The preferred Chinese infrastructure business model does not help win local support as it is based on exporting Chinese equipment, materials, management and labour to the recipient country. There is minimal local content, job creation, training and supplier linkages.

Chinese companies have been accused of poor business practices, such as undercutting local suppliers, failing to honour contracts and failing to comply with local regulations, while delivering low quality and unreliable products, like the plagued Chinese-built power plants in Indonesia.

Perhaps due to a lack of familiarity with market economies and the operations of private companies, Chinese companies’ have shown a preference for working through local political leaders rather than directly with communities affected by their projects. This has meant the social costs of projects are not being adequately calculated and compensated for. This results in protests that can stall projects, as has happened with the Myitsone dam, the Kunming–Kyaukphyu railway and an oil and gas pipeline in Myanmar.

If the local leaders China works with are incompetent, corrupt, greedy or unpopular, this rubs off on Chinese projects, while dissatisfaction with Chinese projects can rub off on the local leaders — heightening political risk in both cases.

In Sri Lanka, the government’s leasing of Hambantota port to a Chinese state-owned company as payment of debts incurred for the port’s construction contributed to its local electoral losses in February 2018. And in Indonesia, there are rumours that President Jokowi’s encouragement of Chinese investments could undermine his prospects for re-election in 2019.

Chinese companies also lack experience operating in ethnically and culturally diverse countries, and are frequently accused of lacking respect for local practices and customs, such as observation of Muslim prayer times and Ramadan. They show no interest in learning about or understanding local populations (or eating their food), and at times come across as arrogant.

This can backfire on local ethnic Chinese populations in Southeast Asia, who already dominate business in some countries. They are favoured as local partners by Chinese companies and would be resented if seen to benefit disproportionately from Chinese investments. Other local Chinese worry that the unpopularity of high-profile Chinese projects could exacerbate latent anti-Chinese feelings that could adversely affect them.

What can China do to counter these destabilising negative perceptions of BRI projects?

First, Chinese companies should only undertake projects that are financially, economically and politically viable, and environmentally and socially sustainable. Including such calculations means many projects will not make the cut.

Second, they should partner with other lenders and investors from different countries. Diversification reduces risk and dilutes the image of projects being only for Chinese benefit.

Third, they should make investment decisions together with the host country, not unilaterally, to ensure that the projects are ‘mutually advantageous’ as claimed.

Fourth, they can help recipient countries to repay their loans, for example by establishing industrial zones for companies relocating labour-intensive manufacturing from China and by developing markets in China for their exports.

Fifth, they should employ better public relations. This includes being transparent and communicating with local media and host communities about project rationales. And they should reduce visibility: opening ceremonies should include other foreign partners and investors as well as more locals, and projects should be branded not as ‘Chinese’ but as ‘national’ projects, to reduce fears of a loss of sovereignty.

Sixth, they should employ locals as labour and management, provide technical and skills training and work with all stakeholders, not just the government or party in power. They should train, encourage and expect their Chinese employees to understand, respect and engage with local cultures. All this requires fundamental changes in corporate culture and business models.

In short, to be successful, BRI projects should become less Chinese.

While this might seem to run counter to China’s hope for ‘soft power’, the billions invested will otherwise not deliver and may even undermine China’s foreign policy goals.

Today, with a massive US$57 billion investment in energy and infrastructure projects in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Pakistan government has to employ a 15,000-strong military force to protect Chinese workers. Despite this, in February 2018, a Chinese shipping executive was shot dead in his car in Karachi in a targeted attack. If China does not learn to adapt to life outside the Great Wall, the BRI risks turning into a foreign policy nightmare, not a bonanza.

Linda Lim is NTUC Professor of International Economic Relations 2018 at the S Rajaratnam School of International Relations (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She is also Professor Emerita of Corporate Strategy and International Business at the Stephen M Ross School of Business, University of Michigan. This article is based on her recent RSIS seminar on the BRI.

A version of this article originally appeared here on RSIS.