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Factoring Trump into the US–Australia alliance

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US President Donald Trump delivers a speech in Washington, United States (Photo: Reuters/Jim Bourg).

In Brief

Around the world, political leaders, foreign ministries and defence establishments are trying to work out what the Trump administration means for them and how they should deal with it. The dilemma is sharper in Canberra than in many other places because the expectations of the US alliance are so deeply set and smoothly honed.

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‘We have no closer relationship’, each side whispers to the other. ‘We have fought alongside you from the Battle of Fromelles in 1918 to the struggle against ISIS in Iraq’, Australian politicians remind their US counterparts.

But the Washington Post’s startling account of the first telephone call between President Trump and Prime Minister Turnbull revealed to the public a concern that was already preoccupying Canberra policymakers. This administration is clearly different from any Australia has experienced since the ANZUS treaty was signed in 1951. The transformation of one of the pleasant rituals of the alliance — first contact between president and prime minister — into a bad-tempered exchange that was then leaked to the press was an alarming reminder of that difference.

The most immediate challenge facing policymakers in Canberra is who to deal with in Washington. Before Trump’s victory in the Republican primary, Australian officials expected that, whatever the result of the election, the great wheel of Washington politics would continue to turn. One group of policy specialists, well known to their Australian counterparts, would shift from the think tanks and universities into the offices of the administration, to be replaced in turn by the departing incumbents.

But Trump upset the applecart. Many experienced Republicans declared their opposition to Trump and refused to serve the new administration. Their disdain was reciprocated by the new President and his supporters, who were happy to discard the foreign policy establishment along with some of the core tenets of the US-led post-war global order.

As a result, senior positions in the new administration will be unstaffed for longer than usual, then filled by people less familiar with the Australia–US relationship. It will take time for the embassy in Washington to develop contacts and even longer for Australian officials to establish the sort of relationships that permit easy communication in difficult times. The hopeful line that cabinet appointees like Defence Secretary Mattis and Secretary of State Tillerson will be able to offset the President’s obvious volatility is whistling in the dark.

A deeper problem is one of language. For 65 years, Australian politicians of all parties have delivered speeches which have reinforced the familiar tropes about an alliance which is based on shared interests and shared values. It is hard to envisage the same language being used on the Prime Minister’s next trip to Washington.

It is not just that our interests have diverged. That’s often happened in the past, although it can be overplayed; contested interests in the Japanese beef market are rather different from a disagreement about an open, rules-based global trading system.

But the expectation of shared values — the promotion of democracy, support for the rule of law — has always been there. But when the administration drafts presidential decrees calling for the review of US participation in treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, you know that something very different is underway.

The history of Australian foreign policy sometimes looks like a chronicle of efforts to avoid unwanted choices. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s it was the choice between Britain and the United States that we tried to avert, then one between China and the United States. ‘Australia does not have to choose between its history and its geography’, declared John Howard. Now, choices are coming at us from all directions.

The text of the ANZUS Treaty essentially says that ‘if things get bad, give us a call and we’ll have a chat about what to do’. Its force and deterrent power has always depended on deep underlying expectations about the instincts and intentions of a United States committed to common international rules and norms.

The natural tendency of Australian foreign policy advisers faced with change is to suggest going along for the ride and seeing where things end up. It is sometimes excellent advice. But not this time. The United States remains a diverse and resilient country, and the better angels of its nature will certainly touch it again. But when they do, the country and the world will be different.

Trump is only the latest manifestation of the broad global change, nationalistic and deglobalising, confronting Australian policymakers. No one now working in Canberra has had to contend with systemic uncertainty on this scale. You have to go back to the early 1960s, when Australia realised that Britain could no longer sustain its strategic position east of Suez or provide the same market for its products, to find a similar shift. The drafters of the Australian foreign policy White Paper and their policy bosses have their work cut out. The post-war global era is over.

Allan Gyngell is Adjunct Professor of Public Policy and Director of the Crawford Australian Leadership Forum at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.

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