursue the same ‘isolationist policy’ that US presidential hopeful Donald Trump has been advocating so strongly. Alternatively, there is a risk that the United States might try to drag Japan into unnecessary conflicts.

And, while Japan’s new security laws expand the role of the SDF, its ability to exercise collective self-defence is still limited under strict conditions. With these limitations in mind, both Washington and Tokyo must elevate the alliance to the next step by developing a more multifaceted partnership.

The United States and Japan are already taking this next step through strengthening trilateral cooperation with like-minded partners such as Australia and India. For instance, Japan and India upgraded their relationship to a ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan in 2014. The relationship has gone from strength to strength ever since, and has included a successful US–India–Japan Malabar naval exercise in 2015.

As for the Australia–Japan relationship, the two countries have forged a ‘special strategic partnership’ that seeks to advance both Canberra and Tokyo’s national interests and to ‘multiply their capabilities to meet joint security challenges’ in the region. Japan’s bid to build Australia’s new submarine fleet, if successful, will provide the crucial strategic element to deepen the partnership not only between the two countries, but also with Washington. This forward-looking approach is important because it recognises the rise of emerging economies in the Asia Pacific and slowly moves from the perspective of United States as an external balancer.

But such trilateral cooperation is still not enough of a confidence building measure to peacefully manage the current geostrategic transition. China has to be included. One way around this could be for Japan to establish an informal gathering between the United States, Japan and Asia’s rising powers, such as China, India, Australia and Indonesia. This gathering could then be used as a consultation mechanism for security issues in the region, including developing functional cooperation in the South China Sea as well as re-examining the effectiveness of the US forward deployment strategy in Asia.

It appears that the US–Japan alliance will not only survive the upsurge in isolationist rhetoric within the United States but will continue to deepen into the future. Yet, to successfully address new challenges and seize new opportunities, the alliance should also be adaptive and develop more multifaceted partnerships with other rising powers in the region.

Pandu Utama Manggala is a PhD scholar at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo.