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Short-term comfort for Abe in Trump’s Russia stance

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Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomes Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during their meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, 26 May 2018 (Photo: Reuters/Grigory Dukor).

In Brief

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has actively pursued closer relations with Russia since his return to office in December 2012. This has included the announcement of a ‘new approach’ to bilateral relations that features high-level political engagement, an eight-point economic cooperation plan and enhanced security dialogue.

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Abe justifies this policy as necessary to lay the groundwork for an agreement that would settle the long-standing territorial dispute over the Russian-held Southern Kuril Islands (known as the Northern Territories in Japan). Underlying this goal is the strategic calculation that Russia does not represent a serious security threat to Japan. The Abe administration instead regards Russia as a potential partner that can assist Japan in addressing Japan’s real security threats: China and North Korea.

This policy has proved contentious among Japanese allies, many of whom advocate a tougher stance on Russia. Former US president Barack Obama used a phone call in February 2016 to urge Abe not to visit Russia in May of that year. More recently, the UK government was displeased by the Abe administration’s refusal to support its claims of Russian involvement in the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury in March 2018.

Japan’s sanctions against Russia introduced after the latter’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 are also notably weaker than those of other G7 members, and Tokyo has happily played host to several Russian officials whom the West has sanctioned.

But while Abe may once have been an outlier within the G7 when it comes to Russia, he can now claim that his policy has the support of Japan’s most important ally: the United States.

Following US President Trump’s summit with Russian President Putin in Helsinki on 16 July 2018 and the US leader’s invitation to his Russian counterpart to visit the White House, Abe’s frequent meetings with Putin appear less conspicuous. Trump and Abe’s shared tendency to avoid criticising the Russian leadership yields a similar effect.

The US President’s introduction of tariffs on Chinese imports also suggests that he agrees with Abe’s assessment that China is the greater threat to the international status quo.

Abe can now legitimately argue that his Russia policy is in line with that of the Trump administration. Indeed, he may flatter himself that he helped shape the US President’s thinking. When Abe and Trump met in February 2017, Abe claims that he advised Trump about how to deal with Russia and told the newly inaugurated US President that Putin ‘is a man who keeps his promises’.

Trump’s engagement with Russia provides Abe with cover from domestic criticism — not least because keeping close to the US position is the norm of Japan’s post-war foreign policy. Abe is free to persist with the ‘new approach’ and to prepare for his next visit to Russia. This will be in September 2018, when Abe will make a third successive visit to the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok and where he will meet with Putin for the 22nd time.

While Trump may have offered validation to Abe’s Russia policy in the short term, in the longer term there remain significant risks.

First, there is no guarantee that either leader’s soft stance towards Russia will yield results. In Abe’s case, there is little to show for more than five years of effort. Despite an agreement in December 2016 to discuss joint economic projects on the disputed islands, there has yet to be any concrete progress.

Meanwhile, Russia’s military presence on the islands has intensified. Moscow deployed Bal and Bastion anti-ship missiles in November 2016 and Su-35S combat jets in August 2018 — the first time fighter jets have been permanently stationed on the disputed islands since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Abe’s enthusiastic courtship of Putin also appears to have had no discernible impact on Russia’s broader geopolitical position in East Asia. As was apparent when the Japanese and Russian foreign and defence ministers met in the ‘2+2’ format in July 2018, Russia does not support Japan’s demand that maximum pressure continue to be applied on North Korea until Pyongyang has demonstrated significant progress towards denuclearisation.

Moscow remains stridently opposed to Japan’s deployment of the Aegis Ashore missile defence system and it refuses to accept Tokyo’s insistence that the defence system is purely defensive and independent of the United States. And, as relations between Moscow and Beijing grow ever closer, it is apparent that the Abe administration has not succeeded in drawing Russia away from China.

The Russian leadership has skilfully used Abe’s enthusiasm for closer ties as a way of demonstrating the G7’s failure to maintain consensus on isolating Russia. In return, all Putin has offered are vague promises of territorial progress, the fulfillment of which is endlessly deferred.

Second, while it is usually wise for a Japanese leader to maintain a foreign policy line in parallel to that of their US counterpart, this is not necessarily the case with Trump. Trump’s Russia policy is extremely controversial and has been subject to ardent criticism both within the United States and internationally. And as Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election continues, there remains the possibility that the Trump administration will ultimately be sunk by charges of collusion with the Russian authorities.

Were this to occur, the similarity between Abe’s approach to Russia and that of the US President would rapidly shift from being an asset to a major liability.

James DJ Brown is Associate Professor and Academic Program Coordinator for International Affairs, Temple University, Japan.

2 responses to “Short-term comfort for Abe in Trump’s Russia stance”

  1. Thanks for an insightful and concise analysis. Two points might be added to this. First, the US Congress has not gone along with Trump’s policy towards Putin/Russia. It recently imposed even more sanctions against Russian oligarchs close to Putin as a way to demonstrate its continuing opposition to Russian policies. There are a majority in Congress and many in the intelligence community who are very concerned about Russian efforts to at least affect, if not undermine, the upcoming mid-term elections in November. Ie, Trump’s positions on Russia and Putin are not endorsed by many Americans.

    As noted in this analysis Russia has not softened its stance on the potential return of the Northern Territories. In fact, it has deployed more military equipment and personnel as a way to show Abe it has no intentions to do this. Not noted here is that this goal of Abe’s is motivated by his nationalist perspective on Japan. Also not noted is that this perspective flies in the face of geopolitical reality.

    • Thank you very much for the comments.

      I very much agree. The United States now has a highly inconsistent Russia policy, with Trump and Congress pursuing contradictory agendas. From Abe’s perspective, however, it is Trump’s position that matters. So long as Trump maintains his Russia-friendly approach, Abe will feel comfortable in doing the same.

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