Within 24 hours, Kim and Moon arranged for their second summit meeting of 2018 on 26 May at the Northern side of the demilitarised zone that separates both Koreas.
In contrast with the first inter-Korean summit on 27 April that took several weeks to organise, the short notice of the second summit indicates much improvement in North–South relations. It also reveals joint inter-Korean diplomatic crisis management.
During this second summit, Kim enunciated his ‘fixed will’ to meet with Trump on 12 June as previously agreed. In a press release the following day on 27 May, Moon announced that Kim re-affirmed the desire to completely denuclearise the Korean peninsula. Both sides agreed that their top civilian and military officials should meet on 1 June to discuss reunions for families separated by the 1950–53 Korean War and the reduction of military tensions. Pyongyang seemed to unilaterally show indirect sincerity in supporting the 12 June US–North Korean summit by dismantling the Punggye-ri nuclear test site with international journalists present as witnesses.
These results convinced Washington of the Kim regime’s earnestness and sincerity in honest nuclear disarmament negotiations. The United States and North Korea dispatched senior diplomats to Singapore to prepare for the meeting of their respective heads of state, and on 12 June the Trump–Kim summit proceeded as planned. When regional powers like the two Koreas are willing to exhibit flexibility and are determined to achieve diplomatic or strategic objectives, they can succeed while concurrently influencing a great power such as the United States.
This phenomenon is not unique or uncommon in the field of nuclear disarmament. Between 1991 and 1996, Ukraine relinquished the nuclear arms that it inherited from the collapse of the USSR. The Ukrainian parliament held spirited denuclearisation debates and bargained strongly with the United States and Russia for compensation and security guarantees.
Despite this, counter-proliferation-minded Ukrainian leaders worked unofficially with their Russian and US counterparts to establish technical processes for deactivating Ukrainian nuclear warheads, shipping warheads to Russia and dismantling missiles and missile launchers. In early 1993, the Ukrainians stated their willingness to discuss de-targeting and removing the guidance systems and warheads from their nuclear missiles. Ukraine also offered the United States the unilateral dismantlement of some of the former’s intercontinental ballistic missiles.
As these technical discussions occurred outside of the Ukrainian parliament’s purview, they helped promote progress that sidestepped political gridlock. Comparing the Ukrainian experience to the North Korean case suggests that the willingness to work outside of formal negotiations with great powers still allows regional powers to achieve secondary diplomatic or disarmament objectives.
The Trump–Kim summit did not result in any concrete and detailed deliverables that would result in North Korean nuclear disarmament at a confirmed point in the future. Instead, vague promises of security guarantees for North Korea from the United States were exchanged for an ‘in-principle’ commitment to total denuclearisation by North Korea. Both sides pledged to normalise their relations at some point in the future.
Even as US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is due to meet his counterpart from Pyongyang to work out the details of implementing the summit’s points of agreement, many factors could impede results. These include political resistance from hawkish factions on both sides and even interference from foreign powers who judge the developments as detrimental to their national interests. Despite any disruptive occurrences that might slow denuclearisation, Seoul and Pyongyang should not resign themselves to this outcome nor to the stagnation of inter-Korean relations.
If both Moon and Kim’s respective administrations display the same will and determination shown by their second summit, progress is possible. A de facto stable peace can be achieved via an unofficial agreement inked between Moon and Kim. If Kim is prepared to play his part, military adventurism and state-sponsored terrorism from North Korea will become a thing of the past.
If Pyongyang displays an irreversible demonstration of nuclear disarmament — such as the surrendering of a few long-range nuclear-tipped missiles to the International Atomic Energy Agency or China — Kim and Moon could then make the case for a relaxation of UN-mandated economic sanctions against North Korea. On Seoul’s part, these positive actions from Pyongyang will provide justification for any significant shipments of humanitarian aid from South Korea to North Korea. All of these factors may provide reciprocal momentum for a reinvigorated virtuous denuclearisation–compensation cycle that works independently of US involvement.
Liang Tuang Nah is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.