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Trump and Xi on dangerous ground amid THAAD blowback

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Seongju residents protesting against the government's decision to deploy a US THAAD anti-missile defence unit in Seongju county, South Korea, 21 July, 2016 (Photo: Reuters/Kim Hong-Ji).

In Brief

It is possible that under its next president, South Korea will buckle after months of overt Chinese economic pressure and suspend deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system, exposing them to further bullying by Beijing. But it is also possible that they will succumb to pressure to deploy the system from impeached former president Park Geun-hye and their US allies Barack Obama and Donald Trump, increasing bilateral and regional tensions beyond their already tense state.

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The choice between the two options is a policy vice, forfeiting flexibility and opportunities the new president should have. Either way, he could alienate one of the superpowers that must cooperate to avoid a new Korean, and perhaps regional, conflagration.

But a new president may refuse to make this Hobson’s choice. South Korea has just provided a moving example of how democracy should work in a way that is uniquely South Korean, almost unprecedented and the envy of much of the world. Broad-based civic activism — combined with a relatively free press and a popular consensus and insistence that governing institutions must be accountable to the public — has now emboldened a new generation of South Koreans, to whom the democracy struggles of the 1970s and 1980s are only a historical memory. Six weeks ago, one demonstrator in Seoul expressed an unforgettable modern maturity: ‘We made a mistake electing Park. Now we will have to get her out and try to do this right the next time’. Americans should be taking notes.

Even a relatively inexperienced South Korean president, taking office after the policy upheavals of the past two decades, would not permit their administration to start under a cloud of subservience to China, to the United States or to their disgraced predecessor.

Much public criticism of the impeached president was directed at her support for the THAAD deployment and her inability to resolve the Chinese economic boycott. We cannot expect that the millions who filled the streets since October will sit quietly if the next Blue House occupant – in their eyes – gives in to Beijing or Washington. Instead the new president may decide to do neither, and stand up to both Xi and Trump in order to preserve South Korean sovereignty and put Korea’s weight behind a regional plan to make each party more secure.

Could the new president pull off this high wire act? These high-stakes political and diplomatic moves carry serious risks.

An immediate task is to alter the calculation of Xi Jinping, who apparently thinks China can control Seoul’s policies through economic warfare. Before the THAAD issue is settled, the South Korean president may insist that China clearly and unequivocally end its economic war. He would need to brace for extended losses from the boycott in any case, but a leader with his enormous democratic mandate, following the ouster of President Park, would certainly command Xi’s attention. A political and economic confrontation between China and South Korea is already underway, and the new Korean administration may judge that it should quickly be addressed head-on.

After that, the South Korean president could turn to the THAAD deployment. Experts have minimised the military utility of this one unit, noting that Japan already hosts two and that Chinese missiles could probably defeat the system’s radar in most contingencies. But THAAD’s symbolic and political impact has far outstripped its defence capabilities. If China views its deployment to South Korea as part of the expanding encroachment on eastern China by linked US-allied missile defences, Beijing could feel compelled to upgrade its own small arsenal of nuclear missiles to preserve a credible deterrent against attack.

When THAAD’s lack of military importance is set against the likely plans of a new South Korean president to reenergise diplomatic and economic engagement with North Korea, Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow and Washington, a Korean decision to keep it in a warehouse — or perhaps even request its removal — may become appealing.

US officials should not be surprised if this happens. Their rush to deploy the system while the public remains bitterly divided over former President Park’s decision to do so, and while her impeachment was pending, has almost guaranteed its rejection. The main opposition party is already preparing for the National Assembly to sue the president in the Constitutional Court in order to force the THAAD decision to go through a normal approval process. They are certainly aware of the political cost if it is accepted as a done deal.

The interconnected issues of THAAD, North Korea and China will define the new president’s single five year term at its start. Serious observers and analysts are increasingly worried about the risk of clashes and even war on the Korean Peninsula, and the role of the South Korean administration will be crucial.

There are ways to play these issues besides the alternatives discussed here. But since the election of George W. Bush in 2000, South Korea’s middle power activism has been suppressed, either by its own leaders or in response to outside pressure. After Park’s impeachment last week, diplomatic creativity could return to the centre of South Korean policy. Only by demanding that both China and the US adopt policies that truly enhance Korea’s security can Korea’s next president best serve his own people, and position the country to expand its contribution to regional problem solving.

Stephen Costello is an independent analyst and consultant and the producer of AsiaEast. He was formerly director of the Korea Program at the Atlantic Council, director of the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation, and vice president of Gowran International.

5 responses to “Trump and Xi on dangerous ground amid THAAD blowback”

  1. Talk about being caught between the proverbial ‘rock and a hard place!’ The ROK’s next President will need a strong backbone to deal with the competing agendas of the PRC vs the USA/Japan.

    I would appreciate reading more about the other alternatives than the ones discussed in this analysis. Also, more on the ‘creative diplomacy’ alluded to here.

    • Richard – Thanks for your reply. Here in Washington, Senator Elizabeth Warren, the consumer’s advocate, has become famous for yelling at fellow democrats to “grow a spine!” and I think she would appreciate your point.
      Of course the kind of steely self-confidence needed to engage in this kind of high-stakes diplomacy, particularly with the ROK’s main trading partner and only ally, is rare. But that is why presidents who are not up to that task have been overrun by stronger or more wily adversaries. It will be a shame if the ROK allows this to happen to them again.
      As for other alternatives, there are many. One would be to carefully craft a moderate initiative that addresses the concerns of China and the US, and that begins to get at the DPRK weapons. This has worked before, and plans have been gathering dust for 16 years on some cases.
      It probably depends on how good the next president is at bringing top thinkers together, mending internal fences, and establishing a policy implementation structure that is smart, transparent, and lean.

      • Thanks, Stephen, for taking the time to reply.

        I audited a course on Korean history a few years ago in which the veteran professor noted that Koreans often view themselves as ‘a shrimp among the whales’ (of China, Japan, and the USA). As such, the country runs the risk of becoming the meal for one, or more, of its larger powerful neighbors,doesn’t it? A very challenging position for any politician to be in!

        I believe Clinton with Albright as Sec of State was close to accomplishing some meaningful progress with the DPRK and China just before his term of office ended. Then Bush 2 came in, 9/11 happened, and the DPRK was seen as part of ‘the Axis of Evil.’ So much for ‘creative diplomacy’!’

        It is admittedly early in the Trump administration but I have grave reservations that he possesses any of the qualities you noted in your last sentence. Hastily put together executive orders, saber rattling,self absorption, and espressions of admiration for ‘strong’ leaders like Putin are not hopeful signs of someone inclined to engage in admittedly challenging and complex diplomacy.

  2. The real problem is simple to solve if it’s just a militaristic NK.

    US forces pulls out of SK, and between SK, NK, China and Russia craft a security guarantee for both SK and NK, that reunification is to be done peacefully and neither side will resort to force, with China and Russia as the guarantors that put some real teeth on the table.

    With security worked out SK and China can then push NK on a path to develop modern economy and train a new class of competent bureaucrats that can be more focused on civil matters rather than military matters. We can begin to see results within half year to one year if implemented correctly. Then denuclearization is only a matter of time.

    US is the fifth wheel – completely not needed in the solution as far as militaristic NK is concerned(I would say in the course of events US is actually the one propelling the problem).

    • Richard – There may come a day when the US can pull out of SK and the neighbors can work it out among themselves. There is more logic to your point than many “experts” would admit. But for the foreseeable future China’s behavior makes it critical that the US remain deeply involved. Globalization, in all its complex and unstoppable dimensions, also argues for continued US involvement.
      When the US had a president who appreciated the linked economic development and security dimensions of the NK problem, it supported a process very much like the one you describe. That was only 17 years ago. But US leadership on the NK issue has been rare, and is becoming less likely. As you note at the end of your comment, the US decision during this period to fear talking and prefer pressure has contributed to the rise in tension we see today.
      All of which puts new responsibility on the next SK president. He may not be up to the job, but if he is smart and organized enough he can make Korea a driving force for new agreements and carefully bring the US up in support. A tall order indeed.

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