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China’s deepening institutional decay

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China's President Xi Jinping arrives for the ceremony to mark the 90th anniversary of the founding of the China's People's Liberation Army at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, 1 August 2017. (Photo: Reuters/Damir Sagolj).

In Brief

China is in transition. And not in a good way. The partially institutionalised political norms of China’s reform era are buckling. Beijing is steadily sliding away from collective authoritarian rule by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elite towards a more personalised variant wielded by President Xi Jinping alone.

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Some shifts are relatively minor. Xi’s 2016 designation as the party’s ‘leadership core’ granted him a title denied to his relatively weak predecessor Hu Jintao. But it merely elevated Xi to the status that reform-era CCP authorities employed to refer to three prior leaders — Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.

Others are more radical. Since 2012, Xi has broken with tacit reform-era party rules against targeting former top leaders (and their families) after leaving office. Long-standing official aversion to anything resembling a cult of personality is steadily being abandoned, as state media increasingly focuses on Xi Jinping alone, to the exclusion of other leaders. Both of those norms developed during the reform era in reaction to Maoist radicalism of the Cultural Revolution.

Now, it appears that the upcoming 19th Party Congress may see two other major reform-era party norms crumble as well.

First, informal rules regarding retirement and succession of top leaders may be broken. Speculation has mounted that age limits could be bent to allow China’s anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan to continue serving on the Politburo Standing Committee.

Further, Xi himself might depart from established practice and avoid elevating a clear political successor to the Politburo Standing Committee as he begins his second (and theoretically final) term as general party secretary. The dramatic 22 July 2017 removal of Chongqing CCP secretary Sun Zhengcai — one such contender for this role — has heightened such suspicions.

Either development would raise the possibility of a yet more dramatic shift later on, such as Xi continuing on — Putin-like — as general party secretary after 2022.

Second, and more importantly, it appears increasingly likely that CCP ideology will be altered to dramatically raise Xi Jinping’s role.

Each of China’s prior leaders has been commemorated by having his name or banner phrase inscribed in the CCP’s charter. Since the reform era, this has followed a clear progression. Each subsequent addition is a downward step in terms of grandiosity. Thus, Marxism-Leninism is a full-blown ‘-ism’ (zhuyi), Mao’s views are classified as a lesser but still comprehensive ‘thought’ (sixiang), while Deng’s ideas are but a ‘theory’ (lilun).

The subsequent (and weaker) leaders, Jiang and Hu, do not even receive the honour of having their names appear alongside their banner phrases.

Repeated ad nauseam in official meetings and documents, such language is stilted and formulaic. But it holds deep meaning. For party cadres, it signals the relative importance of top leaders.

So what of Xi? The 17th Party Congress in 2007 saw Hu Jintao’s banner term inscribed into the party charter at the midpoint of his 10-year administration. Logically, the same should occur for Xi at the 19th Party Congress this year.

But what phrasing to use? Speculation has emerged that Xi might be ‘name-crowned’ by having a banner phrase bearing his name inserted into the party charter. Such a move would already represent a significant break with precedent, elevating Xi well beyond Hu and Jiang in a very visible manner, accurately reflecting Xi’s iron grip over China’s political landscape.

But now even that appears too conservative. Recent events suggest Xi may go yet further.

The major military parade held on 30 June to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army featured a sweeping focus on Xi alone, with no appearances by any other top party leaders. Related state media commentary drew explicit parallels between Mao, Deng and Xi.

Simultaneously, top party officials have begun to issue articles framing Xi’s views in sweeping terms, like ‘Xi Jinping Diplomatic Thought’.

The relevant question is no longer whether the 19th Party Congress will see Xi elevated above Jiang and Hu. Rather, it is: how far will this go?

There are several possibilities. Most likely is the dethroning of Jiang and Hu entirely from China’s political pantheon. Removing their banner terms from the party charter would unmistakably signal Xi’s dominance.

Next likely is a situation in which Xi is elevated to terrain currently occupied by Deng and Mao. Raising Xi to the level of ‘thought’ (sixiang) would clearly situate him among the most important of all post-1949 Chinese leaders.

The 19th Party Congress could also see language associated with Xi’s signature propaganda project — the China Dream, emphasizing traditional Chinese culture and history as the ideological basis for continued authoritarian rule — introduced into the CCP’s charter.  However, it is currently difficult to envision such language being taken too far. As the current political climate chills, party leaders are doubling down ideologically on the imported Western doctrine of Marxism, notwithstanding its now-politically inconvenient language of class and revolution.

But what if China’s top leader seeks not merely to rise to the level of Mao and Deng, but actually surpass them? Could language be introduced into the party charter that subsequent generations might look back on and identify as the early precursors for something grander, say the eventual adoption of a new ‘–ism’ (‘Xi-ism’ with Confucian characteristics?) at a future Party Congress?

Carl Minzner is Professor of Law at Fordham Law School. His book, End of an Era: How China’s Authoritarian Revival is Undermining its Rise, will be published by Oxford University Press in early 2018. Follow him on Twitter @CarlMinzner.

7 responses to “China’s deepening institutional decay”

  1. That’s sounds awesome. Xi-ism with Confucian characteristics!

    You start the article off with your prerequisite bashing of China, but then move on to simply reporting news. After skimming through the hogwash at the beginning, the rest is pretty interesting. Xi is truly a great leader. He is making China great again. What a great fellow!

  2. Fascinating. I’ve always thought that societies and thier politics revert to some sort of norm. Dynasties come and go – here is the latest. It seems that JK Fairbank was wrong and Franz Michael and KA Wittfogel were correct about Chinese society and politics.

  3. 1 The writer speculates that ‘Beijing is steadily sliding away from collective authoritarian rule by Chinese Communist elite’ which he implies is not such a bad thing at all, institutionally, ‘towards a more personalised variant wielded by President Xi Jinping alone’, which is allegedly bad for China.

    In the West the Presidents and Prime Ministers lead the country. Why is it so wrong when President Xi does the same?

    2 “Since 2012, Xi has broken with tacit reform-era party rules against targeting former top leaders..”

    Why is this so bad when he is simply following the universal adage that ‘No one is above the law’?

    This is also true in Washington DC, unless you were President George Bush jr for invading Iraq based on a lie that Saddam had wmd in 2003 and also true in London, unless you were Tony Blair who also invaded Iraq based on the same lie. They, somehow, are above the law and therefore out of reach of the International Criminal Court.

    3 “Speculation has mounted that age limits could be bent to allow China’s anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan to continue serving on the Politburo Standing Committee.”

    When a Professor of Law resorts to speculation and not base his assertion on facts, how can the assertion be taken seriously? And if the anti-corruption czar is doing a sterling job, why is it so wrong to retain his services?

    4 “Xi himself might depart from established practice and avoid elevating a clear political successor to the Politburo Standing Committee..”

    “Might depart”? This is another speculation which also cannot be taken seriously.

    5 “more importantly, it appears increasingly likely that CCP ideology will be altered to dramatically raise Xi Jinping’s role.”

    If the writer has a crystal ball maybe there is some credence in what he says but in case the nuance escaped anyone, China has since adopted a Meritocratic System of Government after Premier Deng Xiao Ping declared in 1978 that “It is not the colour of the cat that counts (anymore) but whether it can catch mice”.

    With that ‘doctrine’ enunciated, the rigid Marxist ideology was tossed out of the window. That is why China could rise so rapidly from being a basket case in 1978 to be the second largest economy in the world today (largest on a PPP basis since 2014) and the world largest trading nation in just 39 years, which has no parallel in the history of mankind.

    Paradoxically, in the Western liberal democracies in the same period, the United States’ fortunes have swoon and it has descended from being a creditor nation to be the world’s biggest debtor nation, with an unpayable National Debt of US$20 trillion.

    George Bush jr was responsible for US$5 trillion of that debt in two wasteful terms of office and “Yes we can” Obama added another US$10 trillion in 8 years.

    Trump is no different. By lowering taxes and engaging in endless wars (“We will fight to win in Afghanistan”, never mind it is the legendary graveyard of Empires) he will add at least another US$5 trillion by the time he flies out of the WH for the last time, increasing the US National Debt exponentially to a whopping US$25 trillion, (not counting the US$222 trillion in unfunded debts estimated by Prof Lawrence Kotlikoff in 2012) and predictably paving the way for a declaration of national bankruptcy in future.

    6 “Speculation has emerged that Xi might be ‘name-crowned’ by having a banner phrase bearing his name inserted into the party charter.”

    Again, if a Professor of Law prances with “speculation” how can his article be taken seriously?

    7 “The major military parade held on 30 June to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army featured a sweeping focus on Xi alone, with no appearances by any other top party leaders.”

    The nuance that escapes the writer is that with Trump threatening to take military action against the DPRK with ‘fury and fire the world has never seen before’, China and Russia are ready for WW3 and both have warned the US not to unilaterally strike the DPRK.

    Is it any wonder then that President Xi inspected the military parade wearing a military fatigue, as if to symbolise that China is now on a war-footing? China has a peaceful rise policy but she would be foolish not to be prepared for any eventuality when there is an unpredictable person in the White House.

    8 “As the current political climate chills, party leaders are doubling down ideologically on the imported Western doctrine of Marxism,..”

    Anyone who has paid attention to Premier Deng Xiao Ping’s “colour of the cat” allegory would intuitively know that the flawed doctrine of Marxism has been tossed out of the window.

    9 “Next likely is a situation in which Xi is elevated to terrain currently occupied by Deng and Mao.”

    When President Xi presides over a China which has the biggest economy in the world in 2020, he deserves to be elevated to the “terrain currently occupied by Deng and Mao.”

    10 “But what if China’s top leader seeks not merely to rise to the level of Mao and Deng, but actually surpass them?’

    The jury is still out.

    • The USA went down also due to sending its manufacturing jobs overseas, not investing in the country, has not solved its racist and economic class problems, lowering the tariff barriers so American companies can bring in their goods from their overseas plants, dismantling the economic and social programs by Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, not encouraging people to save instead of spending, stagnant wages for the last 38 years, etc.

    • I do not agree with Carl Minzner on some points, but his “speculations” have basis, if one looks at Chinese state-controlled media these days. “Xi Jinping xinshidai sixiang”, or Xi’s New Age Ideology is clearly promoted a lot, in connection with the Dangzhang, or the Party’s Charter/Constitution. Xi does emphasize the role of the strong man, traditionalism as well as Maxist Leninism – he acknowledges that it is imported but wants to treat it as an integral part of modern China, and while he is not taking a critical stand towards Deng, he worries about the erosion of official ideology. He says that the Soviet Union had no strong man who would challenge Gorbachev and save the country, while the armed forces became disloyal, and thus erosion of ideology was the primary reason for the destruction of the Soviet Union. Apparently he wants to be that strongman for China. The recent Chinese Congress has given no indication of a successor being groomed, so there is the possibility Xi might seek a third term.
      That’s simply the truth. If Xi succeeds though, the world will be provided with a model of a good combination of political centralization and continuously disrupting technological advances. I do believe that Xi understands that this strongman mode government can only be contemporary and centralization can only work in the long terms in a calmer form. In the end, it might be a good thing for some countries who do not want to drastically change their ways of life, and the world might be safer with a stable China with a Chinese model.

  4. Just the latest version of strong man politics. “I alone can fix it.”

    Trump, Putin, Hitler, Mao and now Xi. But history shows they rarely fix things. Usually they make things worse. Much much worse than a weak leader who can voted out and replaced with someone more competent.

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