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Losing hope in Japan’s snap election

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Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike, head of Japan's Party of Hope, speaks during an interview with Reuters in Tokyo, Japan, 6 October 2017 (Photo: Reuters/Issei Kato).

In Brief

After months of doubts about his long-term viability as prime minister, Shinzo Abe’s national approval ratings began trending upwards in August 2017. North Korean provocations and a parliamentary recess starved scandals surrounding Abe of media oxygen. 

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Meanwhile the opposition Democratic Party (DP) became even more disjointed after electing Seiji Maehara as its new leader as the question of electoral cooperation with the Communist Party in single member district (SMDs) seats further exacerbated internal divisions.

Against a divided opposition that was without an election strategy and losing prominent centrist members to what seemed like a loose and still disorganised proto-party for Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike’s future ambitions, Abe calculated the public would likely put aside their distrust towards him. An election win now, before Abe’s support goes back on the decline, is also calculated to quiet the challengers within his own party and pave the way for a third term in office. This seemingly low risk, high payoff gamble was irresistible and by mid-September it was clear an October general election was imminent.

Then suddenly it appeared that Abe had been outsmarted. Just days before Abe dissolved the parliament on 28 September, Koike announced the formation of her new national political party, the Party of Hope. Koike put forward populist positions opposing nuclear energy restarts and raising the consumption tax while challenging Abenomics by emphasising its insufficient attention to the third arrow — structural and market reform — and overdependence on fiscal and financial policy instruments.

It is unlikely that Hope was whipped up overnight, given that Koike registered the party’s trademark back in February and the high production values and populist messaging of the video released soon after its launch. The migration of a number of Democratic Party politicians, such as Akihisa Nagashima and Goshi Hosono, in the months before the announcement of the new party further suggested that Koike’s play for the centrist wing of the Democrat Party and campaign cash was not purely spontaneous.

For a moment it seemed that the Abe administration was about to lose control over the narrative of who is best positioned to lead Japan’s national revival. The contest between the LDP and Hope in the lower house’s numerous SMDs even raised the spectre of Abe losing the LDP’s parliamentary majority.

Then, as suddenly as the Koike challenge emerged, its momentum stopped. True to her reputation as a micromanager, Koike appeared overzealous in policing the ideological commitments of potential recruits from the Democratic Party. This in turn drove those who resented such a ‘dictatorial’ management style to set up their own party, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ). The CDPJ will now run 63 SMD candidates, potentially making it difficult for Hope to win big in Tokyo unless it can attract soft Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) voters or get more independents to the voting booth — the latter looking increasingly less likely as expectations for Hope fade.

Koike ruled out stepping down as Tokyo Governor and contesting the election herself while refusing to name a prime ministerial candidate from Hope as a parliamentary proxy. Having indicated that her party would not run candidates against Abe’s LDP rivals, such as Shigeru Ishiba and Seiko Noda, a subsequent announcement that her objective was to unseat Abe rather than the LDP appeared to turn the election into a personal vendetta.

Polling data suggests that Abe’s majority is safe and that the ruling coalition will achieve a stable majority, where parliamentary legislative proceedings will be facilitated by ruling party domination of parliamentary committees and chairs. Such an outcome raises two questions about the future of Japan’s electoral politics.

First, has the possibility of a genuinely contestable two-party system been dealt a further blow? In the short-term the answer appear to be yes. The post-2012 Democratic Party of Japan had already been reduced to less than the sum of its parts due to infighting, negative campaigning and underwhelming policy advocacy. Their division means that Hope and the CDPJ will be working at cross-purposes in the SMDs. But there is potentially reason for some optimism for a more competitive electoral system over the long term. Hope and the CDPJ can exceed the former DPJ’s post-2012 performance if they each pick up 10–15 per cent of the proportional representation vote. Greater ideological and policy clarity for both centre-left progressives and centre-right reformists from the split might provide a sharper platform to attract greater public support in the future. Tripolarity might then introduce some interesting dynamics that could challenge the LDP–Komeito electoral alliance.

Second, has the Koike challenge been effectively seen off? If Koike were to have left the Tokyo governorship after just over one year in the job she would have likely undermined her credibility and her long-term leadership prospects. She surely sensed that it was unlikely that Hope could seriously challenge the LDP this time around. This reality, combined with the need to build her local working relationship with Komeito in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, likely guided her announcement that she would not run Hope candidates against Komeito in the SMDs.

At the same time, it is unlikely that Koike’s longer-term influence has been entirely dismantled. As long as Hope maintains a robust and constructive post-election presence in an LDP–Komeito centred parliament, perhaps where Hope is the deciding vote on putting constitutional revision to a popular referendum, Koike may yet achieve her bottom-line objectives for the election.

Corey Wallace is the Einstein Postdoctoral Fellow at the Graduate School of East Asian Studies, the Free University of Berlin.

2 responses to “Losing hope in Japan’s snap election”

  1. Thanks for an informative analysis. While Koike’s reluctance to run as a candidate for the Diet is understandable, it may have also ruled out her having any so called ‘coat tails’ which could have helped elect other Party of Hope candidates. Perhaps if she campaigned more actively in support of some of these candidates it might help?

    Also, the policies she put forth lack specificty in some areas. Eg, how would this new party bolster corporate reform? What would it do about promoting more women into management roles? What would it do about hiring more people into full-time, permanent employment? How would it boost wages? How would it encourage alternative renewable energy production as opposed to re-starting the nuclear power plants? Perhaps it would gain more voter support if its policy proposals had more to offer.

    • Richard, my apologies for the very late response. As the election has now been held, and the results were even worse for Hope than my own pessimistic analysis, then it seems Koike’s path to national leadership might have been cut-off, notwithstanding some major popular reforms of Tokyo in the meantime. The results suggest that momentum is on the side of the CDPJ now – and your second paragraph there applies very well to what they have to do next, including what they want to do in terms of security policy. Unlike Hope, they have some time to draw up an agenda with no national election until the 2019 mid-year House of Councillors election. Still, Hope has potential leverage in any parliamentary debate on constitutional change in the mean time. Thanks for your comments.

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