On 3 May 2017, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced his intention to revise Article 9 of the constitution. One of his proposals is to add a new sentence that will make it clear that the government can keep its Self-Defence Forces (SDF), while maintaining the first and second clauses. He mentioned that he hopes to see the new sentence come into effect in 2020. Article 9 currently states that, ‘the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes’ and that ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised’.

Since he was appointed as the 96th Prime Minister in December 2012, Abe has been reticent about proposing specific amendments to the constitution, though he has criticised the rigidity of the amendment process. Article 96 demands that amendments be initiated through a concurring vote of at least two-thirds of all members of each house of the Diet and then ratified via national referendum. Since May, Abe has appeared uncharacteristically impetuous in proposing a revision in Article 9, which is the very core of pacifism in the constitution.

The calculus behind Abe’s proposal is unclear. There are several possibilities. As is well-known, successive administrations have held that despite Clause 2 of Article 9, which prohibits the government from maintaining any ‘war potential’, the SDF are constitutional forces necessary to protect the lives and property of the people of Japan. The range of roles and missions of the SDF have been meticulously determined and restricted through authoritative interpretations by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. Abe may want to revoke norms that surround and restrain the actions of the SDF.

At the same time, it is doubtful whether this revision will increase Japan’s security. Instead, it may bring about military expansion in neighbouring countries. The latter outcome would make all parties involved more prone to miscalculation, partly because even high-ranking government officials have expressed contradicting views as to the new interpretation of Article 9. Already, the exact nature of the roles and missions of the SDF has become more ambiguous.

The same thing may be said about the possible results of revising Article 9. It would become more difficult for the Japanese people and outsiders to predict under what conditions Japan might exercise its military forces. The meticulously refined restrictions laid down by successive administrations, which were already destabilised by the change in government view in 2014, might wholly lose their relevance under the new clause. New restrictions after the proposed amendment — if there will be any — would have to be produced from scratch by government officials.

One tricky issue about Abe’s proposal is his claim that he only intends to ‘constitutionalise’ the status quo of the SDF. Under this logic, a rejection of his proposal at a national referendum would mean that the sovereign people deny the legitimacy of the status quo. Such a result will destroy the basis of the SDF, and may bring about an uncontrollable confusion about their constitutionality.

As US President Donald Trump puts pressure on North Korea to abandon its missile and nuclear weapons programs, military tension in East Asia is heightening. Abe may think that this self-described ‘deteriorating security situation’ provides a favourable environment to initiate the revision of Article 9. But it is unlikely that enlarging the roles and missions of the SDF will persuade North Korea to abandon its military projects. North Korea’s objective is to maintain the current political regime and assumes that holding the capability to attack the United States with nuclear bombs is the only effective way to achieve that. It has shown off its missile capabilities repeatedly despite protests from many countries.

Some minor right-wing parties have welcomed Abe’s initiative. But most opposition parties strongly criticised his proposal as being half-baked and harmful to constitutionalism. Some voices, even among the ruling Liberal Democrats, argue that his abrupt intervention may make parliamentary negotiations for amending the constitution difficult. The junior partner of the ruling coalition, the Komeito, expresses the view that it is better for an amendment to be made with a broad consensus among political parties and public opinion.

According to an opinion poll conducted by Mainichi Shimbun newspaper in May 2017, 31 per cent of people said that they were against Abe’s proposal to amend Article 9, 28 per cent were in favour and 32 per cent were unsure. It will not be easy for the ruling coalition to build a consensus in parliament that is strong enough to amend Article 9, even though the ruling coalition controls a two-thirds majority in both houses.

The current constitution and its received interpretations have long kept Japan out of conflict at home and abroad, allowing the state to focus its efforts and resources on socio-economic development. Abe should not hastily revise the constitution when the consequences of doing so remain so unclear.

Yasuo Hasebe is Professor of Constitutional Law at Waseda Law School, Waseda University.