In some instances it even borders on ‘yellow journalism’ — namely journalism that is based on sensationalism and crude exaggeration — which is something that has prodded the United States into war in the past.
Some commentators in Washington trumpet the China threat. They use information about Chinese construction on features in the South China Sea to bolster their campaigns to convince the Trump administration that China presents an imminent threat to US interests there, particularly freedom of navigation. Accompanying these concerns are a spate of proposals for aggressive US military action to challenge China’s claims and actions in the South China Sea.
Those in the US foreign policy community who warn of a China threat are finding resonance with some members of Congress and the Trump administration. On 3 May 2018, the White House announced that there would be ‘near-term and long-term consequences’ for China’s so-called ‘militarisation’ of the South China Sea.
Sure enough, a flurry of anti-China actions followed. On 23 May, the Pentagon announced that it had withdrawn an invitation to China to participate in the 2018 Rim of the Pacific Exercise — the world’s largest multinational military exercise.
The Pentagon followed this four days later with a two-ship freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands. The exercise violated China’s regime of required prior permission for warships to enter waters that China claims as its own.
US commentators and empathetic politicians are throwing every accusation they can at China to encourage and justify the need for a US response. They accuse China of being assertive and aggressive, violating the 2002 ASEAN–China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), not conforming to international rules and norms, militarising the features in the South China Sea, generating instability and threatening freedom of navigation.
Let’s examine the strength of these allegations.
China’s efforts to protect what it sees as its sovereign territory and resources against rival claimants in the South China Sea have indeed been both assertive and aggressive. But so have the actions of Vietnam as well as US naval activity in response to China’s actions. China has demonstrated relative restraint vis-a-vis provocative US FONOPs and US intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) probes in the South China Sea.
In other claimants’ eyes China has violated the DOC. But other claimants like Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have also violated the self-restraint provision of the DOC by continuing their own reclamation and construction activities after the 2002 agreement. The Philippines, by filing its complaint against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also violated what China considers to be the most important DOC provision of all — the commitment to resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes through friendly consultations and negotiations involving only the countries directly concerned.
China and the United States do not agree on what many of the international rules and norms are or should be. The United States wants to strengthen the status quo in which it is the dominant actor and patron. China believes it is being constrained by the existing US-led international order that favours a system developed and sustained by the West. China wants respect for its status and interests, and seeks to bend the system to its benefit just as the United States did during its rise.
‘Militarisation’ also means different things to China and the United States. To China, its placement in the South China Sea of what it perceives to be defensive weapons does not constitute militarisation, while the United States is clearly militarising the region with its forward-deployed troops, assets and patrols.
The United States maintains that its FONOPs in the South China Sea are intended to preserve and protect freedom of commercial navigation in the region for itself and others. But China has not threatened commercial freedom of navigation and is unlikely to do so during peacetime.
The United States conflates freedom of commercial navigation with freedom of navigation for its ISR vessels and aircraft. In so doing it makes frequent reference to UNCLOS, which it has not ratified and thus has little credibility interpreting to its own benefit. China objects to what it perceives as US abuse of ‘freedom of navigation’ to its military advantage, and its use of intimidation and coercion to enforce its interpretation.
The United States is overreacting in the South China Sea and this response is likely to be counterproductive. If the United States steps up its naval confrontation in the South China Sea, China may well respond by denying future US Navy port visits, further enhancing its military assets on the features it occupies and increasing its close-in observation of future US FONOPs and ISR probes.
Some US analysts and politicians appear to be trying to goad the United States into military action in the South China Sea even though there is no threat to US core interests there. It is indeed the job of the US defence and intelligence community to plan for worst-case scenarios. But objectivity, fairness and balance — the supposed ethics of independent analysts — are increasingly hard to find in analysis of China’s actions in the South China Sea.
Mark J Valencia is Adjunct Senior Scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, China.
A more detailed version of this article first appeared here in the IPP Review.
China’s efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea to protect its commercial shipping is endangering the free flow of trade, but does the presence of US warships there, including illegally in China territorial waters, has some purpose other than provocations and threats?
Your comment begs the question as to what constitutes China’s (i.e., the PRC’s) territorial waters. It isn’t sufficient to classify the US FONOP sailings as illegal without first establishing the boundaries of the PRC territorial waters. The PRC claims the entire area within the infamous “nine dash line”, (Taiwan, i.e., the ROC, also claims this area, a claim that was resoundingly rejected as having no basis by the Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in the case brought by The Philippines. The PRC invaded the Paracels in 1974, seizing them from Vietnam. The PRC is now engaged in an extensive island-building project in the Spratleys, “creating” islands designed to give the PRC territorial and EEZ rights. The ruling of the Tribunal not withstanding, it is already probably too late to do anything about the PRC’s occupation of the Paracels and the empire-building in the Spratleys without the risk of an all-out war, and I’m far from convinced that even the most hawkish of pundits and politicos in the US would be willing to take that risk.
Mr Valencia’s argument defending Chinese activities in the SCS centres on the reasoning that ‘other ASEAN states have done it, so China is justified in doing it too’. Two wrongs do not make a right. It is beyond doubt that China has reclaimed the most land, built the most military facilities and deployed the most weapons/troops in the Paracels and Spratlys. Other states have done it too, that’s true; but Beijing’s activities continue to be the largest and most worrisome among all the claimant states – worrisome in the sense that these activities run counter to regional peace and stability.
There is also the issue of proportionality – states should respond to provocations in a manner proportional to the original provocation. China may argue it was provoked into conducting its military activities in the SCS, but it has not abided by the proportionality principle with the massive scale of activities it has permitted.
Mr Valencia also ignores the PCA ruling in favour of the Philippines, which China asserts to be void. The court is a globally recognized tool of international law and arbitration. By not participating in the case at all, Beijing has disregarded international law, raising concerns in the region that it does not intend to negotiate at all – although it appears to espouse its interest to negotiate bilaterally rather than multilaterally. Instead, it has followed the great power strategy of ‘might makes right’ – through sheer military prowess, it has taken over control of the SCS notwithstanding what ASEAN claimant states have done in retaliation.
My point is this – Mr Valencia is right to say militarization means different things to China and the US. But unfortunately, China, like the US, believes in might makes right. While the US does want to retain hegemony in the region, China too wants to defend its national interests. In doing so, it ignores the interests of the small states it neighbours. Just because the US is ‘wrong’ doesn’t make China ‘right’ to assert its unilateral claims over the SCS. In short, the choice isn’t binary.
Fundamentally, ASEAN claimant states require a credible balance against a potential Chinese hegemonic threat. The US provides this balance and option. Beijing verbalizes its non-intent to dominate the region, but fails to follow that up with concrete actions. This concerns the other claimant states. In the end, China has set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy – its fear that the US would threaten its national security could, eventually, lead to a coalition of states getting together to counter itself.
It would be worth your doing your own due diligence before posting your comments. The PCA DID NOT rule in favor of the Philippines because the PCA is not a court and it has nothing to do with the United Nations. It only provided a registry and secretarial services for the ad hoc arbitral tribunal, which made the biased ruling on July 12, 2016.
China had already legally made a Declaration in 2006 under Article 298(1)(a) that it would not participate in any arbitration concerning maritime delimitation and historic titles because UNCLOS has no power to decide on any matter concerning sovereignty. This is the fundamental right of any nation which ratified UNCLOS. (For info, the United States Senate has yet to ratify UNCLOS and it cannot be said to be following a rules-based international norm, that it wants other nations to abide by).
President Duterte of the Philippines, a savvy ex-prosecutor knew that the arbitration was null and void. He set the ruling aside and agreed to negotiate with China peacefully.
The claim that “through sheer military prowess, it has taken over control of the SCS notwithstanding what ASEAN claimant states have done in retaliation” is also flawed.
History shows that after WW2, Japan returned the Paracel and Spratly Islands to China in accordance with the Potsdam (1945) and Cairo (1943) Declarations signed by the Great Allies: US, UK, China and Russia.
On 4 Sept 1958 China declared a 12nm territorial water on her coastlines and her islands in the SCS. The US, UK, Japan, France, Australia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines, to name a few, did not object over China’s sovereignty claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. There was no disputes then.
But when ECAFE discovered oil in the South China Sea in the late 1960s it was akin to shouting “Fire” in a crowded theater. Vietnam illegally grabbed 29 features in the Spratlys, Malaysia grabbed 7, Brunei one and President Marcos grabbed 8 features on 11 June 1978, using a presidential decree 1596, which was also illegal.
The claim that “Fundamentally, ASEAN claimant states require a credible balance against a potential Chinese hegemonic threat” is baseless rhetoric. China had already enunciated a policy to “Set Aside” the disputes in the SCS and share its resources a long time ago and recently the Asean claimants, including the Philippines and Brunei which has only one claim, are reported to be talking to China.
Lastly, Mark J Valencia is right to state that “Recently, the criticism has become ever more strident and dangerous. In some instances it even borders on ‘yellow journalism’ — namely journalism that is based on sensationalism and crude exaggeration — which is something that has prodded the United States into war in the past.”
Let’s hope the Unites States and China can resolve their differences amicably to prevent a senseless war, which can go nuclear from the start, over islands and rocks in the South China Sea. This is because no nation will be spared when a nuclear winter sets in.
In Byron Farwell’s book, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars, at the end of the book, I believe it was British General Robert who had made a prediction that there will be a war between the USA and China. Let us hope that he was wrong about it.
The Overview of the said Book revealed that “From 1837 to 1901, in Asia, China, Canada, Africa, and elsewhere, military expedition(s) were constantly being undertaken to protect resident Britons or British interests, to extend a frontier, to repel an attack, avenge an insult, or suppress a mutiny or rebellion. Continuous warfare became an accepted way of life in the Victorian era, and in the process the size of the British Empire quadruple.”
Imperial Britannia may have ruled the waves in the Victorian era but in the modern era all she seems to do is to wickedly waive the rules: for example, when she collaborated with Pax Americana to invade little Iraq, based on lies of WMD in March 2003, thus violating the United Nations Charter.
Is General Robert prescient enough to predict a war between the USA and China over islands and rocks in the South China Sea? Let’s hope not because no nation will be spared when a nuclear winter sets in.
China does not seek wars as she has been the biggest beneficiary of Peace in the last 70 years. President Xi told the US Defense Secretary recently that China is not an expansionist nor will she colonise any country.
This is wise because the Chinese have studied History extensively and found that in the end the Roman, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Ottoman, Dutch, French, Nazi, British and Japanese Empires all fell into the scrap of History when the ‘hubris’ ran out.
I know what the book was all about. I mentioned General Robert’s remark considering the fact that he was one of Britain’s better generals considering the fact that Bitish Officer Corp during that time period was not an intellectual one.
The world nearly came to an end in 1962 with the USA and Russia over nuclear missiles in Cuba. From what I heard, India and Pakistan nearly came to having a nuclear war.
Nowadays, you don’t have to occupy lands to be a colonizer/expansionist. Here is an article about how you can be a de facto colonizer/empire without occupying the land: https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/china-and-gemany-the-honeymoon-is-over/.
Then again China is making huge investments in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia, which is why they are expanding their military particularly their navy in order to protect them in case of civil, social, political, and economic unrest just the USA did from the 1920s to even today. When you become an economic power, you then have to be a military power to protect it, no matter how reluctant you don’t want to be.