Author: Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University
When considering the future of North and South Korea, we can see that the time has come to raise an alternative elite, the kind that meets the expectations of the modern world and has no relationship with the Kim Jong Il regime.
However, it is impossible to participate in any political activity or gain a great deal of knowledge while inside North Korea. For North Korean intellectuals with a sense of the modern world, the birthplace of the alternative elite is the defector community in South Korea. Read more…
Author: Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University and ANU
Over the past year or so, something strange has begun to happen in Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership has taken some actions that have clearly damaged the interests of the ruling clique.
The recent currency reform is the best example of self-defeating policy decisions. For years, the Pyongyang government has waged campaigns against the unofficial and semi-official markets that have played a decisive role in North Korea’s economic life since the collapse of the state-run economy in the 1990s. Read more…
Author: Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University
North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons, but it makes sense for the United States to continue talks now with a more realistic understanding of the North’s strategies and goals.
President Barack Obama arrived in Seoul last Wednesday for a summit meeting with President Lee Myung-bak. No doubt, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme will play a major role in the forthcoming negotiations. Read more…
Author: Andrei Lankov
When it comes to dealing with North Korea, the United States and its allies have no efficient methods of coercion at their disposal; the regime is remarkably immune to outside pressure. Its leaders cannot afford change, so they make sure their state continues to be an international threat, using nuclear blackmail as a survival tactic while their unlucky subjects endure more poverty and terror.
Since outside pressure is ineffective, change will have to come from the North Koreans themselves. The United States and its allies can best help them by exposing them to the very attractive alternatives to their current way of life. Read more…
Author: Andrei Lankov
In the past decade or so, the small army of Pyongyang watchers have been looking for signs of a coming great event, which most expected to happen at any moment. They waited for Dear Leader Kim Jong-il’s decision on the power succession in the world’s only communist monarchy. There were false alarms, waves of unconfirmed and mutually exclusive rumors, but finally, early this year, signals emerging from the North seemingly confirmed: the succession was finally decided.
The first reports were met with some skepticism. However, by April there were no doubts: Kim Jong-un, Kim’s youngest son, began to be frequently mentioned in the North Korean classified propaganda materials. These publications are off-limits for common North Koreans, but the message was clear: the virtues of the ‘brilliant comrade’ Kim Jong-un were extolled in a way which would be proper only for the next leader. So, Kim Jong-il finally made up his mind about succession – or at least that is what most observers came to believe.
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Author: Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University
Bill Clinton’s trip to Pyongyang and the release of the American journalists confirmed what many observers have suspected since early July: North Korea is indicating its willingness to re-start talks with the United States. There are reasons why Washington should not rush to the negotiation table immediately, but few people doubt that these talks will start relatively soon.
The negotiations are likely to be characterized as talks about getting the North to give up its nuclear weapons. But one should not be misled: No amount of diplomatic dealing can achieve that goal.
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Author: Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University, Seoul
Why is Pyongyang Striking Back?
Foreign Aid and Changes in the International Environment
Why is the North Korean leadership so eager to move backward? Given that this same leadership grudgingly tolerated dramatic liberalization in the late 1990s, what changes in the domestic and international situations made this turn of policy, first, possible and, second, desirable?
In order to answer these questions other important changes to the international position of the North Korean regime that occurred between 2000 and 2002 must be briefly considered. From 1998 to 2008 South Korea was governed by left-leaning administrations whose approach to North Korea was known as the Sunshine Policy. This policy envisioned a dramatic increase in unilateral aid to North Korea, typically without any pre-existing conditions. Thus, the amount of aid provided through both government and private channels increased dramatically around 2000, emphasized by the first Korean summit in 2000. The surge in aid was accompanied by a dramatic increase in trade and commercial exchanges, frequently subsidized by South Korea and therefore differing very little from direct aid.
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