The Tribunal found that China’s claimed ‘nine-dash line’ has no legal basis under UNCLOS and China could claim no ‘historic rights’ to resources in the South China Sea.
China did not participate in the proceedings and the Chinese foreign ministry has already announced that it ‘neither accepts nor recognises’ the decision. As the Tribunal has no enforcement mechanism in place, the ruling is unlikely to directly lead to a dispute resolution. Still a change of course in China’s approach is in order.
Besides China and the Philippines, the disputes over the South China Sea also involve Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan. While China has always preferred a bilateral approach, the Philippines sought the support of extra-regional powers, the United Nations and filed a case against China in the PCA. In 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam also jointly submitted their claims to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, although they have not filed individual cases against China.
While the Tribunal’s decision is in some ways not surprising, it is definitely bold. The challenges now facing China lie on two fronts. First, China faces an emboldened US naval presence to safeguard the interests of the United States and its allies in the region. Backed by the Tribunal’s decision, the United States could find itself more justified in patrolling the South China Sea waters and carrying on with its FONOPs (Freedom of Navigation Operations).
Just three days prior to the ruling, China held a week-long combat drill near the Paracel Islands involving ships from its North, East and South fleets. Clearly, China intends to send strong signals to Washington and its allies by exhibiting its naval capabilities.
Second, China faces heightened international claims that it is neither a responsible nor law-abiding global power. Criticism from several corners has already begun. Mindful of a possible backlash, China released its White Paper on the South China Sea, which further strengthens its position as outlined in December 2014. Beijing is also concerned about the acceptability of its claims in the international community, which is illustrated by the fact that it has decided to play a South China Sea propaganda video 120 times a day in Times Square, New York.
Given that the South China Sea is a critical part of China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, it cannot afford to not exercise restraint. Deadlock in the dispute is already damaging the prospects of the maritime arm of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, which promises to act as a catalyst for China to step up infrastructure connectivity in the region and beyond.
China spends a huge sum of its GDP every year to showcase its impressive growth, development and soft power. The fear of a poor image and possible isolation may lead China to strike a deal with the Philippines. Such an approach might not lead to a speedy resolution, but will ensure stability in the region.
Maintaining the ‘status quo’ while quietly trying to turn the situation in its favour is China’s preferred option in almost all of its territorial disputes. It is likely to strive to preserve the current situation in the South China Sea as well. Beijing might therefore reopen bilateral negotiations with Manila. China has also been asking countries in the region to endorse its stand. In April, Brunei, Cambodia and Laos endorsed China’s bilateral approach to resolving the dispute.
For the Philippines, the ruling has certainly bolstered its position. The Tribunal decision enables Manila to negotiate with China from a position of strength. Manila is likely to avoid an overly assertive posture — a move that is consistent with its business interests. President Rodrigo Duterte has already stated that he seeks a ‘soft landing’ with China on the matter. But if China continues to follow its assertive approach, the Philippines will need to rethink its policy. When push comes to shove, with the support of the United States and the Tribunal’s decision, Manila is unlikely to back down.
The South China Sea dispute is one of the biggest flashpoints of this century and any development will have repercussions for the entire region. Any lasting solution must ensure that regional peace and stability is maintained. Sustained communication, continuous dialogue and respect for international law are the only tools to achieve lasting peace, stability and order in the region.
Rahul Mishra is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi. Views expressed are personal and do not represent the views of ICWA.
Indonesia is another disputant in the South China Sea, because China claims that part of Indonesia’s EEZ around the Natuna islands constitute traditional fishing grounds for China. This is a concept that is not recognised in UNCLOS.
Indonesia has no strategy for contesting China’s claims beyond calling time and again for the signing of a Code of Conduct. If this can be called a policy, it makes no allowance for the advances that China has made in the South China Sea since this initiative was first announced over a decade ago.
President Jokowi has undermined Indonesia’s own stance on the South China Sea in his latest cabinet reshuffle by appointing General Wiranto, a thoroughly discredited Soeharto-era TNI commander, to the post of coordinating minister for politics, law and security. He shunted aside to a lesser post Luhut Panjaitan, who was probably developing some expertise in South China Sea issues. Wiranto has none.
The United States was no doubt delighted with the PCA ruling, but it didn’t require this outcome to encourage it continue with its freedom of navigation activities. If, as is very likely, Hillary Clinton succeeds Obama in the White House, we can expect a very assertive, if not hostile, approach towards China in the South China Sea. Let’s hope that no 3am phone calls reach Pennsylvania Ave from some crisis or at least collision in that area.
Once one considers the prospect of bilateral negotiations, which China has always insisted on as the only way to discuss the South China Sea claims, the question arises what Beijing might be prepared to offer Manila. Economic inducements are of course on the cards, but could China really agree to accept Philippine sovereignty over one or two of the islands or rocks in the ‘West Philippine Sea’? How would the Chinese government then explain to its citizens what the nine-dash line meant?
It would be very interesting to learn of India’s reaction to the PCA ruling, whether from Mr Mishra or another Indian observer. Stung by China’s opposition to its attempt to join the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, New Delhi’s unlikely to have been dismayed by Manila’s court victory.
Although the author opines that ‘a change of course is in order’ for China after the recent arbitration decision, he then goes on to describe how the PRC is basically continuing its efforts to convince the other countries in the region to go along with its claims. In fact, the recent announcement of joint naval operations with Russia and ongoing negotiations with the Philippines to fund infrastructure projects like rail construction might lead one to think that China is doubling down, so to speak.
The inability of ASEAN to come up with any statement about the SCS issues proves that the PRC is maintaining enough influence via its relations with Cambodia and Laos, at least, to prevent that organization from coming out directly in opposition to its policies. It is going to be a fascinating and at times worrisome next few months/years in the region.