The inclusion of a considerable number of former military officers in his administration has been Jokowi’s way to balance the influence of the oligarchs that supported him during his presidential campaign.
Arguably, one of the most significant appointments that Jokowi has made is the appointment of Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, a former Suharto era four-star special forces general.
Luhut’s appointment was important for Jokowi for several reasons. Other than providing a crucial channel to the military, Luhut has served to enforce some measure of discipline in the Cabinet. His presence is important for Jokowi to help him consolidate power. Some ministers have mocked Jokowi’s inability to rule, which showed their lack of respect for the president. In addressing political incoherence within Jokowi’s Cabinet, Luhut remarked that it is forbidden for state institutions, ministers or agencies to contradict the president.
Luhut asserted that ministers or state agencies are required to keep the president informed before making public statements. Jokowi justified these dispositions as a way to unify differing voices and interests within his Cabinet.
Luhut is also important to help him balance various oligarchic interests. One interesting strategy was Luhut’s endorsement last year of Rizal Ramli as the Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs. Rizal Ramli has a reputation as a controversial critic and Jokowi’s decision to position him in a very strategic and central ministry has left many wondering whether it was a deliberate strategy against the oligarchs.
Since he assumed the position, Rizal Ramli has devoted significant attention to criticising projects that are related to the interests of several oligarchs. The high-profile feuds included his public attack of Vice President Jusuf Kalla in August 2015 over the 35,000 megawatt electrical generator project that Kalla was proposing. Rizal Ramli also publicly attacked Sudirman Said, who was closely associated with Kalla, over the Freeport fiasco and the Masela gas field controversies.
Sudirman Said and Rizal Ramli were dismissed in the last reshuffle, providing Jokowi the opportunity to bring in a professional, Arcandra Tahar, to replace Sudirman Said. But the new minister was himself swiftly replaced after he was found to possess a US passport. Following this, Jokowi entrusted Luhut to temporarily cover Arcandra’s position.
Luhut’s strong connection with Setya Novanto, the newly appointed leader of the Functional Groups Party (Golkar), also increased leverage for Jokowi as he has an option to switch from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) led by Megawati Sukarnoputri to Golkar for the next presidential election. Setya was previously Speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR), but he resigned after the controversy surrounding the renewal of a contract with an affiliate of US-based Freeport-McMoRan that operates the world’s largest gold mine and third-largest copper mine. Setya was heard on tape asking for a share in a power plant in Papua in return for his role to persuade Jokowi and Luhut, his trusted adviser, to extend the Freeport contract.
Despite all these high-profile conflicts, Setya, with the strong endorsement of Luhut, was elected as the head of one of the most prominent political parties in Indonesia — Golkar — during its recent election. Although the election process during Golkar’s convention was allegedly mired in money politics, Setya’s election was applauded by the president. In return, Setya overturned Golkar’s neutral position to be one of Jokowi’s coalition supporters, adding a significant boost to Jokowi’s position.
Luhut’s powerful role in the Jokowi administration signifies the fundamental benefits gained by the president to solidify his political powerbase. Yet it has also aroused questions over Jokowi’s political independence.
Jokowi’s latest decision to move Luhut to a less prestigious position, as the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, has been seen by many as a sign of Jokowi’s growing wariness of Luhut’s overt influence in Cabinet. This is viewed as a display of Jokowi’s power designed to show that he is still the man in charge of his administration.
Although the appointment of Luhut appears to have diluted the overwhelming control that PDI-P had over him, Jokowi did not abandon his relations with his own party. In fact this relationship is important to deter Luhut’s growing influence in his Cabinet. In the beginning, Jokowi intended to make Luhut a ‘super minister’ by giving him dual positions as the Presidential Chief of Staff and Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law and Security. But the position of Chief of Staff was later given to Teten Masduki, an Indonesian anti-corruption activist, who has warm relations with Megawati. Jokowi appointed Pramono Anung, Megawati’s trusted man, as Cabinet Secretary so that Anung could bridge communication with the party.
This balancing act has shown that while Luhut’s presence is pivotal, it is essential for Jokowi to stay loyal to PDI-P. This will continue over the course of his administration, unless he is able to form his own party in the next election.
Emirza Adi Syailendra is a Research Analyst in the Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University. This is part of a series on the Jokowi presidency.
A version of this article was first published here by RSIS.
Luhut Panjaitan is a former three-star general who was given an honorary fourth star by President Abdurrahman Wahid.
It is important to distinguish rank held while an officer is on active service from one given on retirement. This helps differentiate between retired officers such as Wiranto and Ryamizard Ryacudu, both currently in Jokowi’s cabinet, from the more junior officer, Luhut Panjaitan.
Four-star generals normally don’t receive honorary promotions. It is thus easy for civilians to overlook these important rank distinctions that matter so much to the military.
It grated on Wiranto, for example, that President Yudhoyono was usually called a former four-star general, though his highest rank on active service had been, like Luhut’s, that of lieutenant-general.
There have been only three five-star generals in Indonesia’s history, two of them, Sudirman and Nasution, were dead by the time of their ‘promotion’. Soeharto, who was still alive and in office, was the other one.
Given that Luhut was a retired Christian lieutenant-general who held his last TNI post as long ago as 1999, it is hard to see how he could have been a ‘crucial channel to the military’ when Jokowi appointed him. Ryamizard, a Muslim, whom Jokowi appointed defence minister in 2014, held the four-star post of army chief of staff as late as February 2005.
Luhut is admittedly a far more worldly and cosmopolitan person than Ryamizard, who cuts rather a provincial figure. These characteristics did not, however, necessarily make Luhut a better channel to TNI than the defence minister. If he was indeed a ‘crucial channel’, maybe it was because of his much greater wealth.
The author’s discussion of Luhut’s importance is unfortunately rather confusing. Luhut held the posts of presidential chief of staff and coordinating minister concurrently for less than a month, too short a time for him to become a ‘super minister’.
Then Jokowi stunned Luhut this year by demoting him to the post of maritime affairs coordinating minister with practically no warning. Wiranto took Luhut’s former job. This is an unusual way of treating a ‘pivotal’ figure with a ‘powerful role’, particularly one who had long been Jokowi’s business partner.
To understand Luhut’s current status, one really needs some discussion of his relationship with Wiranto, whose appointment in the reshuffle was perhaps the most surprising one.
The account in this post of the Setya Novanto Freeport-McMoRan saga doesn’t capture the full gravity of the scandal. Setya was one of the most notorious wheeler-dealers in the DPR. It is difficult to think of any earlier DPR speaker forced to resign over a money scandal.
For Jokowi to applaud Setya’s election as Golkar chair shows how cynical and opportunistic he has become. One can only wonder how many illicit fortunes will be made as Jokowi’s signature infrastructure program proceeds.
Much appreciated for the clarification on Luhut’s rank.
I think the matter of channelling can be more subtle than mere use of wealth and rank. It can also be manifested in the form of advise — pointing the right person in the military to make transaction with, advising what the transaction would be, advising policy to appease the TNI, etc. One example would be Jokowi’s speech during ramadan in Cilangkap that pointed out three points: he will not apologise to PKI, he will not dismantle the territorial structure, and increasing the personnel welfare. It is almost difficult to imagine these points came from advise of civilian. The whole Jokowi’s warmth relations with civilian is also quite staggering, such as TNI support towards his overarching project (such as achieving food self-sufficiency, building roads, etc). It is almost impossible he could have done all of those things by himself (the civil military relations under Jokowi is a research that the author is currently completing).
Although he is more publicly known, of course, Luhut is not working alone here. There’s also other behind the scene figure such as Hendropriyono helping him.
Moreover, although Ryacudu or Wiranto held higher rank, at the end of the day, it depends on who are personally closer to the president.
With regards to the confusion of Luhut’s importance, that is exactly this article trying to ponder, whether Luhut is Jokowi kingmaker or not? I would like to suggest Jokowi is still trying to take a distance from Luhut, to hinder his overt influence over his administration. This, however, did not make him less important.
Very straightforward arguments, I personally like it when you provide relevant examples to support your theory.
But any one who has followed national newspapers in Indonesia can connect the dots as you would have and provide linking “conspiracy theory” as you did.
One sharp contrast to Luhut’s role in this is the fact that there are at least two former Golkar top-men aside from Luhut namely Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto. My point is, if you are to provide some linkages to Jokowi’s intention to opt for a switch alternative from PDI-P to Golkar why must it come from Luhut?
Second, Luhut is a devoted Christian Protestant and educated in the US (with MBA degree) aside from 4-star general as mentioned. If I were in Jokowi’s shoes it would make no sense to even consider any advise from him, let alone be influenced to choose men of his choosing in strategic positions. If that is not solid enough, try considering the majority (moslem) point of view, choosing someone from a “kafir” advice will make it unjustified.
So in my humble opinion, you still need to come up with something substantial evidence to support your cloudy judgement.
I still like your work though..keep it up!
Luhut Panjaitan is a former three-star general who was given an honorary fourth star by President Abdurrahman Wahid.
It is important to distinguish rank held while an officer is on active service from one given on retirement. This helps differentiate between retired officers such as Wiranto and Ryamizard Ryacudu, both currently in Jokowi’s cabinet, from the more junior officer, Luhut Panjaitan.
Four-star generals normally don’t receive honorary promotions. It is thus easy for civilians to overlook these important rank distinctions that matter so much to the military.
It grated on Wiranto, for example, that President Yudhoyono was usually called a former four-star general, though his highest rank on active service had been, like Luhut’s, that of lieutenant-general.
There have been only three five-star generals in Indonesia’s history, two of them, Sudirman and Nasution, were dead by the time of their ‘promotion’. Soeharto, who was still alive and in office, was the other one.
Given that Luhut was a retired Christian lieutenant-general who held his last TNI post as long ago as 1999, it is hard to see how he could have been a ‘crucial channel to the military’ when Jokowi appointed him. Ryamizard, a Muslim, whom Jokowi appointed defence minister in 2014, held the four-star post of army chief of staff as late as February 2005.
Luhut is admittedly a far more worldly and cosmopolitan person than Ryamizard, who cuts rather a provincial figure. These characteristics did not, however, necessarily make Luhut a better channel to TNI than the defence minister. If he was indeed a ‘crucial channel’, maybe it was because of his much greater wealth.
The author’s discussion of Luhut’s importance is unfortunately rather confusing. Luhut held the posts of presidential chief of staff and coordinating minister concurrently for less than a month, too short a time for him to become a ‘super minister’.
Then Jokowi stunned Luhut this year by demoting him to the post of maritime affairs coordinating minister with practically no warning. Wiranto took Luhut’s former job. This is an unusual way of treating a ‘pivotal’ figure with a ‘powerful role’, particularly one who had long been Jokowi’s business partner.
To understand Luhut’s current status, one really needs some discussion of his relationship with Wiranto, whose appointment in the reshuffle was perhaps the most surprising one.
The account in this post of the Setya Novanto Freeport-McMoRan saga doesn’t capture the full gravity of the scandal. Setya was one of the most notorious wheeler-dealers in the DPR. It is difficult to think of any earlier DPR speaker forced to resign over a money scandal.
For Jokowi to applaud Setya’s election as Golkar chair shows how cynical and opportunistic he has become. One can only wonder how many illicit fortunes will be made as Jokowi’s signature infrastructure program proceeds.