But Abe’s ruling coalition may become an obstacle to his plans. On its own, the LDP lacks a two-thirds majority in both the lower and upper houses of Japan’s parliament necessary for constitutional change. In the lower house, it holds a two-thirds majority with its junior coalition partner Komeito. In the upper house, the LDP–Komeito coalition relies on minor opposition parties for its two-thirds majority. Even if the upper house minor parties prove amenable, internal coalition politics could still derail constitutional change if individual parties make demands that are incompatible with Abe’s ambitions.
Another complicating factor is the Japanese public’s reluctance to jump on board with plans for constitutional change. A nationwide telephone poll conducted on 13–14 January 2018 showed that 54.8 per cent of respondents are against revising the Constitution, with only 33 per cent supporting. Opinion polling specifically focussed on Article 9 (rather than constitutional revision more broadly) has shown an even larger percentage of respondents expressing disapproval.
Securing public approval via the nationwide referendum required for constitutional changes will be an uphill climb. Article 9 is a symbol of Japan’s peaceful post-war identity, and changing it is anathema to the many Japanese who understandably view the destruction and loss that World War II brought as a national tragedy. Some dislike Abe’s long-held view that Japan needs to ‘escape the post-war regime’.
Many Japanese citizens also assert that their country’s pacifism helped restore its reputation in the global community. They argue that peaceful conditions allowed Japan to build a first-world, capitalist economy with one of the world’s most highly skilled workforces.
The public also distrusts Abe’s intentions. It is widely assumed that revising Article 9 will not be limited to the constitutional recognition of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF). This suspicion stems in part from the LDP’s 2012 draft constitutional revision that supported broader changes. Others are wary of Abe’s affiliation with right-wing organisations like Nippon Kaigi that advocate deeper constitutional revision. There are also segments of the Japanese public that doubt the utility of amending Article 9. They are unconvinced that changing the SDF’s legal status will allow it to better respond to regional security threats or to change the way it operates on the ground.
Complicating matters are the apprehensions of regional countries that are understandably resentful of Imperial Japan’s conduct in 1895–45.
Abe’s intentions to formalise the SDF’s legal status need not alarm Japan’s citizens or neighbours. He is proposing to revise Article 9 to make the legality of Japan’s military unequivocal, but he is still committed to keeping the war-renouncing clause.
While critics argue such a revision is merely a symbolic matter, Abe’s desired change will help remove uncertainty in this grey area of Japanese law. The amendment will confirm that Japan may legally engage in individual self-defence and will complement the September 2015 security bills that allowed the SDF to engage in limited forms of self-defence. In Japan’s deeply rules-bound society, the importance of providing legal clarity to decision makers — especially during times of crisis — cannot be overstated.
Another benefit of the proposed legal change will be the added burden it places on the calculus of Tokyo’s menacing neighbour Pyongyang. If the amendment passes, North Korea would know that Japan’s decision-making process on matters of self-defence is less encumbered than before, which would likely create an element of uncertainty in Pyongyang.
Although understandable tensions remain over issues of memory and history, it is time that Japan’s neighbouring states acknowledge that Japan is a different country today with a new generation of leaders. For the past 70 years, Japan has renounced aggression and has been at peace with its neighbours. It is a stable democracy with a proven commitment to the rule of law, a free press, an independent judiciary and equality.
In recent decades, the SDF has developed an honourable track record worthy of the global community’s trust. Since the early 1990s, the SDF has participated in a number of non-combatant overseas missions that have helped provide peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in accordance with international law. In each of these missions, Japan’s leadership and the SDF demonstrated discipline in keeping within the boundaries of their agreed responsibilities.
The SDF and its civilian leadership are not a rogue outfit that poses a risk to other states. Its contribution to world peace and aid needs to be highlighted by Abe’s administration to help address domestic and regional concerns over revising Article 9.
The Asia Pacific’s changing dynamics bring new challenges to the region’s security balance and call for proactive, responsible measures. Amending Article 9 of the Constitution is a prudent and measured step towards enabling Japan to function like any other sovereign nation. Neither Japan’s citizens nor its neighbours should fear Abe’s proposed constitutional change — instead, they should embrace it.
Ted Gover is an instructor of political science at Central Texas College, Camp Pendleton, California.
I believe this analysis is flawed in some significant ways. First, it fails to note that 70% of the populace are opposed to amending the SDF aspects of Article 9. Up to now Abe’s efforts ‘to educate’ the electorate about his proposed changes to the Constitution have failed because the vast majority are profoundly committed to not going down what they view as a slippery slope back to the past.
Second, the author acknowledges that there are ‘understandable tensions over issues of history and memory’ amongst Japan’s neighbors. But it is naive to think that China, S Korea, et al will acknowledge that Japan is a different country with different leaders. Abe’s membership in and support from others who belong to the far right wing group Nihongi which wants to return Japan to its so called ‘former glory’ contradict this assertion that he is a new leader. This plus his continuing brittle and arrogant refusal to really make amends to the victims of Japanese military imperialism during the Great Pacific War and the efforts made by his Education Ministry to rewrite history textbooks give Japan’s neighbors just cause to hang on to their resentments and distrust.
Finally, the Security Laws of 2015 were rammed through the Diet because Abe and the LDP had a 2/3 majority rather than because the public really supported these changes. Abe and his cohorts have threatened freedom of the press and removed people from NHK who have been critical of his policies. The judiciary in Japan is nowhere near as independent of government policy making as the author suggests. Ie, Japan’s democracy is not as solid as the author opines.
Dear Contributor,
If you begin with false facts it is not surprising that your conclusions fail as well. Namely, you state: “The [Constitutional] amendment will confirm that Japan may legally engage in individual self-defence and will complement the September 2015 security bills that allowed the SDF to engage in limited forms of self-defence.”
The second part of this statement is simply false. In reality, the passage of the 2015 Security laws meant that Japan’s military forces (SDF) can now fight alongside the United States and other allies in cases where the latter claim they are under attack, even if Japan itself is not directly under attack, i.e. Japan can now engage in so-called “collective self-defense” (J. shūdan bōei) on behalf of the U.S. and other allies.
Secondly, Japan will now play a bigger role in taking up security responsibilities under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. During his visit to the U.S. in 2015, Abe promised he would repeal the older laws governing the deployment of SDF troops overseas in support of the U.S. and other allies. Abe has been under pressure to have Japan do more in the U.S.-Japan alliance as financial concerns grow in the U.S. over defense spending, i.e. Japan will now pay more of America’s military budget that is already so large it cannot be properly audited.
Third, the new Security laws mean an increase in the heated rhetoric between Japan and China regarding their disputed territorial claims over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands since the U.S. now claims it will military support Japan’s ongoing control of these islands. This is despite the fact that these islands were taken over by Japan in the midst of the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5.
It is important to understand that these changes have occurred even before a possible change to the Constitution. A constitutional change will only increase the likelihood of Japan fighting in one or more of America’s now unending wars. Fortunately, as you rightly point out, the majority of the Japanese people don’t support this change and for good reasons, not because of the past but fears about the future. Although in a non-combatant role, Japan monetarily supported and sent troops as part of the US invasion of Iraq, an invasion that was based on nothing but falsehoods. Why would the Japanese people want to do that again?
By all means, argue for your position, but, for starters, at least get your facts straight.