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Filipino strongman Duterte not just talk

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Philippine president-elect Rodrigo Duterte speaks during his final campaign rally in Manila, Philippines, 7 May 2016. (Photo: AAP).

In Brief

There may be more to the Philippines’ new president Rodrigo Duterte than his tough guy image indicates. In the populist theatrics that are Filipino politics, the overwhelming election of Duterte should not have come as a surprise, even with common, but inaccurate, comparisons to the US presidential candidate Donald Trump.

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Unlike Trump, Duterte is an active Filipino politician and, unlike Trump, his rhetorical bluster is backed by action.

Duterte’s campaign was notable for its tough and sometimes trashy talk, particularly his pledges to step outside the law to crack down on crime and corruption. He has even threatened to curtail the role of the Philippines legislature if its members are found to be corrupt or don’t join him in his fight against corruption.

Duterte is seen as a political outsider because he is not of the traditional Philippine elite. Yet in a country in which private armed groups and extra-legal measures have been commonplace in politics, Duterte has earned an undeniable reputation for backing strong words with strong action.

As mayor of Davao City in southern Mindanao, where insurgency and crime have been rampant, Duterte has allegedly cracked down on drug crime by ordering the extra-judicial killing of drug dealers, alleged drug dealers and others who have earned the mayor’s ire. Duterte’s reputation is enough to cause concern among entirely innocent people. It has been suggested that, in order for Duterte to preserve his political position, not all of those killed in extra-judicial circumstances in Davao City were criminals. Yet, when it comes to cracking down on crime and corruption, there is no doubt that Duterte has been effective.

While Duterte’s tough-talking campaign for the presidency won him many fans among those Filipinos who encounter crime and corruption on a regular basis, he is also seen by many to be a ‘people’s leader’, sympathetic to the plight of the country’s disproportionate poor. Duterte was also the only presidential aspirant to put forward clear plans to deal with two of the Philippines’ biggest problems: China’s encroachment in the South China Sea and the Islamist separatist rebellion on his home island of Mindanao.

The Philippines reasonably claims that China has encroached on waters that should, under international law, fall partially to the Philippines’ jurisdiction. Rather than making a simple — and confrontational — territorial claim, Duterte has suggested an alternative in which disputing countries in the South China Sea negotiate a resource-sharing agreement in a mutually administered region.

In contrast once again with his head-on approach, Duterte is keen to finally sign a peace agreement with Mindanao’s Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Finalising the peace agreement has been held up by the Philippines’ sometimes self-serving legislature. Duterte has warned the legislature against continuing to block the agreement.

The case of Mindanao speaks to Duterte’s view that the Philippines should be a federal rather than a unitary state, which might go some way towards resolving some of the country’s regional problems, particularly in the Islamic south. This proposal is unlikely to receive a positive response from the legislature, and confrontation between the new president and the legislature can be expected.

Duterte is also proposing banning the sale of alcohol after midnight. His concern for tackling social ills runs the full gamut from organised crime to potential social misbehaviour.

None of this suggests that Duterte is the knight in tarnished armour that the Philippines has been waiting for. But it does suggest that, while Duterte may have unorthodox methods regarding crime — and perhaps shoring up his own political position — he appears to have some understanding of complex issues that have to date largely escaped the attention of the Filipino political elite. The question now is whether Duterte will tone down his hometown tough-guy image to rise to the presidential office.

There is hope Duterte’s vice-presidential partner will aid in reining in his more volatile qualities. Unlike most other republican systems, elections in the Philippines do not see the pairing of vice-presidential candidates with presidential ones. In a very tight race, vice-presidential candidate Leni Robredo appears to have just squeezed ahead of Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, the son of former Philippines dictator Ferdinand Marcos. Robredo comes from an activist, political background and her social justice orientation might be a useful foil to Duterte’s more aggressive interpretation of ‘justice’. Robredo also appears to have the skills to succeed Duterte, who is only allowed one term as president.

The elections showed that being a ‘strong’ political leader has continued appeal for many, perhaps most, Filipinos. Marcos may have come from a very different political (and geographic) background to Duterte, but aspects of his appeal were similar.

As unofficial polling was showing that Robredo was beginning to pull ahead of Marcos in the vice-presidential race, Marcos called for polling to be stopped on the grounds that the results might ‘confuse’ voters. This led to the impression that he may have been creating an opportunity for vote-rigging, as his father Ferdinand Marcos did in his own last election.

While many Filipinos look to good, smart candidates as their preferred leaders, many — perhaps most — also continue to look to more superficial aspects of appeal. But populism should not be taken as a sign that Duterte is not serious about governance outcomes. Behind the theatrics, Philippines politics is played hard, sometimes to the point of violence.

Professor Damien Kingsbury is Professor on International Politics at Deakin University.

A version of this article first appeared here on Asian Currents.

13 responses to “Filipino strongman Duterte not just talk”

  1. Scholarly, yet simple and objective assesement of the Philippine’s political environment as a whole that led to Duterte’s presidency. Indeed, the Filipinos, in casting their votes in favor of Duterte, “silently shouted” the phrase “puro salita, walang gawa” towards the present and past administrations.

  2. Overall a fair characterization of the President-elect of the Philippines but there are hypes and some inaccuracies:

    1 “..the overwhelming election of Duterte should not have come as a surprise..”

    How could it be described as the “overwhelming election of Duterte” when he only garnered about 38per cent of the popular votes, which means about 62per cent of the people of the Philippines did not vote for him?

    2 “The Philippines reasonably claims that China has encroached on waters that should, under international law, fall partially to the Philippines’ jurisdiction.”

    The author fails to clarify which waters China allegedly encroached on under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), which the meddling Uncle Sam has persistently refused to ratify since it came into force in 1994.

    In the interest of a peaceful settlement of the South China Sea (SCS) disputes, why not start with the Treaty of Peace, signed between Japan and the Republic of China on 28 April 1952.

    Article 2 stated clearly that “Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.”

    http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm

    Since the US, Japan, Australia and Asean nations abide by the one-China policy, that Taiwan is a part of China, then by extension, the Spratly and Paracel islands have been returned to their rightly owner, China, on 28 April 1952.

    On 4 Sept 1958, China issued a Declaration that, henceforth, her territorial seas would be 12 nm, and that included the territorial seas in the Spratly and Paracel islands.

    The US, Japan, Australia, North Vietnam, France, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei did not raise any objection.

    In fact, on 14 Sept, Mr Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister of North Vietnam, wrote a letter to Premier Zhou En Lai and stated unequivocally “We have the honour to bring to your knowledge that the Government of the DRVN recognizes and supports the declaration dated 4th September, 1958 of the Government of the PRC fixing the width of the Chinese territorial waters…”.

    When oil was discovered in the SCS by ECAFE in the late 1960s, Vietnam grabbed 29 features and today it is the third largest crude oil producer in the SCS, behind Brunei and Malaysia. The latter grabbed 6 features and Brunei grabbed one.

    President Ferdinand Marcos grabbed 9 features in the SCS on *11 June 1978*, using Presidential Decree 1596. Was that legal and rule-based? No.

    China has yet to produce a single drop of crude oil in the SCS.

    Taiwan occupies the Taiping island, the biggest in the Spratly and under Article 121 of Unclos, it has a 200 nm EEZ, which extends over all the 9 features annexed by Marcos and which also extends to the coast of the Philippines. Under Unclos Article 15, the new maritime boundary is equidistant from Taiping island to the Philippines coast.

    So who is doing the alleged “encroachment”? It is certainly not China.

    3 “Duterte has suggested an alternative,.. negotiate a resource-sharing agreement in a mutually administered region.”

    The reality is that the resource-sharing proposals have been put into place by China and the Arroyo and Aquino Govts a long time ago but under Uncle Sam’s tutelage, the Philippines reneged on them and suddenly took the disputes to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at the Hague in 2013.

    Mr Duterte has made a paradigm shift because he is a lot smarter and he knows that 100per cent of nothing is nothing. As a lawyer, he also intuitively knows that in a legal impasse, the best way out is to settle out of court.

    He also knows that even a win or partial win at the Hague is meaningless because the PCA cannot award the Philippines with any feature in the SCS, which President Marcos annexed in June 1978 and renamed them the Kalayaan islands, since the PCA has no power to decide on Sovereignty.

    China was, therefore, right not to participate in the arbitral tribunal at the Hague because in 2006, China had already exercised her *rights* under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and made a Declaration under Article 289, that excludes compulsory arbitration, which concerns sovereignty, which, essentially, is what the Philippines wants the PCA to rule but the PCA has no such powers.

    Despite of the above alienation of China’s territories in the SCS, China is willing to negotiate with each claimant in a peaceful manner, to the satisfaction of both sides.

    A bilateral negotiation, resulting is a win-win solution is by far better as with mutual development of the islands and reefs, the Philippines will share a high percentage of the resources in the disputed areas, resources that the Philippines desperately needs today.

    The Philippines is, arguably, one of the poorest countries in Asia and she needs to upgrade infrastructures, build high-speed trains, harbors, airports, get capital tools and build modern factories to create millions of jobs, build hospitals, schools, universities, malls, etc to usher in the 21st Century and prosperity for the people of the Philippines.

    China has the means to help the Philippines achieve all that if the investor-confidence and friendship between the two countries improve.

    If the Philippines chooses to go down the slippery-slope with Uncle Sam instead, all she will get are more bombs to usher in endless wars, more poverty and destruction for decades to come.

    • Thanks for this response. The ‘overwhelming’ aspect refers to the Philippines method of elections (same as Indonesia at the provincial level). The assumption is that the two highest candidates will go to the run-off and each will double their vote, ergo Duterte gets 76% of the vote which is, by any assessment, overwhelming. If what you are arguing against is the Philippine’s electoral method, that is not an issue addressed in this very short article.

      In terms of UNCLOS, I am not sure that the US has much influenced the positions of claimants on the South China Sea. regardless, the Philippines has long staked a claim that, under UNCLOS, poses a strong case. Rather than confrontation, while Duterte’s position may not work, it’s a constructive option.

      with best wishes,

      Damien

      • It should be noted that regardless of Taiwan’s claims and their conformity to those of China (which Taiwan does not recognise), they do not comply with UNCLOS, which supercedes all previous claims not formally established. Malaysia is the principle claimant to the SCS, especially in relation to the Spratleys and Paracels. Vietnam’s claim is more tenuous under UNCLOS.

        • Thank you for your response.

          1 “It should be noted that regardless of Taiwan’s claims and their conformity to those of China (which Taiwan does not recognise), they do not comply with UNCLOS, which supercedes all previous claims not formally established.”

          Not true. Why not start with Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace, signed between Japan and the Republic of China on 28 April 1952. (under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 and the Cairo Conference of 1943.)

          Article 2 stated clearly:

          “It is recognised that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands.”

          http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm

          The last time I checked the ROC (now called Taiwan) and Japan have not abrogated that 1952 treaty, which preceded the concept of the 1982 UNCLOS.

          2 “Malaysia is the principle claimant to the SCS, especially in relation to the Spratleys (sic) and Paracels.”

          This is seriously flawed. Malaysia has made no claim on the Paracel islands, unless you know something that others don’t.

          3 “Vietnam’s claim is more tenuous under UNCLOS.”

          I agree. Many Vietnamese scholars make the same mistake by claiming that Vietnam had control of the Paracel islands since the 17th century.

          The only problem is that in the 17th century, Vietnam, as a country, did not exist.

          In 1802,when Emperor Gia Long ascended the throne, after defeating the rebels, he proposed to name the peninsular “Namviet”, but since Gia Long paid tributes to Qing China, he had to seek approval from the Qing Emperor. That request was turned down as the name resembled a Chinese legendary state, near the northern border, called “Namyue”.

          Gia Long reversed the name to ‘Vietnam’. He was then quoted by many Vietnamese scholars to have ‘discovered’ the Paracel islands and had colonized them.

          But how could a vassal state dare to seize the territory of the Suzerainty state, has not been explained.

          In 1931, Japan invaded China and in 1938, under the fog of war, France invaded the Paracel and Spratly islands.

          In 1939, Japan evicted the French and colonized these islands, which were returned, after WW2, to the ROC, by extension to China, in 1952 under the Treaty of Peace, in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of 1954 and the Cairo Conference of 1943.

      • Thank you for your response.

        1”The ‘overwhelming’ aspect refers to the Philippines method of elections (same as Indonesia at the provincial level).”

        The Philippines’ presidential electoral system is based on a plurality voting system, in which the candidate who polls more votes than any other candidate is elected. Duterte polled the most votes.

        2 “The assumption is that the two highest candidates will go to the run-off and each will double their vote, ergo Duterte gets 76% of the vote which is, by any assessment, overwhelming.”

        There is no run off in the presidential elections in the Philippines, unlike in Brazil, if no candidate garners more than 50% of the popular votes.

        In Brazil’s closest presidential election results in 2014, Dilma Rousseff narrowly defeated Neves in the second round, taking 51.6% of the vote to Neves’ 48.4%.

        3 “In terms of UNCLOS, I am not sure that the US has much influenced the positions of claimants on the South China Sea.”

        The US Senate has yet to ratify UNCLOS but please don’t underestimate Uncle Sam’s propensity to meddle behind the scene.

        4 “the Philippines has long staked a claim that, under UNCLOS, poses a strong case.”

        The reality is that when the US gave the Philippines its independence in July 1946, the US did not hand over any such island in the South China Sea.

        It was the former President Ferdinand Marcos who annexed 9 features in the Spratlys on 11 June 1978, using presidential decree 1596 and renaming them, the Kalayaan islands.

        But the Spratly and Paracel islands were already returned to the Republic of China by Japan, under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace signed on 28 April 1952, by extension to China, under the One-China policy recognized by the US, Asean, Australia and the EU.

        http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm

        Also the Treaty of Paris of 1898 never mentioned any island in the South China Sea, when Spain handed over the Philippines to the US as a colony after losing the Spanish-American war.

        In addition, the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the 1900 Treaty of Washington and the 1930 Convention between the United States and Great Britain, described the western limit of the Philippine territory as 118 degrees East longitude.

        China’s islands and reefs in the South China Sea, including Huangyan Dao (Scarborough shoal), are all west of that longitude.

        When UNCLOS came into force in 1994, it did not award any littoral states with any island or reef as it has no such powers to do so.

        • Thanks for this. Yes, I understand that the Philippines electoral system relies on a simple plurality, but the implicit logic of the system is that, if extrapolated, it would produce a particular result (as in Indonesia’s provincial elections). In any case, Duterte achieved a significant plurality compared with other candidates. In a system which allows more than two candidates but which operates on the basis of a plurality, the number of votes divided by the number of candidates will almost invariably mean that no-one can achieve an absolute majority.

          As for UNCLOS, conflating it with US foreign policy does not logically follow. You may have a preference for a particular emphasis or outcome, but the way UNCLOS works is fairly mathematical. On this basis, claims by both China and Taiwan to any of the island groups in the southern portion of the SCS are, at best, tenuous.

          • Thanks for your response.

            1 “In any case, Duterte achieved a significant plurality compared with other candidates.“

            Let us then agree that “Duterte achieved a significant (not overwhelming) plurality compared with other candidates” and move on.

            2 “As for UNCLOS, conflating it with US foreign policy does not logically follow.”

            If the nuance escapes anyone, the US foreign policy in East Asia is predicated on the senseless obsession to contain a rising China and it risks falling into the “Thucydides Trap”.

            As the US Senate has not ratified UNCLOS since it came into force in 1994, the US navy is operating outside the provisions of an international law, under the pretext of exercising FON.

            http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/freedom-of-navigation-ops-us-exercising-right-or-might

        • Dear Kttan,
          I am not sure why you are pursuing these arcane issues, but the simple fact if that there is no treaty between claimant states that recognises Chinese claims to the SCS, that statements by third parties as to the boundaries of states are irrelevant for the purposes of UNCLOS, and that preceding agreements, unless formally ratified by subsequent governments, have no binding value. The Philippines has a claim to the SCS relative to its nearest land points in tandem with those of Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan (which continues to stake a separate claim to that of China) and of China itself (by extension of its claim to unity with Taiwan).
          I personally do not especially care about the status of the Philippines’ claim, other than it has one and this matter needs to be resolved. It appears, however, that you are invested in the claim by China to the islands of the SCS which, as you probably know, is not recognised by any other country in the world, nor by the UN. Assuming no prior agreed territorial ownership (which there is not), then we revert to the UNCLOS 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone position. This allocates about half of the Paracels to China. Under this rule, Scarborough and the Spratleys clearly fall to the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Vietnam comes close to a legal claim, but not quite (despite its military presence). In any case, it appears that neither China nor Vietnam are interested in the international rule of law on this issue and that it will continues to be a site of regional tension and potential conflict. Duterte’s proposition, of revenue sharing was, I thought, a good lateral approach to an otherwise unresolvable debate that pits military force against law. So, given I don;t have’ (as they say) a dog in this fight, what is your interest?

          • 1 “I am not sure why you are pursuing these arcane issues,”

            To seek the truth so that the SCS disputes can be solved peacefully. The alternative is war, which can go nuclear from the start if the US and China are involved and this will destroy Planet Earth.

            2 “but the simple fact if that there is no treaty between claimant states that recognises Chinese claims to the SCS,”

            This is circular argument because it is obvious that neither is there a treaty between claimant states which recognizes the claims of the Philippine (9 features), Vietnam (29 features), Malaysia (6 features) and Brunei (one reef).

            But there was the Treaty of Peace, signed by Japan and the ROC on 28 April 1952 where Japan returned the Spratly and Paracel islands to the Republic of China, by extension to China, under the On-China policy. Why do you ignore Article 2 of this said Treaty, which was predicated on the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Conference?

            Also please note that on 4th Sept 1958, China made a declaration of a 12nm territorial water, which included the Paracel and the Spratly islands. On 14 Sept 1958, Prime Minister Mr Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam, sent a letter Premier Zhou En Lai to acknowledge that “the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes and supports the declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s territorial sea made on 4 September 1958.”

            In the Sino-Franco Convention, concerning the Delimitation of the Border Between China and Tonkin, signed in Beijing on 26 June 1887, it stated clearly that all the isles, East of the treaty delimitation line, were assigned to China and that included Hainan island and the, Paracel and the Spratly islands

            3 “The Philippines has a claim to the SCS relative to its nearest land points in tandem with those of Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, etc.”

            If this is true then when UNCLOS came into force in 1994, the Singapore island could be claimed by Malaysia as it lies only 4 Km from Malaysia’s southern coast, which has a 200 nm EEZ. This is not true as UNCLOS does not award a littoral state with islands it did not own prior to 1994. The Philippines has no legitimate claim to any feature in the SCS.

            4 “I personally do not especially care about the status of the Philippines’ claim, other than it has one and this matter needs to be resolved. “

            Then why do you continue to ignore President Marcos’ illegal annexation of 9 features in the Spratlys, using a presidential decree 1596, on 11 June 1978?

            5 It appears, however, that you are invested in the claim by China to the islands of the SCS which, as you probably know, is not recognised by any other country in the world, nor by the UN. “

            Not true. North Vietnam recognized China’s claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands as well as Taiwan (if one can call it a country) and Japan did too, since it signed the Treaty of Peace on 28 April 1952.

            The US, UK, Australia, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Phlippines did not object when China declared a 12nm territorial water in the Spratly and Paracel waters on 4 Sept 1958? Why now?

            6 “Assuming no prior agreed territorial ownership (which there is not), then we revert to the UNCLOS 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone position.

            Not true. Please do not make reckless assumptions. UNCLOS does not award a littoral state with any island it did not own prior to 1994, as it has no such powers.

            7 “In any case, it appears that neither China nor Vietnam are interested in the international rule of law on this issue..”

            Not true. On 30 June 2004, China and Vietnam ratified the Maritime Boundary Agreement for the Tonkin Gulf, which is part of the South China Sea. It is Uncle Sam which has yet to ratify UNCLOS and is the one militarizing the SCS disputes.

            8 “Duterte’s proposition, of revenue sharing was, I thought, a good lateral approach to an otherwise unresolvable debate that pits military force against law.”

            I agree his proposition is timely but it is not new as this was proposed by China and agreed upon by the Arroyo and Aquino Govts a long time ago, before Uncle Sam started fishing in the troubled waters.

            9 “So, given I don;t have’ (as they say) a dog in this fight, what is your interest?”

            My interest is to seek the truth. For example, I had to rebut your claim that “Malaysia is the principle claimant to the SCS, especially in relation.. to the Paracels”, which is not true as Malaysia makes no claim on the Paracel islands.

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