Abe’s desire for constitutional amendment had been made clear long before the official announcement in 2017. The Abe administration made a cabinet decision in 2014 to reinterpret Article 9 in a way that would allow Japan to engage in collective self-defence under certain conditions, such as the existence of a clear threat to Japan. The cabinet decision was followed by the enactment of a set of security bills in 2015 that effectively enabled this constitutional reinterpretation. Abe’s proposed constitutional amendment would confirm the legality of reinterpretation by writing the expanded function of the SDF into the constitution.
Japan’s current regional security environment is indeed precarious. It could even further deteriorate if China becomes more assertive in its military posture or if North Korea continues testing its nuclear missiles. From the perspective of the United States, a stronger Japanese military presence in East Asia would help to maintain US influence and a balance of power in the region.
But those who argue for Japan’s greater military involvement in regional security through an amendment to Article 9 may want to consider the following.
From a geopolitical perspective, an increase in Japan’s security engagement in East Asia, and the intensified US–Japan military pressure on North Korea that this would enable, would be unlikely to force North Korea to succumb. It is not clear how an amendment to Article 9 would create a shift in the regional military balance that would be significant or threatening enough for North Korea to refrain from continued missile testing.
Constitutional amendment could also undermine Japan’s relations with China and South Korea. Japan’s closest neighbours have not forgotten the historical legacy of Japanese imperial aggression, nor are they willing to overlook the lack of serious remorse or criticism about Japan’s imperial past among Japanese nationalists. Not surprisingly, China and South Korea view Japan’s move to increase its military capability with a considerable degree of suspicion.
From a domestic perspective, the legality of the SDF will remain questionable even after an amendment to the constitution so long as Clause 2 of Article 9 (which prohibits Japan’s possession of a military) remains intact. Japanese legal scholars and a former director general of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau have pointed out that it remains uncertain whether the SDF is distinct from a military force (and therefore constitutional) because its military capacity is beyond the minimum force necessary for self-defence.
For this reason, some members of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) such as Shigeru Ishiba reject Abe’s third clause proposal and instead advocate for the replacement of Clause 2 with a new clause that permits Japan to possess a ‘national defence army’.
But even if Clause 1 on the renunciation of war is maintained, that does not guarantee sufficient constraints on the SDF’s activities. Clarifying and changing the constitutions’ interpretation means that the SDF’s engagement in international conflicts may become almost unlimited, as the expanded scope of its activities are confirmed and legitimised. On the flipside, if Abe’s proposal for constitutional amendment is rejected in the national referendum, this could further undermine public confidence in the legality of the SDF — which would also have implications for support of the US–Japan security treaty.
But the biggest cause for concern in the push for constitutional amendment is Abe’s political ideology. It cannot be assumed that post-war Japan is an entirely different country with a new generation of leaders when the Prime Minister is a right-wing revisionist. Other LDP politicians and many of Abe’s supporters share his revisionism. The ultra-nationalist group Nippon Kaigi — which has a parliamentary league for which Abe serves as a special advisor — even dreams of restoring the fundamentals of imperial Japan.
Abe uses the deteriorating security environment in East Asia as an excuse to accomplish his long-term goal of constitutional revision. Abe is determined to release Japan from the shackles of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which — for him and for other nationalists like him — Japan is not recognised as a ‘normal’ country that has a right to possess a military. Constitutional amendment is a step in that direction.
But an amendment to Article 9 as proposed by Abe would not meaningfully enhance Japan’s contribution to regional security, and it would risk undermining Japan’s already fragile relations with its closest neighbours. Abe’s intention to amend the constitution is a serious cause for concern, not only for Japanese citizens but also for the region, and it is not something that should be in the least bit embraced.
Hiroaki Watanabe is a Lecturer in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield.
Abe and his primary LDP supporter Aso are facing the serious challenges of the school/Finance Ministry scandals right now. These may jeopardize the 2/3 majority he will need in the Diet for a proposed amendment to the Constitution. Assuming he survives and gets the vote in the Diet Abe will still need to convince a majority of voters to approve the amendment in a referendum. From what I have read elsewhere this is not yet the case.
Bottom line: Abe has an uphill battle in front of him. Maybe the voters’ common sense will prevail.
Yes, I agree with you.
As a Japanese citizen and voter I do not wish to see Article 9 removed or replaced by the Abe government but I believe that any argument that the Japanese Constitution must have Article 9 is fundamentally racist whether that argument is made by a Japanese or a non-Japanese.
Nothing equivalent to Article 9 was imposed on either Germany despite its responsibility for two major wars in the twentieth century and overtly genocidal policies.
I have never seen any advocacy of an Article 9 or its equivalent for the United States which is at least as guilty of conspiracies to engage in wars of aggression, the charge used against those on trial as “war criminals” in the IMTFE.
As a Japanese I cringe when I read a Japanese suggesting that somehow Article 9 is all that stands between us and a return to the 1930s because this is confirmation of the most virulent anti-Japanese racism of the type described in John Dower’s War Without Mercy, that the Japanese are inherently warlike and that without Article 9 the Japanese would run wild once again in very short order.
Further, references to the 1930s are irrelevant to any consideration of Article 9. The key movement in the 1930s as stated in countless books and articles written at the time and recently recognised in books such as Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State by Janis Mimura was one of a centrally planned and directed economy run by technocrats, something of a third-way between market capitalism and Soviet style state socialism.
Article 9 does not address this issue in any way, shape, or form.
Anyone who equates the 1930s in Japan solely with militarism demonstrates that they do not know what was actually going on in the 1930s. They are also ignoring the fact that the military, especially the Kwantung Army was heavily infused with socialist ideology and created Manchukuo in order to have a centrally planned and controlled economic base and a reform model for Japan itself.
I have seen no indication whatsoever that Abe is interested in this aspect of the 1930s even though one of his two grandfathers, the one journalists love to cite for his alleged influence on Abe, was so much of an advocate of state led planning and control that contemporary businessmen said he was a red and postwar he considered joining one of the nascent socialist parties.
It is quite difficult to understand the logic of your comment as it seems to be based on a pre-fixed bias and part of your comment is irrelevant to my article. Your comment that suggests my article is ‘racist’ is simply irrelevant and you do not seem to understand the main point of my article. Overall your comment sounds like those made by right-wing Japanese nationalists who are real racists and deny any wrongdoing of Japanese imperialism. They identify themselves as ‘victims’ rather than ‘victimisers’ by criticising Western powers, which is exactly what you do. It is ironical that your Japanophile view as a Japanese citizen (originally American) is quite similar to those of Japanese nationalists.
You say it is racist when only Japan had something like Article 9 imposed on it. However, in the case of Germany, there was a complete regime change unlike in Japan so an Article 9 was unnecessary for Germany. In the case of Japan, there was no fundamental regime change in that the imperial system remained. In fact, Article 9 was a condition for the regime continuity. In the case of the US, Japanese nationalists argue in a similar manner to you that the IMTEF was unfair to Japan because it was based on judgement by winners of WWII, especially the US. However, although it may be a matter of degree, it is difficult to argue that the US itself has committed a crime against humanity in a similar level as Japan. Japan was also a totalitarian regime that did not respect human rights and forced its people to die in a unreasonable manner.
In my article, I did not say anything like that the Japanese are inherently warlike. I just claimed that Abe and his supporters espouse historical revisionism and an amendment to Article 9 is a step in that direction. Japan is not a single actor. There are many people in Japan who have different values and opinions.
You cannot say references to the 1930s are irrelevant to any consideration of Article 9 as they are obviously relevant (although I do not understand why you mention this as I do not particularly refer to the 1930s in my article). Article 9 is aimed at preventing Japan from repeating wartime atrocities. What you say is the key movement in the 1930s – a change in the Japanese economic system – is a corollary of Japan’s war effort and the key movement in the 1930s was the rise of military. Here you can refer to Noguchi Yukio’s ‘1940’s system’ or Chalmers Johnson’s books to understand the basics of the origin of Japan’s postwar economic system, which has it roots in the war-time economy in the 1930s and 1940s. In any case, what you are arguing here is irrelevant to Article 9 and my article.
The 1930s was not just about the rise of militarism but that was by far the most significant event. I wonder how your argument about the economic ideology of the Kwantung Army can deny the significance of militarism in the 1930s. Actually, the Kwantung Army had a significant role in promoting militarism in Japan.
I hope that you can understand the main point of my article without a pre-fixed bias. I find your comment mostly irrelevant and your view on Japanese imperialism is quite close to that of Japanese nationalists.
Thank you for a very thoughtful and well-argued essay. I can only express the hope you are also sharing your viewpoint in as many Japanese-language venues as possible. Please continue disseminating this most important message.
Thank you very much for your comment. I will try to disseminate my viewpoint in as many Japanese-language venues as possible.