The long simmering insurgency erupted into open conflict in January 2004 in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. The insurgency has lasted 14 years so far. In the intervening period, authorities claim there have been over 18,000 incidents of terrorism leading to over 7000 deaths. Reports of persistent injustices and arbitrary violence perpetrated by the authorities continue to erode confidence in the central government’s ability to resolve the dispute.
Pathan cites a number of recent incidents (including coordinated attacks on ATMs and drive-by shootings) as proof of a dramatic resurgence. But such acts have been commonplace for years and recent figures suggest that there has been a marked reduction in the number of incidents.
Terrorism related events have declined dramatically from a peak of 2061 incidents in 2010 to 489 incidents in 2017. This figure is not as low as the levels prior to or up to 2004 (143 incidents) and 2005 (240 incidents) but this does indicate a dramatic decline since the 2010 peak.
Repeated efforts to find a resolution over the years have broken down over apparently irreconcilable differences. Government authorities continue to face difficulties finding clear and credible insurgent representatives with whom to negotiate. Mara Patani has been touted in recent years as the front group best able to deliver on negotiations but their influence appears limited. This leaves the principal insurgent group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), to operate at arm’s length from this so-called peace process.
Pathan suggests the downward trend in incidents can be explained by a level of self-restraint within BRN and a more careful selection of targets. He claims that BRN representatives say their recent attacks prove they can still strike and ratchet up at will. But this reckoning does not adequately account for the statistical trend. This trend can be explained in part by what the Thai military itself has done to raise levels of professionalism within its own ranks. These changes have led to a marked reduction in accusations of human rights abuses.
Despite the focus on improved tactics and procedures, the military’s strategy remains largely unchanged. For Thai officials, the one non-negotiable condition is Thai state unity. Ideas for a federal model or for enhanced autonomy for the Malay Muslim south have generated considerable angst in Bangkok. Fears of irredentist tendencies in northern (Lanna) and northeast (Isaan) Thailand have caused a level of unease inside governing circles over Bangkok’s control of the outlying provinces. Such fears, widely regarded as overstated, have been used as justification to deem concessions unacceptable.
Sources indicate that while the government remains determined not to cave in on questions of separate governance, some concessions have been made to accommodate local mores on language and Islamic dress for instance. These appear to be having some effect. In addition, more carefully targeted and restrained military and police operations have contributed significantly to the reduction in incidents. Reports of graft and corruption detract from the government’s commitment to spend billions of dollars on local development projects, but the graft itself is being publicly scrutinised at least and government pronouncements suggest they recognise the need to respond.
There is a view that a more restrained use of force and a more active engagement from the army in delivering services through its ‘forward government’ program may have contributed to the fall in violence. This is still subject to debate. Continued sporadic media reporting of politically motivated violence against security forces suggest BRN insurgents remain quite active. It is worth remembering that in the 1990s the BRN was widely seen as a spent force, only to return with a vengeance from 2004 onwards.
The news of the surrender of a significant militant figure may not be a dramatic turn in events. Warnings about BRN’s enduring capability cannot be dismissed out of hand. But there does seem to be a growing momentum for a modicum of peace. What remains, it appears, is at least in part attributable to a background level of violence that Desmond Ball and Nicholas Farrelly associate with local criminal activity — people and drug smuggling, illegal gambling and the sex trade.
Despite its image as a land of smiles, Thailand has a remarkably high level of violence nationwide. In seeking to discern the difference between background violence across Thailand and the levels of violence in southern Thailand, authoritative statistical comparisons are hard to find. But anecdotal indications suggest that while the violence in Thailand’s deep south remains unacceptably high, it is now approaching levels that have been taken as relatively normal in border provinces abutting Thailand’s other neighbours in Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia.
John Blaxland is Professor of International Security and Intelligence Studies, Director of the Southeast Asia Institute and Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University.