Since the IS-inspired Dhaka cafe attack in 2016, Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies have scaled up their operations across the country — 906 people have been arrested for their alleged involvement in Neo-JMB and around 100 militants were killed during these operations. This has created leadership disarray within Neo-JMB and drastically reduced its capacity to raise funds and carry out attacks.
As the year draws to a close, Neo-JMB appears weakened but not yet contained. The group has a new leader reviving the group. Recruitment continues and the group is allegedly planning terror attacks. There is also the possibility of lone-wolf or single actor attacks, as pro-IS propaganda materials are still available online and circulated through social media.
This year has also seen the re-emergence of JMB, which is gradually rebuilding its networks after the arrest of hundreds of JMB leaders and activists in 2005. According to Bangladeshi authorities, JMB and Ansar al-Islam (the Bangladeshi wing of al-Qaeda) are possibly working together, or at least have similar targets. The July 2018 killing of Shahjahan Bachchu — a writer, publisher and former left-wing politician — is a case in point. Bachchu came under the radar of both terrorist groups thanks to his secular blogs. The groups then worked in tandem to kill him: Ansar al-Islam conducted the reconnaissance while JMB eliminated him.
In mid-2018, JMB opened a new wing in India: Jama’atul Mujahedeen India (JMI). The group believes in using Qital (armed struggle) to ‘uproot polytheism and to establish Islam’ and claims that the Indian subcontinent is a future battlefield for establishing the caliphate.
The revival of JMB highlights the possibility of a new wave of terrorist activities in Bangladesh, especially as the country prepares for elections at the end of 2018. The group vehemently opposes democracy and may try to target polling centres.
Bangladesh and India have carried out around 100 joint operations to dismantle JMB. But the success of this campaign will be limited unless a long-term strategy is formed to check Islamist militancy.
While the Bangladesh government’s response to terrorism in 2018 was largely operational, they have put in place a range of strategic initiatives. Authorities are focussing on the threat of cyber-radicalisation and mobilisation by militant groups. They are also engaging Muslim clerics to create greater awareness of extremism and terrorism and working to regulate Madrassa education.
Bangladeshi authorities continue to organise community engagement programs and inter-faith dialogues. Some agencies are currently working with academics to promote an in-depth understanding of preventing and countering violent extremism. Law enforcement agencies are also using mobile-apps to collect human intelligence and feedback from the community.
Bangladesh’s key challenge at this juncture is to build a well-structured counter-terrorism strategy and action plan. This should include cyber platforms for encouraging moderation and a policy for rehabilitating extremists.
Hampering Bangledesh’s efforts is the limited coordination between counter-terrorism agencies and the prison system. Quite often, terrorist detainees and inmates bribe prison officers to be transferred to prisons of their choice. This makes monitoring difficult.
One positive development has been the establishment of an Anti-Terrorism Tribunal (ATT) — under the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Act — to more efficiently trial terrorist suspects. The ATT will be in charge of the Dhaka cafe attack trial. The second tribunal will be set up in Chittagong.
Notwithstanding the decline in attacks, the terrorist threat in Bangladesh remains real and the fight against it is likely to continue. Despite the sustained operational response, terrorist groups have been able to survive, re-organise and expand. Bangladesh’s response must be recalibrated. While police and other law enforcement agencies are doing their part in the operational realm, there is a need to ensure continuity and to rethink strategic options. As a new administration takes over in 2019, it remains to be seen how Bangladesh will work to reduce the threat.
Iftekharul Bashar is an Associate Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2018 in review and the year ahead.