Japan’s post-war prime minister Shigeru Yoshida decided that Japan would become a member of the Western community by concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US–Japan Security Treaty in September 1951. These decisions enabled Japan not only to enjoy the United States’ security umbrella but also gave it access to the US market and to US technology, which were both indispensable for Japanese recovery and economic development. Meanwhile, Japan’s security role in the context of East–West rivalry was limited to maintaining defence forces at a ‘minimum necessary’ level, while hosting US troops on its soil.

The end of the Cold War and Japan’s economic miracle proved that Yoshida’s decision was basically correct. Japan became a winner of the Cold War with relatively low costs. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed as if liberal democracy had become a universal value of the world. At the same time, Japan was urged to contribute to the maintenance of the US-led liberal international order at a level commensurate with its economic power.

This is why, as early as the 1990s, Japan began to dispatch its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas for international peacekeeping or disaster relief operations, for multilateral institution-building and for the promotion of democracy and human rights through diplomatic and economic measures. Japan also agreed with the United States to utilise the US-Japan alliance not only to protect Japan but also to contribute to regional and global order-building based on their shared values and interests.

This broader strategic goal of the US–Japan alliance partly came into play during the US-led war on terror, in which Japan dispatched the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq for the reconstruction effort. Japan also provided a large amount of financial support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. Japan’s military and non-military support for the war on terror was primarily motivated by the maintenance of strong bilateral ties due to the growing threat of North Korea, but equally important was Japan’s desire to keep US primacy in the Asia Pacific by supporting and supplementing US regional and global roles.

For Japan, the rise of China was manageable, if not inevitable, so long as the United States showed a strong enough commitment to regional security — including Japanese defence. But with the advent of US President Donald Trump, Japanese policymakers are for the first time in the post-war period seriously questioning their policy of supporting the US-led international order. An initially optimistic view of Trump has been replaced by caution and confusion about his administration’s strategic coherence.

True, the Trump administration has for now continued its close security commitment to its Asian allies and partners, including the provision of nuclear extended deterrence. Yet such commitments seem based on short-term and narrowly defined interests rather than a long-term commitment to the international order itself. Japan was shocked when President Trump immediately accepted Kim Jong-un’s offer of the US–North Korea summit meeting and even suggested the potential withdrawal of US forces in South Korea without any consultation to regional allies.

Japan’s regional friends and partners have already begun their shift from the old mindset: they now increasingly hedge against the dual risks of a more hegemonic China and an increasingly unreliable United States.

South Korea has pursued the early takeover of wartime operational control on the Peninsula from the US military while continuing to maintain good relations with China and taking its own initiative for peace negotiations with North Korea. New Delhi, while increasingly cautious about China’s growing power and influence, has seemed to maintain its traditional non-alignment policy and has actively promoted the ‘multi-polarisation’ of the world with China and Russia. Indonesia has pursued its ‘global maritime axis’ policy with aspirations of multipolarity and of maintaining a ‘pivotal position’ against major powers. Even Australia, which has supported the US-led liberal order for many years with Japan, has recognised the risk of overdependence on its ‘great and powerful’ friend and some of its policy-elites have begun to consider a ‘plan B’.

Japan has also boosted its defence capabilities, while expanding its strategic horizons to Indo-Pacific. Yet its defence budget remains under 1 per cent of GDP, and its ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy, despite its very geostrategic image, actually focusses on economic and some low-key defence cooperation with regional countries. Indeed, many Japanese believe that the most important aspect of FOIP is to keep and strengthen the US military presence in the region by expanding the scope of US–Japan cooperation and by supporting or supplementing US regional activities with other like-minded democracies. While such a strategy seems successful so far, it remains unclear to what extent or how long the United States can show commitment to FOIP, especially under its ‘America First’ President.

Should Japan continue its support of the US-led international order? If not, what is the best alternative?

Some may suggest that Japan should distance itself from the United States and gradually boost ties with China. But without a military backbone that is commensurate in power to China’s, Japan’s bandwagoning to China will likely bring Japan under Chinese hegemonic influence. This would not be acceptable to most Japanese people.

Others might recommend that Japan focus its resources on homeland defence while giving up the illusion of ‘liberal order-building’ by developing its own nuclear program. But such a ‘Japan First’ policy would not only increase the risk of military conflict between Japan and its neighbours — it would also completely undermine the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Such a move may well promote the collapse of the rule-based international order and invite a world where ‘might is right’. It is quite easy to imagine who in Asia would stand the most to gain from such a state of affairs.

Japan is faced with strategic puzzles. The US alliance will remain the centre of Japan’s foreign policy, and Japan may need to assume greater burden-sharing within the alliance. At the same time, Japan must go beyond the previous paradigm of merely ‘supporting the US-led order’ and should instead seek its own more independent role for regional order building. Japan’s strategic partnerships with regional like-minded democracies, as well as its continuous engagement with China, can be the foundation for such a new order building strategy.

Tomohiko Satake is a Senior Research Fellow at National Institute of Defence Studies, Tokyo. The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of NIDS or the Ministry of Defence, Japan.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Peak Japan’.