Based on the seismic waveforms, the blast is estimated to have been about 10 kilotons — more than twice as large as the recent test in January and is the most powerful test conducted so far by North Korea.
A more significant revelation from the test is the rapid progress that North Korea has made in developing their nuclear technology. According to the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), the test ‘finally examined and confirmed the structure and specific features of movement of [a] nuclear warhead that has been standardised to be able to be mounted on strategic ballistic rockets’.
In addition, KCNA explained that standardisation of a nuclear warhead, ‘will enable the DPRK to produce at will and as many as it wants a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power’.
North Korea’s fourth test in January 2016 came with an unconfirmed claim that their technology had progressed to the point of developing a hydrogen bomb. Regardless of their H-bomb capacity, or ability to standardise warheads, it is clear that North Korea already possess a closed technology, or at the very least will have such capacity very soon.
North Korean nuclear tests must be understood within the context of already highly tense US–China relations. The current debate over the South China Sea and cybersecurity are among a host of issues which have caused great strains between the two superpowers. Although Beijing has agreed to implement sanctions against North Korea, they have consistently opposed applying the tougher sanctions that the United States and others have called for.
Aside from sanctions, the United States has responded to the previous tests by staging a large-scale joint military exercise and the deployment of the THAAD missile defence system which enhances defence cooperation with South Korea and Japan. But, these measures have been viewed by Beijing as a means for the United States to enhance their strategic assets in the region.
As the situation develops, instead of dealing directly with North Korea, China may instead counter US policy by increasing its own strategic assets in Northeast Asia. Indeed, the ceaseless posturing between the United States and China allows North Korea a great deal of political leverage to conduct nuclear tests.
When we consider North Korea’s nuclear test records of the past — in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016 (in January) — the regime conducted their nuclear test roughly every three years. During this period the tests were used by North Korea to strengthen their position in negotiations. They demanded that the United States provide them with humanitarian and financial aid, energy assistance, cease US–ROK military exercises and sign a peace treaty as a precondition to discussing the issue of denuclearisation.
The restarting of the Yongbyon experimental nuclear reactors in March 2013 signalled a change. This allowed North Korea to modify their strategy and produce greater stockpiles of nuclear materials enabling more tests and accelerated their testing program.
This has also meant that the more recent tests have been absent from previous demands. Presently, North Korea has next to no interest in receiving economic assistance nor even security assurances for their de-nuclearisation. Rather, after realising that there will be no change to the US government’s policy of ‘strategic patience’ — a policy by which the United States would wait for North Korea to decide to de-nuclearise — North Korea is pursuing a strategy of ‘nuclear development first, negotiations later’.
Such a platform would allow North Korea a stronger position from which to negotiate as a state that possesses nuclear weapons. Washington’s imminent presidential transition presents a unique opportunity for Pyongyang. Both the incoming president and a ‘lame-duck’ Obama will be unable to take any military measures such as striking North Korea’s nuclear facilities.
Accordingly, it is likely that North Korea will conduct additional tests this year and make further progress towards a national nuclear program. In order to truly show that their nuclear capacity is a real threat to the United States, these tests would most likely involve a stronger amplification factor and an intercontinental ballistic missile with a standardised nuclear warhead.
The Obama administration stated that the latest nuclear test will not lead it to a change of its assessment of North Korea’s overall ‘nuclear and military capabilities’. But, North Korea will eventually reach nuclear capacity, in which case, the United States must take real action through either negotiation or a military intervention. In light of North Korea’s updated strategy, the incoming US president should re-think and reassess ‘strategic patience’.
Sangsoo Lee is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm.
This article was first published here on ISDP Voices.
The problem with negotiating with North Korea is that they won’t give up their nuclear weapons, so you would have to pay a billion or more a year for a freeze. Also the North will cheat and will not allow intrusive inspections to confirm their compliance. Then the US congress would never give the North a billion a year in fact I don’t think you could get 50 million a year. I believe the North is lying about its nuclear capabilities, the North has very little uranium in fact the Soviets said they had none worth mining. So they get uranium at great difficulty and expense. Then they have to choose between nuclear fuel for their 5 MW reactor or uranium enrichment for a uranium bomb. Obama has kicked the can down the road and handed off a much worse situation in North Korea then when he first became President 8 years ago. George Bush endangered the world with his reckless actions and Obama has endangered the world with his reckless inaction. China has a 400 billion balance of trade surplus with the US as they continue to aid North Korea to get nuclear weapons in order is kill millions of Americans. Make China choose between aid to North Korea or access to US markets, that is what a patriotic government would do, but we haven’t had one of those in decades and the future does not look bright unless you like mushroom clouds.
I know that North Korea never gives up its nuke. I also think it is not good idea to have negotiation to compromise. But during the past process of Six party talks, the dialogue could stop North Korea’s nuclear test and at least delayed its nuclear development.
One might hope that Six Party talks might reduce the tension in the region. The USA and others achieved an agreement with Iran but only after many years of effort and being close to failure more than one time. IF the USA and China can find avenues on which they agree, they might be able to accomplish something. But one must also realize that this Kim is different from his father. Up to now he seems impervious to Chinese efforts, limited as these are, to get him to lessen these activities.
The time is overdue for planning how to deal with the uncomfortable truth (Bennett Ramberg, Unpalatable Choices: Facing North Korea’s Nuclear Reality, YaleGlobal ONLINE, Sep. 20).
Pyongyang and Tokyo have known that President Obama does not do anything except delivering flowery speeches. Pyongyang has been happy with President Obama’s eight years’ inaction.
But Tokyo has been unhappy; people related with foreign affairs in Tokyo have nicknamed him the American Naoto Kan. (Kan was prime minister from 2010 June to 2011 September.)
Thanks for the suggestion to read Ramberg’s article. He opines that the USA and the world should accept the fact that the DPRK is and will be a nuclear state. He does not articulate very clearly what should be done after that, however.
What would you have Obama actually do?
Should he initiate a pre-emptive strike against the DPRK’s nuclear facilities, etc? That would lead to a huge counter attack on Seoul where the DPRK has a huge number of conventional artillery aimed with thousands, if not millions, of lives lost. Would Kim also attack Tokyo and other parts of Japan?
What other ideas do you or the foreign affairs people in Tokyo have?
Your questions are a little bit too hard for a layman like me.
Mr. Kevin Maher, who long worked in the US embassy in Tokyo, said on Japanese TV, “President Obama is not even up to understanding his foreign policy is in disarray and not working at all.”
President Obama will leave office quietly. But if he preempted North Korean nuclear facilities even at the cost of Japanese casualities, it would be a better option than leaving North Korean nuclear weapons intact. This would be something that we might have to do some time.
I do not know what ideas Japanese specialists have or what views they are exchanging and discussing with American counterparts.
Ex-defense minister Nakatani (NK) and a Japanese specialist appeared on TV the other day. NK often refused on account of confidentiality to comment on specific matters.
The other specialist seemed to have an inside track. He said they were mulling the possibility, for instance, of developing cruise missiles with an American consent to hit at Pyongyang and Yongbyon. He also said they were considering the possibility of North Korea contacting ISIS for terrorist activities so that it would engage in terrorism in South Korea through South Korean sympathisers. (North Korea blew up a flying South Korean passenger airliner once.)
The North will not be content with their own nuclear weapons; it can give its know-how to other countries or dangerous groups.
An American high administration official (it may have been Mr. Michael Green,) went to Beijing soon after the North’s second test. Every Chinese he talked with said the North’s nuclear weapon was a small matter of little consequence to them; their principal concern was the Chinese economy continuing growth.
Some Japanese say Chinese might not be displeased with the North’s neclear weapons because it would confound the United States and Japan.
I feel perhaps anything is better than allowing North Korea to be a nuclear country.