The first Panglong Conference in August 2016 was a landmark event that brought together representatives of key ethnic groups to discuss ending Myanmar’s long-running civil conflicts. One of the key items on the agenda this time around will be the search for an agreement on the fundamental principles of the Union Accord. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) terms imply that only signatory Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) have the right to be involved in decision-making processes with respect to the Union Accord’s principles. NCA was signed by eight of the EAOs in 2015. But many of the agreements under the NCA, especially the interim arrangement between NCA and Political Dialogue, are yet to be properly implemented. Although the NCA and the follow-up political dialogue framework promised the signatories political dialogues in their respective states, not all signatories have enjoyed such rights.

The Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) — Myanmar’s peace decision-making body — has agreed to draft state constitutions for each state and region as one of the fundamental principles. This was aimed at solidifying signatories’ commitment to the NCA pathway. But there has been debate as to whether the 2008 constitution amendment should take place before drafting additional state constitutions. Generating a consensus on drafting the state constitutions is important and providing opportunities to address such issues in-depth will make the conference more meaningful for signed EAOs.

Another hope for the conference is for more of the EAOs to sign the NCA. But this goal may be hampered by the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) — a coalition of EAOs that formed in 2011 — and its 8-point demands, which promote ‘all inclusive’ principles. At the same time, the government has been pressing hard to reach a ‘Deed of Commitment’ agreement with the non-signatory EAOs that would prefer to not sign the NCA straight away. Regardless, if UNFC’s 8-point demands are not met, it is possible that these likely-to-sign players may choose to not sign the NCA as it will affect their unity.

Some observers are concerned that the NCA has not helped end war on the ground. Since June 2011, intense conflict has broken out intermittently between the military and a group of EAOs known as the Northern Alliance, comprised of the Kachin independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA). The government did not invite three of the Northern Alliance members to participate in the first 21st Century Panglong Conference in 2016. Instead, the alliance commenced dialogues with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and these seven EAOs established a new negotiating committee.

This committee has called for a proposal of ‘inclusive participation’, which offers an alternative opportunity for political dialogue without having to sign the NCA. Political observers argue that this group alone makes up nearly 80 per cent of arms strength in Myanmar. They are also based in geopolitically significant locations on the China–Myanmar border. If the government adheres to an NCA pathway without considering discussions with this new committee, future conflict is likely. On China’s request, these seven EAOs will join conference. Attending either as observers or special guests, the non-signatory EAOs cannot take part in discussion.

Myanmar’s National League for Democracy (NLD) government has put the peace process at the forefront of the country’s reform strategy. But it has not been successful in curbing the conflict between the military and EAOs or convincing non-signatories to sign the NCA. Making its first ceasefire deal with non-EAOs is proving to be a monumental task for the NLD.

Meanwhile, the military has already made it clear to all stakeholders that they support the NCA pathway to peace and accept the ‘six principles of peace’, one of which is a demand that EAOs must adhere to the 2008 constitution. This provides the government little opportunity for intensive negotiations with major non-signatories, who are at this stage very unlikely to sign the NCA.

The current peace dilemma is enormous. Reaching any agreement through this mechanism without the consent of major non-NCA signatories will push them further away from the NCA pathway and may potentially incite more radical demands. If the government presses hard on signing the Deed of Commitment agreement or the NCA without fulfilling some of the demands from the UNFC, non-signatory EAOs are unlikely to come on board. At worst, they may look for alternatives.

Overall, the government must bring major non-signatories to the discussion table in order to stop ongoing conflict and make the peace process more inclusive. But the NLD government will find it tough to push for concessions given that the NCA conditions are controlled tightly by the military.

While it is overambitious to expect a ground-breaking agreement from this conference, the event is still a necessary step towards breaking the current impasse in Myanmar’s peace process. The NLD government must act with a delicate hand.

Su Mon Thazin Aung is Deputy Director of Training and Capacity Building at the Institute of Strategy and Policy, Myanmar.