The announcement represents a rare moment of agreement between the two rival parties, the Democrats and Puea Thai, which have been at loggerheads since the 2006 coup. The Democrats represent the Bangkok establishment and the southern region, while Puea Thai (and its earlier incarnations) represents the rural and urban working classes, particularly from the north and northeast.
Even though the military regime has all but forbidden campaigning against the draft constitution, agreement between the two parties now means that the draft will face an uphill battle to be passed in the referendum.
The draft constitution envisages an appointed Senate, limits on parliamentary authority, enhanced powers for non-elected state agencies and a provision for a non-elected prime minister. It is widely seen as designed to create a constitutional framework that would allow the military and their royalist backers to oversee Thai politics for the foreseeable future, whatever the outcome of elections.
The architect of the current draft is 78-year-old Meechai Ruchupan, a conservative lawyer with long-standing Palace and military connections. Meechai embodies the political thinking of Thailand in the 1980s, when the military and the Palace shared power. At that time General Prem Tinsulanonda, a Palace favourite, was prime minister and Meechai ran the prime minister’s office. Elections never threatened that control until the late 1980s.
Then, as now, the tension was resolved by a coup in 1991. Then, as now, Meechai headed the constitutional drafting committee appointed by the coup-makers. The subsequent political conflict led to the Bloody May incident of 1992, when the military opened fire on pro-democracy demonstrators, killing scores. Meechai drafted the amnesty bill that exempted those responsible for the killings from prosecution.
The military regime’s tight control has spawned numerous conspiracy theories. One theory alleges that the current regime was never serious about having the constitution adopted in the first place. Rather, its aim was simply to distract the public from its unpopularity and to prolong its rule for as long as possible, at least until after the royal succession is settled. After all, Article 44 of the provisional constitution grants Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha the power to order a new constitution to be adopted if and when he chooses. An earlier draft constitution by another conservative lawyer, Borwornsak Uwanno, was rejected by a military-appointed National Reform Council in September 2015.
The referendum comes at a time when the military’s post-coup popularity among its conservative supporters has been eroded. Prime Minister General Prayut’s public appearances are by turns petulant, foul-mouthed and self-pitying. The regime’s handling of the economy, even in the eyes of its own supporters, has been dreadful.
Its foreign policy, which seems deliberately designed to rebuke the United States by exaggerating Thailand’s warm relations with China and Russia, appears reckless by the high standards of Thailand’s foreign affairs establishment.
Given the evaporation of much of its support even among its conservative backers, its incompetence at managing the country and its lack of foreign friends, the question is, why is the military regime still in power more than two years after the coup?
One answer is its skill in repression. This dates back to the lessons it learned in the Cold War years. While repression is undoubtedly ugly, the military has so far managed to regulate it to a level that it does not outrage enough people to spark a mass uprising that might threaten its political position.
But the other answer is ongoing uncertainty about the future of the monarchy, which is the single reason for the conservative turn in Thai politics over the last decade.
The resolution of Thailand’s 11-year-old political conflict depends on the outcome of the succession following the passing of the 89-year-old King Bhumibol, now in the 70th year of his reign. The Crown Prince is deeply unpopular. Many conservative Thais doubt his ability to manage the affairs of the monarchy at such a crucial moment in Thailand’s history.
Because of the sensitivity in discussing the monarchy there is much speculation over the real state of the king’s health. According to one conspiracy theory among some Red Shirt supporters, the king is already dead. The military regime and its supporters are keeping it a secret, in order to prolong their rule by living off their legitimacy of defending the throne from republicans.
A more widely accepted view is that the king now cannot live without life-support, and no doctor would dare suggest that it be removed. If this were true, he could potentially be kept alive artificially for some time to come.
Because of the monarchy’s centrality to the political system, at present, all sides in Thailand’s political crisis are playing a waiting game. One thing is for certain, though: no matter what the outcome of Thailand’s constitutional referendum on 7 August, no one believes that it will resolve the political crisis.
Dr Patrick Jory is a Senior Lecturer in Southeast Asian History at the School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry at the University of Queensland.
Do the member states of ASEAN respect the autonomy of a member country to such an extent that they refuse to step up and attempt to at least influence these anti-democratic, repressive actions being taken by the military in Thailand? Is any of the other members even having quiet, off the record discussions with the Generals in charge of the country? Those like Japan which rely on auto assembly factories in Thailand will get concerned if/when there is an outbreak of violent anti-government demonstrations.
Member states of ASEAN all strictly adhere to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member nations. And the military regime in Thailand is hardly alone in Southeast Asia in its use of anti-democratic, repressive actions.
Re. Japan, interestingly figures for Japanese investment in Thailand have dropped sharply this year. There is some speculation that Japan may be gradually moving at least some of its manufacturing out of Thailand to Vietnam. But Japanese businesses have lived and profited under military dictatorship and coups in Thailand before, so this is more likely a commercial decision.
“…the high standards of Thailand’s foreign affairs establishment.”
I hope you’re attempting irony when you say this. Thailand’s foreign affairs establishment is notoriously incompetent.
No, I think it’s a fair judgment. Looked at from the perspective of the last century and a half, arguably Thailand’s foreign affairs establishment has been the most successful in Southeast Asia – an extremely volatile region where superpowers are constantly rubbing up against each other. By and large the people they have are extremely competent. Admittedly, over the last decade and a half it has been affected by the political crisis, as has almost every other institution in the country. But that’s more a statement of the depth of the crisis than the standard of the foreign affairs establishment.