The Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, has once again displayed its characteristic zeal for scorched-earth counter-insurgency tactics, which it has honed over decades in other minority regions of the country — such as Karen, Shan and Kachin. Visceral anti-Muslim sentiment throughout Myanmar has given the Tatmadaw an even more brutal edge today in Rakhine State. As its willful and excessive use of force against the stateless Rohingya pushes yet another exodus of tens of thousands of refugees into Bangladesh and excites passions across Muslim Indonesia and Malaysia, the Tatmadaw has arguably emerged as a serious threat to regional cooperation and security.
Against this grim backdrop, Australia — with a decades-long record of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping — has a role to play in preventing a dangerous downward spiral.
Australia has a strong record of making significant contributions to peace and stability in the region. In the early 1990s, Australia’s former foreign minister Gareth Evans and military commander John Sanderson were instrumental in instigating a UN-mandated international response in Cambodia. And in 1999, Australia led the multilateral intervention in East Timor with the help of a number of Southeast Asian states including Thailand and the Philippines. Today, the Australian Defence Force is more capable than ever to respond to crises and disasters.
The Rakhine crisis presents an important opportunity for Australia to step forward as a regional leader to address a spiralling humanitarian crisis and counter the radicalisation and violent extremism that will surely follow if the refugee crisis imposed on Bangladesh is allowed to fester.
Australian leadership would involve pledging and following through swiftly to fund new refugee camps inside Bangladesh that are needed desperately. With Australian assistance and expertise, these camps could securely and humanely shelter Rohingya refugees — with clinics, mosques and basic schools — as they await return to their homeland inside Myanmar.
One can only hope that in the coming months this latest eruption of the long-running Rohingya crisis will prompt enough concerted international pressure on Myanmar to ensure the safe return of its refugees.
In the short term, ASEAN simply lacks the resolve and unanimity to act decisively on the humanitarian front. Indonesia has called for action and dispatched its foreign minister to Naypyidaw, but it is not well placed to act decisively. Given the religious dimension to the animosity, it is unlikely that a predominantly Muslim country — be it Indonesia or Malaysia — will play a leading role in addressing this crisis.
For their part, Thailand’s ruling generals have displayed a genuine affection for their Tatmadaw counterparts and co-religionists in Myanmar and are otherwise distracted by domestic political drama. Other ASEAN members lack the capacity and commitment to play a leading role.
The United States is also otherwise occupied, as President Trump confronts the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, a reinvigorated insurgent campaign in Afghanistan and a plethora of other challenges in the Middle East, not to mention flooding in the US’ southeast.
Elsewhere, India is acutely concerned about Chinese influence in Myanmar and is therefore unlikely to take actions that could be construed as critical of Naypyidaw. Indeed, it appears India is actually looking to expel its own Rohingya refugees — albeit without burning down their homes and raping their womenfolk. Bangladesh itself is totally overwhelmed by the scale of the refugee influx, a state of affairs only exacerbated by recent catastrophic flooding.
This leaves Australia as the only regional player with the financial and technical capacity and diplomatic clout to take up a real leadership role. It is unpleasant to think of tragedy as an opportunity. But this crisis appears to offer an important opportunity for Australia to act as a responsible and compassionate regional player, as others for various reasons are falling short. Nor should compassion be seen in purely altruistic terms. If squalid, make-shift border refugee camps are left to fester, the anger and extremism they will foment is likely to migrate ideologically and physically to Malaysia, Indonesia and possibly even Mindanao.
Action is required now as a preventive measure to address humanitarian needs and hopefully to counter the prospect of the further spread of violent extremism. Australian leadership would require humanitarian assistance and efforts to counter extremism wrapped up into one.
Australia has rightly sought to focus more on its own region to help bolster security and stability. A flotilla left Sydney harbour on 4 September 2017 tasked with building relations and demonstrating Australian goodwill across the region. Operation Rakhine Rescue is begging to be launched.
John Blaxland is Professor of International Security and Intelligence Studies, Director of ANU Southeast Asia Institute and Head at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU.
Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based security consultant and analyst.
A version of this article first appeared here at the Bangkok Post.
Overall, this article suggests that Australia has a role to play in responding to the events unfolding within Myanmar and its neighbouring states. In this regard, the authors ultimately suggest that Australia offer immediate and direct financial assistance in the development of refugee camps in Bangladesh, where a majority of the dispossessed Muslim minority of Myanmar have fled. The authors emotive language creates a compelling platform for the urgent and arguably apparent need for such assistance. Moreover, the focus upon Australia’s desire and ability to be a regional leader facilitates Australia’s position as a significant member within the regional and international community. In doing so, the authors suggest the current events in Myanmar are an opportunity to demonstrate Australia’s capacity and compassion. The authors also suggest that Australia is the only regional player with the financial and technical capacities, and diplomatic clout to adopt a ‘real leadership role’. Whilst such propositions do give credit to the role Australia has played within the Southeast Asian region to date and its apparent desire for this to continue into the future, the propositions do not shed light on the obstacles associated with providing such assistance. For example, they do not address the primary diplomatic and economic issues associated with such a task along with the domestic political obstacles relevant to supporting such task. The propositions also does not contemplate the international legal concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ that centres upon sovereign state’s obligations to protect its populations from humanitarian atrocities and the subsequent international communities responsibility to assist states in satisfying such responsibilities, which is arguably a key element in addressing or at least examining the current circumstances. The propositions also avoid addressing the significant criticisms that Australia has attracted in its previous roles within the region – for instance those associated with its intervention and subsequent relationship with East Timor. Accordingly, whilst the article offers a direct response to addressing the immediate issues faced within both Myanmar and neighbouring states, it fails to consider the live procedural and political issues that also must be addressed and overcome.