Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan has been seeking to expand its security partners beyond the United States. This includes bolstering defence cooperation with India, Southeast Asian nations and NATO countries such as the United Kingdom and France as well as moving to revive the idea of a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that includes India as well as the United States, Australia and Japan. Australia and Japan have often referred to each other as their most important security partner after their respective alliances with the United States. The Australia–Japan partnership was affirmed in 2007, upgraded to a ‘comprehensive’ partnership in 2008 and then to a ‘special’ partnership in 2014.

Japan was disappointed after losing the contract to France in 2016 to provide Australia with its next generation of submarines. Former Australian prime minister Tony Abbott gave the impression that Japan would be awarded the contract unopposed but was forced to open up the bidding process to international tender. This put a dampener on the much-hyped strengthening of bilateral defence ties. The sale would have locked Australia into relational arrangements with Japan over the submarines’ 40 year lifespan — something much more than a transactional deal. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs placed the deal within the context of the elevated status of the Japan–Australia ‘Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century’, and noted that it would strengthen Japan–Australia bilateral maritime security cooperation in the Asia Pacific. But there were major concerns about whether entering the arrangement would pull Australia against its own interests into a triangle with the United States and Japan to contain China.

In the wake of the loss of the submarine contract, the possible signing of a Reciprocal Access Agreement was extolled as a way to get the defence relationship back on track and further deepen the bilateral defence partnership. Japanese media framed the push for the agreement, which would enable military training exchanges, as a ‘move to bolster regional security in the face of North Korean aggression and Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea’.

While the two leaders engaged in a nice photo op that showed off the Patriot missile battery directed at shooting down enemy (North Korean) missiles as well as praised the Australian-made Bushmaster Protected Mobility vehicle used by Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF), there was a distinct lack of tangible output from the visit. The Reciprocal Access Agreement has been left hanging for now, and it is not clear how long it might take to sort out the legal issues that bedevil Japan’s entering an agreement like this. An agreement would open the door for SDF troops to conduct military exercises out of Darwin just over three quarters of a century after Japan bombed the city during the Pacific War as well as for Japan to take part in the regular US–Australia joint military exercise Talisman Saber.

Some are encouraging the conclusion of the Reciprocal Access Agreement as a stepping stone toward a more formal military alliance between the two countries vis-a-vis a rising China. But as Hugh White has argued, Australia should not let itself so easily drift into committing ‘to supporting Japan in a conflict with China over the’ Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

The two leaders underlined the need for cooperation with the international community — including China — in order to demonstrate a united front and to apply tough economic sanctions against North Korea. But there was no mention of any broader regional cooperation strategy beyond this. Sanctions need to be part of a broader strategy. They can impose a cost on North Korea to bring it back to the negotiating table. But there needs to be realism about this given that the North Korean government survived the ‘arduous march’ famine of the mid-1990s, which demonstrates the regime’s capacity to survive economic hardship. If there is a chance that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons it needs iron-clad guarantees for its own economic and military post-denuclearisation survival.

The two leaders alluded to Trump’s undermining of the international order. Prime Minister Turnbull noted that ‘the strategic logic that is driving our countries to work more closely on defence and security is only getting stronger as the regional environment becomes more dangerous and challenging’. Both leaders also emphasised the importance of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’. But they avoided specifically endorsing the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and avoided criticising or mentioning Mr Trump by name.

There is a perception that deepening Australia–Japan defence ties as well as any movement on the recently revived Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is aimed at containing China. This frame needs to be avoided. The more urgent need is for Canberra and Tokyo to gear their cooperation toward both keeping the United States engaged in Asia (and away from Trump’s America First trajectory) as well as to bolster cooperation with China that reinforces its role as a responsible stakeholder in a transparent and inclusive rules-based regional order.

Ben Ascione is a research scholar at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. He is Japan and Korea editor at East Asia Forum and a research associate of the Japan Center for International Exchange in Tokyo.