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Japan’s constitutional revision debate isn’t asking the right questions

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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe makes a speech after reviewing Japanese Self-Defence Forces' (SDF) troops during the annual SDF ceremony at Asaka Base in Asaka, north of Tokyo, Japan, 14 October 2018 (Photo: Reuters/Kim Kyung-Hoon).

In Brief

After Shinzo Abe was re-elected for another term as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) — and thus as Japanese prime minister — in September 2018, he made it clear he will push ahead to revise Article 9 of the country’s post-war constitution. The prospect of changing Article 9, which prohibits Japan from engaging in war and maintaining armed forces, is causing domestic polarisation and international consternation.

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Since returning to power in 2012, Abe and the conservative LDP have hoped to make Japan a more ‘normal nation’. They want a Japan unencumbered by the restrictions of Article 9, without questions about the legitimacy of contributing to its military alliance with the United States and without so much resistance from a still somewhat anti-militarist public.

The LDP proposed a draft revision of the constitution in 2012 that seemed to be aimed at greatly reducing Japan’s explicit constitutional constraints on the use of military force and shifting focus to questions about what the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) ‘“can/should” do and “can’t/shouldn’t” do to the democratically elected Diet to debate and legislate’. But the 2012 proposal widened the meaning of the ‘defence only’ restriction to include ‘collective defence’ — the ability to aid the United States and other allies.

Still too drastic a change from Japan’s past, the 2012 draft was watered down in 2018 because it would clearly not win the approval — of neither opposition within and without the LDP nor the majority of the public — required to initiate and pass a referendum. The LDP has now agreed on a minimum revision that would only change the second clause of Article 9 to clearly legitimise the SDF.

Whether for or against revising the constitution, what no one seems to be asking is how much this watered down revision would really matter? If the LDP fails in the revision, many assume current policies will have little import for Japan’s security future. If the LDP’s proposed revision passes, many others assume it may bring momentous change. Are either of these assumptions valid?

Japan’s constitutional security problems stem from US policies during the post-WWII occupation of Japan. After the United States gave Japan its ‘no war’ constitution, it went back on its original intent and encouraged Japan’s military rearmament and support when the Cold War began, polarising Japan into left and right over the alliance relationship with the United States. Then prime minister Shigeru Yoshida had to pacify the United States to maintain its protection without further polarising Japan or alienating its neighbours.

From 1952 when Japan regained its sovereignty, a conservative consensus gradually emerged which came to be called the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’. This consensus was to build up the SDF but rely primarily on the US alliance for defence, limiting the SDF to an auxiliary role and only in direct defence of Japan.

The Yoshida Doctrine became established dogma among moderate conservatives. But after the electoral reforms of 1994, it also became the policy of more centrist and moderate major parties, including the current LDP coalition partner Komeito. Even the more liberal Democratic Party of Japan administration that governed from 2009 to 2012 seemed to want to pull Japan back to the Yoshida Doctrine.

Except for a small minority of recalcitrant socialists and communists, Japan has never really been ‘pacifist’. Instead, it may be said to have a strong anti-militarist political subculture that has held on to the Yoshida Doctrine in practice, while making the original wording of Article 9 symbolically sacrosanct.

The majority of the public’s continued adherence to the Yoshida Doctrine is also somewhat irrational when almost all the circumstances of its origins have changed. Japan has successfully democratised and gained economic strength and independence, the severity of domestic polarisation over defence has diminished, and Japan’s neighbours (except China and the Koreas) are more accepting of a militarily strong Japan.

Meanwhile, the rise of China, an erratic North Korea and US President Donald Trump’s pressure on allies to contribute more militarily is creating an expanding gap between Japan’s constitution and the reality of its military strength in a threatening security environment.

All of these factors undermine the conditions that made the original Yoshida Doctrine viable.

The real, unexamined questions in the debate over constitutional revision should be: is it is healthy in a democracy for there to be such a gap between the current international, regional and domestic reality and what the constitution says? And what are the future security consequences and dangers of diminishing or maintaining that gap?

Those who oppose any revision think the current status quo is fine and with almost-religious fervour insist that any change will open the floodgates for Japan to once again become an aggressive military power or get drawn into a war because of the United States.

The former fear is silly given the viability of Japan’s democracy, the public’s anti-militarist attitudes, the electoral accountability of the system and the influence of political opposition. But the latter is quite rational. The ‘alliance dilemma’ is a crucial consideration, especially for a country that has enjoyed the benefits of peace under US protection for almost 75 years: how not to become abandoned by the bigger alliance partner or become trapped in military adventures that are not in the smaller partner’s interest.

Every alliance decision and issue in Japan becomes entangled in fundamental controversies about the basic legitimacy and legality of the SDF and regional collective defence. Japan has long refused military entanglement while selectively contributing in non-military or at least non-combat ways to the US alliance to prevent abandonment. Can this continue in the shadow of the threat of China and North Korea in the Pacific region, the changed de factosecurity policies and heightened US expectations in the age of Trump?

Whatever the fate of the current constitutional revision under Abe, it will do nothing to change this constitution-reality gap, address these contradictions or answer any overarching security questions. In the present debate, no one seems even to be raising the real questions or discussing the security dilemmas Japan will likely face in the future.

Ellis S Krauss is Professor Emeritus at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California, San Diego.

A longer version of this article first appeared here on Global Asia. 

2 responses to “Japan’s constitutional revision debate isn’t asking the right questions”

  1. Thanks for an illuminating analysis of this gap between a constitution that was drafted 70+ years ago and the security and geopolitical realities that Japan faces today. I would add that the country’s leaders have failed to educate the people adequately about how circumstances have evolved in recent decades. Instead, most people in Japan were far too comfortable in the 60’s through the 80’s accepting the security umbrella provided by the USA while they focused on developing the economy. Since the so called bubble burst, people have been more worried about getting the country back on its feet economically than on security issues.

    I would add two other factors not noted here. First, Japan has never really adequately reconciled its so called historical issues with its former enemies. Unlike Germany with its neighbors in Europe these continue to fester. Thus S Korea, in particular, but other Asian allies are nervous over the prospects of a more robust Japanese military because they are still haunted by memories of Japanese war atrocities, etc.

    Second, Japan’s demographic challenges may make a new approach to security a moot point. With a declining population and a huge, ever growing debt how will the country have the manpower for a larger, potentially more robust military? And how will it pay for it?

  2. I don’t understand the rationale for privileging ‘collective defence’ for lthe United States and other allies”. Why privilege allies, especially when those allies have historically instigated war? Australia’s experience has been that its military alliances historically tend to draw Australia into wars with countries that do not immediately threaten Australia.

    It would make more sense for Japan to support U.N. peace keeping; that is what a “normal” country should do. Fighting wars on behalf of allies is not “normal”. The vast majority of U.N. members do not engage in any military conflicts on behalf of allies.

    Japan is already normal, and in fact, more countries should be like Japan (in terms of having constitutional restrictions on armed conflict).

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