Some experts in Japan argue that the remaining participants should ratify the TPP and wait for the United States to join in a few years. They insist that Japan should not follow Trump’s suggestion of instigating bilateral negotiations with the United States. The TPP without the United States will not benefit some participants, including Japan and Vietnam. So long as the TPP remains the model for free trade agreements in the 21st century — as Abe has repeated on a few occasions — Japan and Australia are justified in trying to unite the remaining TPP members, sign the treaty and wait until the United States returns to a free trade regime in a few years.

But Abe has not acted upon this advice. As Trump quickly rejected the TPP and demanded that Canada and Mexico renegotiate NAFTA, Abe leant forward, presumably accepting the inevitability of bilateral negotiations with the United States. In his phone conversation with Trump on 28 January, Abe did not mention the TPP. And in his upcoming meeting with Trump in Washington on 10 February, Abe may agree to bilateral US–Japan negotiations instead of insisting on the TPP’s survival.

Some argue that with the TPP crumbling, Japan should promote the ongoing Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, thereby setting a model trade standard for the Asia Pacific. But RCEP sets a lower benchmark than the TPP. The RCEP negotiations themselves have been conducted in competition with the TPP, and as the TPP stumbles then there is less pressure to finalise RCEP. RCEP’s conclusion, originally set for the end of 2016, has been extended.

With global sentiment currently against the free movement of goods, services and people, at least APEC’s modest and steady modality still offers hope for open trade and investment in the Asia Pacific. And the United States cannot withdraw from APEC without legal enforcement.

Another pressing issue that will be raised in the meeting is the current US trade imbalance with Japan. The US–Japan trade imbalance was the main source of bilateral conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of services and capital imbalances moving in opposite directions. Economists from both countries took the side of economic rationality and the issue calmed down for the following two decades. But tensions have again resurfaced, this time on Trump’s Twitter account.

According to reports, Abe will seek to counter Trump’s trade concerns by proposing the US–Japan Growth and Employment Initiative to generate 700,000 jobs in the United States and create new markets worth $450 billion over the next decade. This would be on top of the estimated 1.5 million jobs that Japanese firms have already generated in the United States. This is not just any business deal, with the Japanese government’s pension fund being mobilised for it. This policy mirrors the traditional Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) strategy of stimulating the domestic economy, only this time Abe is applying it to the United States.

But is Abe trying too hard? These economic manoeuvres won’t necessarily help the US rust belt. Rather, Abe needs to convince Trump of his economic reasoning and insist on the necessity of continued bilateral economic cooperation in this globalised world.

Some Japanese believe that if the United States forgoes international cooperation under Trump, Japan should try to improve its diplomatic relations with China and strengthen non-military security rather than stirring tensions in East Asia. Abe appears to be moving in the opposite direction.

In fact, Abe’s recent diplomatic moves may be more about China’s military threat in the East and South China Sea than any economic issue. Abe’s priority to solidify the US–Japan military alliance — despite its increasing financial burden — as well as his visit to three TPP countries might have been motivated by a desire to strengthen security cooperation closer to home.

The LDP has long maintained close contact with US defence establishment personnel on diplomacy, including Republicans with hardline views. During his first visit to Japan as US Defense Secretary, James Mattis reaffirmed the US military commitment to defend the Senkaku Islands under the terms of the Japan–US Security Treaty and showed appreciation for Japan’s increased defence spending. Hopefully the new Secretary of State and other Republican leaders around Trump will show more sensibility than the President has thus far.

Ippei Yamazawa is Emeritus Professor of International Economics at Hitotsubashi University, Japan.