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Countering terror in Bangladesh

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Policemen patrol on the road leading to the Holey Artisan Bakery and the O'Kitchen Restaurant after gunmen attacked, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 3 July, 2016. (Photo: Reuters/Adnan Abidi).

In Brief

2016 was a challenging year for counterterrorism in Bangladesh. The so-called Islamic State (IS) succeeded in carrying out a series of attacks, most notably the July attack in the capital city of Dhaka. Despite counterterrorism operations by Bangladeshi authorities, the group’s residual strength remains significant.

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Bangladesh is facing an additional threat from Ansar al-Islam, the local chapter of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Local terrorist groups are also reportedly reorganising.

The rise of IS in Bangladesh has significantly affected the country’s security landscape. 2016 saw at least a dozen targeted killings of religious and sectarian minorities, particularly in the north–western and south–western regions. These attacks were important indicators of the growing influence of IS in the country. The group conducted its most lethal attack on 1 July on the Holey Artisan Café in the diplomatic zone of Dhaka. 20 hostages, mostly foreigners, were killed during the attack.

The attack came at a time when Bangladeshi authorities were in a state of denial about the growing traction of IS in the country. Investigations showed the attackers were trained in Gaibandha, a northern district of the country. The firearms and materials for the grenades used by the attackers were manufactured in Bihar, India and smuggled to Bangladesh via the Chapainawabganj border. It was an unprecedented attack, in which a large number of foreigners were targeted. Due to the massive media coverage it received, it is believed that terrorists might use it as a model for future attacks in the country.

Since at least September 2015, IS has been showing increasing interest in Bangladesh. In early 2016, the 14th issue of IS’ propaganda magazine, Dabiq, included two interviews focusing on Bangladesh. One was of Bangladeshi IS leader Abu Ibrahim al Hanif, who emphasised the geographic significance of Bangladesh for expanding the group’s activities to India and Myanmar. It also included another separate interview of a Bangladeshi foreign fighter Abu Jandal al-Bangali who died in Syria.

IS in Bangladesh has also shown its ability to raise funds, both from domestic and external channels. Concurrently, it has recruited from both urban and affluent classes, as well as from the often experienced and madrassa-educated members of the local terrorist group Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Within Bangladesh, IS has 50–60 active and well trained members, with a further 50 Bangladeshis having travelled to Syria. The diversity of its local memberships shows IS’ message is gaining traction across different segments of society. With IS losing territories in its heartlands in Iraq and Syria, it will likely shift to other wilayat (governorates), particularly in the Middle East and Afghanistan, which may also implicate Bangladesh.

AQIS also remains a long-term threat to Bangladesh’s security due to its relatively wider local network. AQIS is largely represented by Ansarullah Bangla Team or Ansar al Islam but also has connections with JMB and Harkat ul Jihad al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), the oldest terrorist group in Bangladesh. Though AQIS in Bangladesh has previously used cold weapons, it is rapidly developing its own capacity to produce explosives.

AQIS propaganda is easily accessible online, which is a key factor behind the growing radicalisation in the country. The group has also been active in spreading its propaganda materials in the local Bengali language.

On top of IS and AQIS, Bangladesh faces a significant threat from various other groups, especially JMB. JMB’s activities continue even though many of the group’s key leaders are in prison. A significant portion of JMB’s funds are now being channelled into the procurement of arms and explosives from India. Meanwhile, the HuJI-B is also reportedly regrouping, mostly in the port city of Chittagong.

Since the Holey Artisan Café attack, Bangladeshi authorities have undertaken some new initiatives to counter terrorism. The newly-formed taskforce Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) Unit became fully functional and carried out at least seven major operations in which at least 30 terrorists — including the IS leader in Bangladesh Tamim Ahmed Chowdhury — were killed. Bangladeshi authorities also disrupted an incoming remittance of US$50,000 sent from Spain through China.

Law enforcement agencies, particularly the CTTC Unit of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police and the Rapid Action Battalion, have launched mobile apps to help citizens report terrorism related information. Bangladesh has also launched a new programme offering cash incentives to militants for renouncing radicalism, though its effectiveness remains to be seen. A leading group of Islamic scholars in Bangladesh have issued a fatwa (religious edict) condemning terrorism and militancy, including violent attacks on non-Muslims. The fatwa was signed by more than 100,000 Islamic scholars, legal experts and clerics.

But Bangladesh must scale up the social media intelligence and special weapons and tactics capabilities of its police force if it wants to keep pace with terrorist groups. Another key weakness of Bangladesh’s counterterrorism policy is that it lacks a rehabilitation program for terrorist detainees and inmates. As 2016 comes to an end, it is evident that IS ideology will persist, despite the organisation’s relatively weak operational capability. Bangladesh is also likely to see a gradual re-emergence of AQIS as it attempts to reclaim turf in the country.

Looking to the future, both groups may try to exploit the plight of the Rohingya people in western Myanmar. Bangladesh–Myanmar border areas are a vulnerable place and almost all terrorist groups in Bangladesh use the Rohingya crisis in their recruitment rhetoric. According to unofficial estimates nearly 100,000 Rohingyas have crossed over to Bangladesh. It is highly likely that the upsurge of violence in western Myanmar will play a key role in boosting the funding and manpower of Bangladeshi terrorist groups.

The terrorist threat to Bangladesh will remain and likely grow in 2017. The targets of terrorist groups have clearly expanded and so has their recruitment pool, which includes a vulnerable segment of Bangladeshi diaspora. Bangladesh needs to commit to sustained and long-term investment in scaling up its counterterrorism capabilities.

Iftekharul Bashar is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. An earlier version of this article first appeared in the Counter Terrorism Trends and Analysis, a Journal of International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at RSIS.

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