Further, instead of earnestly collaborating with the United States on North Korea, China is gearing towards a different tandem — one where Beijing and Moscow may begin to call the shots.
At their summit in the Kremlin on the day of the ICBM launch, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping displayed a united front. Instead of calling North Korea out for another brazen violation of numerous UN Security Council resolutions, they struck a pose of neutrality between the two main antagonists — Pyongyang and Washington. Moscow and Beijing called for a ‘dual freeze’ deal, which would mean a North Korean moratorium on nuclear and missile testing in exchange for a halt to US–South Korean military exercises.
Washington has so far rejected similar proposals as unacceptable, but it may now need to pay attention. The announcement at the Kremlin summit was the first time that China and Russia so clearly and unambiguously articulated a common position with respect to North Korea.
Simultaneously with the Xi–Putin meeting, their respective foreign ministries issued a joint statement in which Moscow and Beijing explicitly link their assistance with reining in the bellicose Kim regime to the United States’ willingness to make major strategic concessions in Northeast Asia.
In the joint statement, Russia and China insist that ‘allied relations between separate states should not inflict damage on the interests of third parties’ and express opposition to ‘any military presence of extra-regional forces in Northeast Asia’ as well as ‘the deployment of the THAAD antimissile systems’. The joint statement ends with Russia and China vowing ‘to protect the two countries’ security interests and to ensure a strategic balance in the region’.
In other words, China and Russia want the United States to weaken its strategic grip on Northeast Asia — at least with respect to the Korean Peninsula and the US–South Korean alliance. Unless the United States agrees to a new security architecture in the region — one in which its political–military footprint in Northeast Asia considerably shrinks — Beijing and Moscow will continue to keep North Korea afloat and protect it from any serious pressure.
Russia and China have sent a clear message to Washington: respect our strategic interests and concerns in Northeast Asia (and beyond) or face an increasingly menacing nuclear North Korea. They can afford to make such statements — it is China and Russia that exclusively hold the keys to the DPRK’s survival, providing North Korea with fuel, food, and transport links to the outside world. Without active collaboration from Beijing and Moscow, Washington is powerless to resolve the North Korea nuclear problem.
Fundamentally, China wants the United States out of East Asia, whereas Washington is keen to preserve its strategic primacy in the region — including its military foothold on the Korean Peninsula. Until this basic contradiction is resolved, Beijing’s cooperation with Washington on North Korea will be half-hearted at best. It was naive from the very beginning to expect Xi to abandon the DPRK — an important geopolitical asset — in exchange for some trade concessions from the United States which (even if granted) could be easily reversed in the future.
In the same vein, how can Washington expect enthusiastic assistance from Moscow on North Korea when Russia is under US sanctions and even more will be imposed soon? It is hardly possible to insulate the North Korea problem from other issues that bedevil US–Russian relations. Putin might be willing to help Trump with North Korea, but he is not someone who provides his services for free. Considering the current toxic atmosphere between Washington and Moscow, which has been exacerbated by the ongoing ‘Russian meddling’ scandal, even the Putin–Trump ‘bromance’ will hardly be able to produce a rapprochement.
As Washington’s relations with Moscow and Beijing look complicated, China and Russia are likely to continue to closely coordinate on North Korea. Of course, Beijing is the main player here. China has the highest stakes riding on the Peninsula and wields the most leverage with respect to Pyongyang, even though Russia’s links with North Korea should not be underestimated too. Further, it is imperative to remember that Sino–Russian collaboration on North Korea is just one element of their ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ which has only grown tighter under Trump.
Kim’s nuclear menace is a symptom of the dysfunctional state of the current international order — where not even a rogue nuclear state can bring major players together. As long as this is the case, expect Pyongyang to steadily advance its nuclear capabilities.
Artyom Lukin is associate professor and deputy director for research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University. You can follow him on Twitter at @ArtyomLukin.
Excellent analysis. I can only hope the “powers that be” are listening in Washington (though, sadly, I doubt it). Please keep up the good work!
As Hugh White noted recently on EAF and others have opined elsewhere China and Russia have much to gain from the DPRK keeping the USA and its allies Japan and S Korea off stride because of the North’s advances with nuclear weapons. Xi and Putin must be at least pleased that Trump, Abe,and Moon are all struggling to find any solid footing in their dealings with Kim. If Trump thinks domestic healthcare reform is ‘complicated,’ what does he think about this situation on the Korean Peninsula? His efforts to blame Obama or Xi/Putin are already failing. What is he going to do in the coming weeks?
Lukin’s article provides an interesting and insightful analysis of the North Korean Nuclear Weapon debate. To this end, whilst some may disagree with conclusions reached in the article, the article sheds light on the broader political and economic issues that impact the discourse and management of nuclear weapons. The article also underlines the manner in which diplomatic relations directly influence the evolution of the legal and political landscapes of the international community.
In this regard, Lukin’s conclusion that the ‘nuclear menace’ of North Korea is a ‘symptom of the dysfunctional state of the current international order’, can be recognised as an accurate reflection of the broader political and economic issues that are influencing the current debate. In this regard, Lukin observes the key trade relations between North Korea, China and Russia and how these handicap any sole initiative by the United States. Lukin also sheds light on some of the obstacles, which include the tenuous relations between the United States, Russia and China, that will challenge the adoption of a collaborative approach by the states in response to North Korea. This is refreshing, with much of the media attention being published in respect of the issue focusing upon the dialogue and threatening rhetoric that has recently been exchanged. Similarly, Lukin’s conclusion that the inconsistent response of the United States, China and Russia to North Korea’s nuclear initiatives is thought provoking. In this regard the article gives rise to key questions that plague international relations, including the prioritisation of respective states strategic interests comparative to the stability and safety of the broader international community.