It will also impact on the Philippines, the current ASEAN chair and America’s oldest ally in the region.
If everything goes according to plan, Trump will travel to Southeast Asia to take part in the fourth summit between ASEAN and the United States next November. Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, has used this platform and related summits during his two terms to strengthen ties with ASEAN. The grouping has been seen as a fulcrum around which the global powers can meet and network both formally and informally.
This year’s summit in February was an extraordinary event — a symbol of Obama’s successful engagement with ASEAN leaders, whom he has met with on 11 occasions. His rebalance policy has also augmented the United States’ commitment to peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific.
By joining the Philippine hosted ASEAN–US Summit, the new US administration would also send a strong signal that Washington still values strategic and security ties with Manila. Just a few weeks ago, President Duterte repeatedly declared that he would like his country to distance itself from the United States. He also expressed a wish to decrease the scope of joint US–Philippines military exercises, and said that he may even scrap the new agreement on enhanced security cooperation concluded last year under the Aquino administration.
If the new US president decides to skip the trip next November and focuses instead on domestic or other issues, the ASEAN–US relationship will quickly falter as other major powers compete fiercely for influence in Asian space. Most importantly, Trump will miss the opportunity to meet with other leaders from East Asia, who will join the leaders-only security forum known as the East Asia Summit (EAS).
After the EAS expanded in 2011 to include the United States and Russia, the former has dominated the agenda, pushing strategic issues such as counter-terrorism and climate change into the mainstream. In recent months, the regional political and security landscape has shifted in response to growing anxieties about the new direction of US politics. Any indication that the United States is paying less attention to the region would severely damage its credibility.
Without Trump, other EAS leaders will fill the vacuum and set the EAS agenda, especially on issues related to instituting a new regional security architecture. It is an open secret that China and Russia are actively promoting their own comprehensive security arrangements.
After Duterte’s visit to Beijing last month, the Philippines’ relationship with China has improved dramatically, despite the July decision by The Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration on the South China Sea. Neither side discussed the verdict during the visit: instead they chose to dwell on the future of trade, investment and joint cooperation and development in the disputed maritime areas.
By addressing maritime disputes bilaterally with China, Duterte has done what his predecessors have failed to do — return to ASEAN’s long-held position that territorial battles must be settled bilaterally and that other aspects of joint cooperation can be engaged with under the framework of the ASEAN–China relationship.
Adding salt to the wound, the expected demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a US-led high-end free trade agreement, has demoralised its Asian signatories, especially the four ASEAN members (Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia and Singapore) who placed their faith in the US economy.
China under President Xi Jinping has adopted an extremely pro-active foreign and economic policy stance, enticing more and more countries into the Chinese sphere of influence. The Belt and Road initiative is gradually making inroads as the first continent-wide connectivity scheme. With 57 member countries, China’s financial brainchild — the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank — is beginning to provide much-needed funds for essential infrastructure projects in the region.
By reducing tensions with China over the maritime disputes these past months, Manila has strengthened China–ASEAN cooperation on the eve of its 25th anniversary. If the trend continues and relationships remain productive, other claimants may move to settle and manage their disputes with China. Malaysia’s recent discussion with China over its maritime issues with China is a good example. As the Philippines returns to ASEAN’s embrace, Duterte will play a crucial role in ASEAN’s engagement with the major powers contesting for influence in the region.
But it remains to be seen how the Trump administration will deal with maritime security issues.
For the time being, claimants in the South China Sea are pursuing a wait and see strategy and sticking to the status quo following the Hague verdict. This provides some space for the parties to work out their differences and identify common areas of interest for joint development and cooperation.
Kavi Chongkittavorn is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University.
Khun Kavi,
Good article. As you suggest, US-ASEAN relations could well be at a tipping point. China’s economic influence in the region would likely exceed that of the United States in any event, but the collapse of the TPP and the Chinese-backed infrastructure bank will certainly accelerate that process.
Politically, the undemocratic, authoritarian regimes that dominate most ASEAN countries will share more with Beijing than with Washington. It will require a depth of commitment and diplomatic dexterity unlikely to come from a Trump presidency to turn this tide. Unfortunately, the only pivot we may be talking about before too long will be ASEAN’s pivot away from its decades-old relationship with the United States.
“Politically, the undemocratic, authoritarian regimes that dominate most ASEAN countries will share more with Beijing than with Washington.”
In this case, the authoritarian Trump administration is the best contender against the influence of authoritarian Xi administration in the region.
Time will tell whether Trump has the interest, let alone the patience, to cope with the snail’s pace of deliberations that are part and parcel of ASEAN’s processes. I, for one, doubt he will.
Interesting that the Philippines and China take a step closer to each other after the Court ruled against China’s activities on the islands, etc. It seems as if that gave Duterte political cover to do this.
Trump can fix the US-Philippine relations. If he will not pull the American companies in the Philippines and invest more in the Philippines especially on BPO sector. If Trump is committed to deport filipino illegals, that won’t be a problem because the Philippines acknowledges the laws of the US. Another important thing, is Trump willing to send big chunk of aid to the Philippines especially militarily and I’m talking about at least a billion US dollars. Duterte seeks huge aid from the US because the US spent billions of dollars to Egypt and Pakistan who just ditched the US after the deal while here is the Philippines a formal ally, being threaten by China and is also facing terrorism is considered by the US as not under threat.
It’s wrong to say that China has threatened the Philippines. The US, Japan and Spain have invaded and colonized the Philippines but not China, despite ex-President Marcos’s annexing of 8 features in China’s Spratly Islands in 1978, using presidential decree 1596.
In fact, President Duterte have recently said “I would rather go to Russia and to China, At least, even if we do not agree with the ideology, they have respect for the people.”
Why would China threaten the Philippines when China has signed MOUs to invest in the Philippines, worth US$13 billion plus another US$11 billion later?
Especially the four ASEAN members (Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia and Singapore)