The question then is why has this happened? And how can radical sentiments be most effectively combatted?

The difficult reality is that religious laws in Pakistan have played a considerable role in inculcating radical ideas. Religious laws in Pakistan restrict freedom of expression and narrow the space available for discussing the viability of religion in state affairs. They can help foster intolerance and extremism, and may resonate with terrorist groups.

In Pakistan any reproval of Islam is considered to be blasphemy under current legislation. Attempts to reform Pakistan’s religious laws have been met with strong opposition as sizable segments of the public consider such laws, including the Hudood Ordinance and Blasphemy Law, as integral to Islam itself. The dominant religious narrative holds that blasphemy is an unpardonable offence that is punishable by death. Anyone who suggests otherwise is also liable to be killed.

For this reason some consider extra-judicial killings for blasphemy-related offences to be just. So when Qadri killed Taseer, he was hailed as a hero by a significant proportion of the population. This included not only religious conservatives but also the community of lawyers who offered to take up Qadri’s case for free. Qadri became, however erroneously, a symbol of the defence of the Prophet and Islam for many.

Naturally then, when the death sentence was meted out to Qadri, there was a public outcry and Qadri was cast as a martyr. People flooded the streets, tires were burnt in protest and strikes were announced all over Punjab. More than a 100,000 of Qadri’s supporters mourned at his funeral. Almost all of the Qadri supporters belong to the Barelvi school of thought, which has traditionally been apolitical and non-militant. This indicates that, when it comes to blasphemy, militant and non-militant groups often agree.

In the protests that followed 25,000 Qadri supporters (mainly Barelvis) demanded the government declare Qadri a martyr, unconditionally release all Sunni clerics — including those being held for murder and terrorism-related charges — and remove Ahmadis and other non-Muslims from key government posts.

So how did Pakistan come to this point? Contrary to popular belief, this process started in the 1970s during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s government. It was at this time that, to appease Islamists, Bhutto declared that Ahmadis were not Muslims. The state’s connection to Islam was further institutionalised during General’s 11 year rule. According to Zia, ‘Pakistan … was created in the name of Islam and the country will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam’.

Bhutto and Zia were concerned not only with placating religious conservatives but also with dampening the fervour of extremists by providing them space to vent their frustrations. Yet the provision of such ideological space breeds a radical milieu since it allows for extremist beliefs to thrive. Pakistan cannot realistically hope to end religiously motivated violence in Pakistan unless the extremist ideology that fuels this violence is challenged. Anti-terrorism operations, military courts and capital punishments alone are not enough. Pakistan must also work to urgently combat the mindset of extremists.

Unless attempts are made to deflate the ideological space given to radicals by creating a systematic counter-narrative, terrorists groups will continue to find sympathy and support for their cause. Certainly, the ‘silent majority’ does not regard Qadri as a hero. There is general belief that Zia’s legacy of Islamic laws, including the Blasphemy Law, needs to be reformed. Still, the polarization between religious conservatives and secularists has stymied any meaningful conversation on how to solve the problem. Pakistan needs to expand the common space for debate so all people can engage peacefully with one another on policy issues.

Efforts to grow the common space in Pakistan cannot give undue priority to the opinion of religious conservatives but neither can they afford to disregard the tradition of Islam. Otherwise, radicals will continue to label any attempts at reform as ‘Western’ and ‘threats to Islam’.

The Pakistani government should work to engage more moderate clerics to counter radical beliefs. One option is the Pakistan Ulema Council (PUC), one of the few religious councils that did not protest Qadri’s execution. Engaging with moderate clerics is crucial as it can help to delegitimise those who use blasphemy as a pretext to commit violence. PUC is comprised of Islamic clerics and scholars from a number of Islamic traditions, and has issued fatwas prohibiting both honour killings and the act of declaring others to be non-believers (kafir).

While PUC, along with other groups such as the Council of Islamic Ideology, have asserted that the Blasphemy Law cannot be amended, they are willing to review it. Even this is a step in the right direction as it allows for a discussion of the legislation. Arafat Mazhar — the founder of Engage, an institution for research and reform of religious laws in Pakistan — is already engaged in disseminating their findings on how classical scholars did not consider blasphemy a capital offence. Considering the political importance of religion in Pakistan, Mazhar’s work could promote reform within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence. Such work is critical and needs to be emphasised at a policy level.

While blasphemy will likely remain a crime for the foreseeable future, the abolition of capital punishment will reduce mob violence and could help delegitimise radicals like Qadri.

Shahzeb Ali Rathore is a research analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence & Terrorism Research, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.