Indonesians have reason to be both optimistic and pessimistic coming into 2012. The question is: which outlook is more likely to prevail?

In his New Year message, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) requested that all Indonesians work to maintain order. Acknowledging that the country’s political landscape is becoming more heated due to the upcoming general election — scheduled for 2014 — SBY urged Indonesia’s political parties and politicians not to inflame tensions.

Yet, problems in Indonesia are mounting. Hoping not to have more heated situations is not enough; the President is expected to do more. In 2011, many persistent problems were not dealt with, and corruption is still the biggest challenge in the country. Though Indonesia’s rating in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index improved slightly from 2.8 in 2010 to 3.0 in 2011, deep problems remain. Junior bureaucrats were found to possess billions of rupiahs in their savings accounts; wealth which is largely incompatible with their standard salaries. The wife of a former deputy police chief facilitated billions of rupiahs worth of grafts for members of Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR). And the head of a public elementary school stole huge amounts of public money which was supposed to be used for the school.

Mahfud M.D., the chairman of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court, in December 2011 noted that many state institutions appear to have been ‘contaminated’ by corruption viruses. Out of the several judicial authorities dealing with anti-corruption legal actions — the National Police, the Attorney General’s Office and the Corruption Eradication Commission — only the latter stands strong, even though it is also under attack by many lawmakers, who wish to weaken it.

In 2012, Indonesia should look to its neighbours, including Singapore and Australia, in its effort to deal with corruption. Indonesia should not feel awkward about learning from other countries. It is better to ‘lower’ the country’s dignity for some time in order to subsequently reach a more dignified status.

Human rights also demand greater attention, particularly after the recent bloody clashes involving citizens, corporations and police authorities. State authorities have been found guilty of human rights abuses in some recent cases, such that national and international attention remains focused on Indonesia. Some progress has been made, with reforms instituted since 1998 increasing the freedom of the press, and the public have also become more critical of human rights abuses perpetrated by the authorities.

This year may also see a possible breakout among the governing coalition parties, with the potential to shake the foundations of SBY’s government. This could be sparked by the Bank Century saga — the bank for which Indonesia’s previous government authorised a large bailout. Even though Indonesia survived the financial crisis — due perhaps to its bailout policy — some politicians in the DPR remain committed to prosecuting the policy makers responsible for the move, of whom are members of the current government. Interestingly, the strongest critics of the policy are members of the Golkar Party and Prosperous Justice Party, which are both members of the governing coalition. Either way, Indonesian politics will undoubtedly become more heated in 2012. Even though the next general election is two and a half years away, campaigning has already started. Some parties have announced their presidential candidates, whereas others are still in a wait-and-see mode.

Internationally, 2012 will be less hectic than 2011, with Cambodia chairing ASEAN after Indonesia’s stint last year. Another issue that may prove difficult for policy makers is the protection of Indonesian migrant workers abroad. Last year, an Indonesian citizen was beheaded by Saudi authorities, to strong public criticism in Indonesia. The government must nevertheless be commended for its ability to save a number of other workers through its diplomatic missions in Riyadh and Jeddah. But others are still waiting to face court proceedings, with many confronting potential death penalties.

One positive from December 2011 was an increase in Indonesia’s sovereign credit rating. Fitch Ratings increased Indonesia’s ranking from BB+ to BBB- with a stable outlook. The upgrade should provide for increased foreign investment, which in the future can create more jobs. This opportunity shall not be missed or wasted, but it is up to Indonesia’s elites to determine the country’s longer-term direction. Indonesia can move forward, or embrace the status quo. But it is also possible to go backward if care is not taken.

Yasmi Adriansyah is a PhD student at the School of Politics and International Relations, the Australian National University, and Executive Director of Projecting Indonesia. 

1. Markets and corruption in Indonesia
2. Indonesia’s struggle with reform
3. Asia’s mixed outlook for 2012

Australia’s first academic conference on Indonesian terrorism was held at the Australian National University (ANU) early in December.

Entitled ‘Indonesian Terrorism in a Global Context’, the conference brought together researchers specialising in the study of Indonesia’s jihadists and scholars working on global trends in terrorism. The various topics covered, and insights drawn from related discussions, help build a picture of the current state of terrorism in Indonesia.

Rice University’s David Cook, gave the keynote address, tracing the history of jihad as a concept, first from its understanding in classical Islamic texts and then through its subsequent reinterpretation. Militant groups have used this later interpretation to help justify the use of terror as a tactic, and to provide a theological basis for suicide attacks in particular. Cook discussed the critiques of terrorist acts that have come from within militant circles, and argued that the most salient protest against terrorism is the rejection of indiscriminate violence against civilians, especially fellow Muslims. This critique is of particular significance because it undercuts claims that terrorists are acting in defence of the Muslim community.

Nelly Lahoud, from West Point’s Counter-Terrorism Center, examined the doctrine of defensive jihad, and how terrorists have reinterpreted this concept, especially those associated with al Qaeda, to be a duty incumbent on each individual Muslim, rather than a more diffuse collective responsibility. The diaries of al Qaeda operative, Fadil Harun, reveal, according to Lahoud, the essentially pragmatic nature of al Qaeda and the absolute primacy it gives to the doctrine of defensive jihad over all other aspects of religiosity. Additionally, she argued that the Arab Spring had dramatically undermined the jihadist project, because it grew as a democratic protest movement — rather than being led by terrorist groups — and was aimed at removing corrupt, repressive Muslim regimes.

Quinton Temby examined the murky relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al Qaeda. He adduced new evidence of the close collaboration between key figures in the 9/11 plot, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, and JI leaders like Hambali. Sidney Jones, senior researcher with the International Crisis Group in Jakarta, reviewed recent developments within JI, contending that it is now a largely non-violent organisation, but has the capacity to regenerate and provide logistical support to more extremist jihadists. She identified the successful police operation against the group’s operations in Poso, Central Sulawesi in 2007 as the ‘knock-out blow’ to JI. This operation, which led to the arrest of key leaders, pushed the organisation toward preaching and education and away from jihad.

Solahudin, an independent terrorism researcher, looked at case studies of two terrorist groups which he argues are unique: Jemaah Imron and Laskar Hisbah. Jemaah Imron, formed in 1980, was Indonesia’s first home-grown terrorist organisation and carried out the hijacking of Garuda flight DC9 Woyla in 1981. The second group, Laskar Hisbah, was involved in a series of attempted assassinations and bomb plots in Solo and Klaten, Central Java in early 2011. Solahudin argued that both groups mutated from being radical to terrorist because of the presence of a charismatic leader. ANU’s Greg Fealy looked at the nature and role of apocalyptic literature within Indonesian jihadism, paying special attention to the idea that the Antichrist (Dajjal) is present on earth and leading the forces of evil against Islam. For jihadists, perceptions of the approaching end of time — preceded by a cataclysmic struggle between Islam and its enemies — is a powerful factor in their beliefs about the need for physical struggle to defend their faith. Angus McIntyre examined the motivations of the Bali bomber Imam Samudra, contending that Samudra’s narcissistic personality led him to use terrorism as a means of disowning his own sense of humiliation at being unable to defend his community from Western ‘attack’. Reflecting these international considerations, Curtin University’s Ian Chalmers also argued that a paradigmatic shift has occurred in Indonesian jihadism, and the terrorists’ ‘struggle actions’ are increasingly justified on global rather than local grounds.

Sally White, from ANU, discussed the case of Putri Munawaroh — a jihadist widow — and the reaction to her circumstances within jihadist circles. Despite reports that Putri wanted to die a martyr, White used analysis of jihadist web and blog sites to argue that Putri’s views on the virtues of martyrdom do not reflect growing radicalisation among jihadist wives in general.

A number of speakers addressed issues of disengagement from terrorism and deradicalisation. Julie Chernov-Hwang, from Goucher College, has conducted research among former jihadists and identified a number of factors that have led to individuals leaving terrorist activities. Most former jihadists cite the importance of building new relationships outside jihadist circles as crucial to their turning away from violence, even if they still ascribe to radical ideas. The terrorism researcher and journalist Noor Huda Ismail also discussed his personal experience of helping numerous jihadists disengage through productive work and by pursuing opportunities for broader social interaction.

Greg Fealy is Associate Professor at the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University. Dr Sally White is Senior Research Associate at the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University.

1. Terrorism today: Jemaah Islamiyah, Dulmatin and the Aceh cell
2. Aid to Indonesian Islamic schools helps undermine terrorism
3. Pakistan: US losing hearts and minds in the battle against terrorism

Indonesia’s economic growth remained strong in 2011 despite continued turmoil in the international financial markets, due to the euro crisis, and weakened global growth.

Significantly, this slow down also affected China, which has become one of Indonesia’s major export markets, but Jakarta was able to see off this risk. In the third quarter of 2011 economic growth reached 6.5 per cent year-on-year for the third consecutive quarter, mainly supported by strong private consumption and exports (although exports were slightly down from the second quarter).

For this reason the Indonesian economy remains relatively well positioned to weather future external shocks, although the World Bank has lowered its 2012 growth forecast for Indonesia to 6.2 per cent — slightly lower than its forecast of 6.3 per cent in October. Still, the growth forecast for 2011 has remained unchanged at 6.4 per cent.

A freezing up of the international financial markets or a severe prolonged global slow down could adversely affect portfolio inflows, the prices of Indonesia’s primary commodity exports, and domestic and external demand. Although so far the impact of weakening global activity on the Indonesian economy is relatively limited, there have been some portfolio outflows. FDI inflows also declined in the third quarter, although they are still higher than the country’s average inflows over the past two years.

Indonesia’s current account maintained its positive importance in the third quarter of 2011 with a small surplus of US$0.2 billion — but this current account surplus was inadequate to cover the capital and financial account’s deficit of US$3.4 billion. As a result, Indonesia’s overall balance of payments posted a US$4 billion deficit, which reduced the country’s foreign exchange reserves to US$114.5 billion by the end of the third quarter of 2011. This is sufficient for 6.6 months of imports and official external debt service payments. But Indonesia’s balance of payments is forecast to regain a surplus for the whole of 2011, which will continue into 2012, supported by an increasing surplus in the capital and financial account due to strong portfolio and FDI inflows.

During the past year inflationary pressures have also tended to decline in line with global commodity prices. The declining price of gold and the adequate supply of food — due to increased production and imports, better distribution, and lower inflationary expectations — have been instrumental in this process.

In affirmation of Indonesia’s continued economic progress, the Fitch Ratings Agency has recently upgraded Indonesia’s long-term and local currency ratings to ‘investment grade’, a move that will further boost Indonesia’s standing among global investors. To this end, the Indonesian government has worked hard to ensure macro-economic stability. It is crucial that the government continues its reform program and strengthens its macroeconomic fundamentals.

But despite continued growth rates, Indonesia’s growth strategy has not achieved ‘welfare’ in the broad sense of the word. While estimates by the Central Agency of Statistics show that the number of poor people declined to 12.5 per cent of the population in 2011 (or a little more than 30 million people), many in Indonesia are still poor. This is clear from the large number of beggars in the cities, and the amount of workers in the informal sectors — which account for about two-thirds of Indonesia’s total labour force of more than 100 million people.

There is also the fact that males and young male graduates respectively have much better access to education and employment than their female counterparts. Access for the rural poor to basic health care in their villages is also limited or inadequate, if it exists at all. Clean air and water and the protection of biodiversity are inadequate, and similarly for anti-corruption measures. Indonesia’s struggle against the vested interests of the economic elite, which often distorts or adversely influences government policies, is generally ineffective or unsuccessful.

Indonesia’s rapid population growth of 1.5 per cent — in a country of more than 240 million people — also adversely affects quality of life. This is, among other issues, reflected by the UNDP’s recently published Human Development Index, which ranks Indonesiaat number 124 among the 187 listed countries — lower than Bosnia at number 74, or even Palestine at number 114. So in addition to pushing economic growth to higher levels, in 2012 the Indonesian government should prioritise Indonesia’s social development to enhance the quality of economic growth.

Thee Kian Wie is a Senior Economist at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.

This is part of a special feature: 2011 in review and the year ahead.

1. Confidence in Indonesian economy
2. Indonesia: Blessed by strong economic growth and the curse of resources
3. Indonesia’s economy continues to surprise

Agreements achieved in the early morning of 11 December in Durban, South Africa appeared to salvage the UN climate talks — but have also raised questions about the commitment and capability of countries around the world to urgently tackling climate change.

After two weeks of difficult negotiations, governments involved in the 17th session of the Conference of Parties (COP-17) agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol and negotiate a binding agreement for all countries to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

These agreements, known as the ‘Durban Platform’, also include the implementation of the Green Climate Fund, the establishment of an Adaptation Committee, and the further development of REDD+ (helping to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation).

But the results of Durban’s climate negotiations need to be cautiously analysed, since they could potentially have different implications for the planet generally and developing countries like Indonesia more specifically. Whether Durban resulted in decisions which clearly translate into global action to cut GHG emissions — and to financially and technologically support mitigation and adaptation in developing countries — is crucial to Indonesia.

Developing countries in Durban, for instance, managed to have developed countries agree to the inclusion of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which will commence in January 2013, as part of the Durban Platform. This will avoid a gap at the end of the Protocol’s first commitment period, ending in 2012. But the Protocol, having set binding targets for 37 developed countries to reduce GHG emissions to 5 per cent below 1990 levels by 2012, may lose its significance in the second period since some countries like Canada, Japan and Russia are reportedly unwilling to take part. And with the US still opting out, the Protocol will likely only achieve small reductions in GHG emissions.

The Durban Platform also included a roadmap to negotiate a new global treaty covering all countries to reduce GHG emissions. Negotiations for this treaty are expected to conclude by 2015, and the treaty will come into force from 2020. But many climate analysts are not convinced by the direction of this particular agreement. Although covering both developed and developing countries, including Indonesia, the projected emissions resulting from this treaty — based on the current pledges made by these countries since Copenhagen COP-15 in 2009 — may lead to a global average temperature rise of more than 3.5 degrees Celsius. This means that the future of people all around the world, and particularly in vulnerable countries like Indonesia, is at stake.

Consequently, new commitments and action to address the ‘emissions gap’ are needed, so the planned treaty can effectively tackle climate change. By the end of Durban, there were no new pledges for stronger emissions reductions. Additionally, waiting until 2020 for the treaty to take effect may be too late; there is a huge risk that the limit of emissions in the atmosphere will already have been reached, such that actions to stabilise the climate will be next to impossible and too expensive.

A formal structure for the Green Climate Fund — and a work plan by which it will operate, mobilising funds from both private and public sources — was also included in the Durban Platform. A number of countries signalled their readiness to contribute to the fund, but realising their promises may prove daunting — especially in the wake of the global financial crisis. This situation has left many unanswered questions for developing countries, since the fund was created to support policies and actions aimed at addressing climate change in these states.

Also, the negotiations on finance, specifically for the Green Climate Fund, have not resulted in the establishment of a specific funding window for REDD+ at the global level. If agreed to, this would provide significant support for tropical-forest nations, including Indonesia, to further develop their REDD+ programs at national and local levels. Significantly, Durban did produce an agreement exploring a variety of financial sources — ranging from public and private finance to market mechanisms — which could lead to financial support for REDD+. This agreement could not only open the door for new and long-term investments in REDD+, but also help ensure the future of investments already in place. But the rules pertaining to safeguards in the REDD+ decision appear to be weak, especially when it comes to rules on protecting indigenous communities and biodiversity. This may undermine the credibility of REDD+ and make it unattractive to investors.

Another positive decision reached in Durban, especially for vulnerable countries like Indonesia, is the establishment of the Adaptation Committee, which will coordinate adaptation activities on a global scale.

Overall, the Durban climate talks have provided mixed results for developing countries like Indonesia. There was some marginal progress, but huge questions remain. Political promises and weak agreements will hardly reduce GHG emissions. Only strong decisions and real action can demonstrate the level of seriousness in addressing climate change. It is therefore imperative that Indonesia continues to work hard, unilaterally and with other countries, on climate change mitigation and adaptation. Without this, the nation’s survival and the fate of the planet looks uncertain and grim.

Fitrian Ardiansyah is a PhD student at the Australian National University, and the recipient of the Australian Leadership Award and Allison Sudradjat Award.

A version of this article first appeared here in the Jakarta Post.

1. Measuring the success of Indonesia’s involvement in Durban
2. Durban: where success will mean the avoidance of failure
3. Climate change: Where are we at globally now?

The global climate change negotiations — underway from 28 November to 9 December in Durban, South Africa — have people asking once again whether countries around the world will agree on solutions to tackle climate change.

It is also an appropriate event to assess the involvement of developing countries like Indonesia, and particularly to understand whether their involvement in this UN climate conference will significantly contribute to a successful outcome.

Durban, hosting the 17th session of the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), will certainly pick up from where last year’s UN climate change negotiations in Cancún, Mexico, and the subsequent inter-sessional meetings left off.

But now the central challenge is to see whether governments involved in Durban will build on the progress achieved in Cancún or withdraw from this promising path and allow short-term national interests to shroud the negotiations. The Cancún Agreements form the basis of the largest collective effort to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to date, with national plans formulated under the banner of the UNFCCC, thus helping ensure accountability.

The package encompasses finance (with the Green Climate Fund and fast-start financing), the Cancún Adaptation Framework, a Technology Mechanism (to support action on mitigation and adaptation, and facilitate low-emission economies) and a formal incorporation of REDD+ (stating clearly that the framework to address deforestation is not only about reducing emissions but also halting and reversing forest loss). It is critical that governments involved in the negotiations, especially Indonesia, lock in the progress of the Cancún Agreements and push for their implementation.

Indonesia, as a resource-rich country striving to develop its economy, alleviate poverty and deal with climate change, has a lot at stake through its involvement in these climate change negotiations. For instance, it is critical to Jakarta that further implementation of the Cancún Adaptation Framework is negotiated. Ensuring the establishment of the Adaptation Committee is the first step toward this. The committee’s establishment will send a strong signal to vulnerable countries affected by climate change, including Indonesia, that governments around the world are serious about helping these countries confront the impacts of climate change.

Indonesia also needs to work hard with other parties to negotiate the realisation of fast-start finance and the Green Climate Fund. The former incorporates pledges made by developed countries to mobilise new and additional resources, amounting to US$30 billion for the period 2010–2012, to help mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. The Green Climate Fund will support projects, programs, policies and other activities in developing countries, using thematic funding windows. But with a number of developed countries facing short-term financial challenges, negotiations on finance are likely to be difficult. Specific to the Green Climate Fund, Indonesia must work together with other tropical-forest nations and like-minded countries to lobby for a special window for REDD+ under this fund.

Tropical-forest nations such as Indonesia have already piloted REDD+. The Indonesian government has produced several policies and strategies to guide its development and implementation, including the introduction of a moratorium on new permits to convert forests and peatlands to other land uses. But this may not be sufficient. Tackling deforestation involves different actors, sectors and layers of governments. These entities are known to have competing interests over land use. Without the provision of clear incentives, it is a Herculean task to persuade these actors to change the patterns of land use in Indonesia. A special window of funding for REDD+ at a global level would certainly provide more than a moral boost for tropical-forest nations to advance their REDD+ development at a national level and on the ground.

Adding to already tough negotiations on finance, Indonesia and other developing countries must also remind parties at the Durban conference about the importance of identifying sources of long-term finance, which are needed to cut GHG emissions and support the adaptation efforts of vulnerable countries. Climate change is going to be a long-term phenomenon and countries like Indonesia will suffer if mitigation and adaptation efforts are formulated only with a short time frame in mind.

And with the need for long-term commitment and action on climate change, Durban is crucial to producing an agreement — or at least a convincing direction — toward a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. This is especially urgent as the Protocol’s first commitment period — which regulates developed countries’ commitment to cutting their GHG emissions — will end in 2012. The agreement on a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol will also help persuade big emerging economies and other countries to set out a clear mandate for a comprehensive and legally binding agreement.

In Durban, the climate talks are at a crossroads. Governments, including that of Indonesia, and other parties have a long road ahead if they are to demonstrate their seriousness about addressing dangerous climate change. The costs of climate change — socially, environmentally and economically — are high. A delay to act will prove ruinous. Indonesia’s delegation has no choice but to commit to continuous hard work and provide real leadership to guarantee a successful outcome in Durban’s climate negotiations.

Fitrian Ardiansyah is a PhD candidate at the Australian National University and the recipient of the Australian Leadership Award and Allison Sudradjat Award.

1. Durban climate talks bring mixed results for Indonesia
2. Durban: where success will mean the avoidance of failure
3. Cancun COP16: A ‘six-pack’ for long-term cooperative action

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, commentators on East Asia Forum have highlighted the moderate character of Southeast Asian Islam.

Bahrawi argues that contested interpretations of Islam are democratising Islam in Southeast Asia — but similar contests seem to be ineffective in countries like Pakistan. And van Bruinessen argues that large, resilient Islamic organisations are stabilising Indonesian democracy — but comparable organisations are failing to play such a role in other Islamic countries. So are local factors playing a bigger role in Southeast Asia than is usually suspected? Islamic countries in Southeast Asia can be treated as valid role models for other Muslim countries only if non-local factors can explain the existence of moderate Islam in Southeast Asia.

There are six major Muslim communities outside the Arab world: the immigrant Muslim communities in the West, Persian, Southeast Asian, South Asian, Sub-Saharan, and Turkic Muslim communities.

Since the 19th century, Arab Islam has claimed moderate Islam in northern and western parts of South Asia. But Islam in rest of South Asia continues to be moderate so that we can still speak of an Eastern Islam to refer to Islam in both Southeast Asia and parts of South Asia. Sub-Saharan Muslims are rarely taken seriously on ideological issues, and moderates within immigrant communities in the West are often denounced as sell-outs.

This leaves just four potential role models within the Islamic world — Arab, Persian, Turkic and Eastern Muslims, which can be further classified into two broad groups: those who use Arabic language and/or script for daily communication and those who do not. So far only the latter have proven to be largely moderate and conducive to relatively stable democratic states. Thus it is not surprising that, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, moderate Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia are often suggested as role models for Muslim-majority countries in other regions.

Muslims in countries like Turkey, Bangladesh and Indonesia, and in provinces like Paschimbanga and Tamil Nadu in India, are ethno-linguistically rooted and only use Arabic for prayers and specialised religious studies. In these places, Muslims are more likely to read translations of the Quran in their mother tongue (and in a non-Arabic script). This has four salutary effects reinforcing the ethno-linguistic rootedness of believers.

First, the majority of people in these Muslim communities cannot directly participate in the religious discussions within the Arab world, and are less affected by such discussions.

Second, clerical control over religious discussions is largely confined to specialised debates. The routine debates most believers are exposed to are conducted in a linguistic medium which the clerics cannot claim exclusive control over. This helps limit the role of clerics to the religious sphere and isolate them from secular affairs.

Third, the favourable position of local language among the believers helps maintain links with local cultural heritage.

And finally, local languages allow engagement between believers and non-believers. Non-believers can access activity within the local Muslim community through a common language and make creative contributions.

These effects reinforce ethno-linguistic roots by strengthening the bond between the believers and their local cultural heritage, as well as the bond between the believers and non-believers who share that heritage. Ethno-linguistic rootedness in turn dampens the quest, if there is any, for global ideological and cultural dominance à la the jihadists. And secular bonds between believers and non-believers, and the marginalisation of clerics, shield the state from communal religious pressures.

Ethno-linguistically rooted communities in Pakistan have proven to be resilient to Wahhabi influence. Indian provinces like Paschimbanga and Tamil Nadu, where non-Muslims and Muslims alike use regional languages, are less prone to religious riots. Bangladesh, which separated from Pakistan to protect Bengali language and heritage, is actively contesting radical Islam and is known for democracy and the empowerment of women. In contrast, the Deobandis, who are the major ally of Wahhabis in South Asia and dominate the Pakistani military establishment, are opposed to all non-Deobandi Muslims and promote Arabic — ‘the religious and official language of Islam’ — at the expense of South Asian languages and scripts. The Taliban, who destroyed the cultural heritage of Afghanistan and adjoining parts of Pakistan, are products of Pakistani Deobandi seminaries.

The contrast between the Arab-dominated strains of Islam and Eastern Islam cannot be starker — a divide that is unlikely to be bridged. This divide is reinforced in West Asia and North Africa by the dominance of Arabic, which has long ago erased the linguistic and, to a lesser extent, cultural diversity of the region. To that extent, the moderate Eastern Muslim communities cannot serve as role models for the Arab world. The Arab world has to find its own solutions.

Vikas Kumar is Assistant Professor at Azim Premji University, Bangalore.

1. Worlds at stake in Arab Reform
2. Moderate Islam in Southeast Asia and Egypt
3. After the Arab Spring: A role for Northeast Asia?

After a long-drawn-out process, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono finally announced his decision on 18 October to reshuffle the cabinet.

This will be the first and last major reshuffle in his second term as Indonesia’s president.

His landslide election victory two years ago indicated the weight of public expectation on Yudhoyono — which he has so far failed to live up to. In fact, many have characterised his second term as no different from the first: Yudhoyono is seen as more rhetoric than substance, and prone to indecisiveness and weak leadership. These characteristics are most clearly visible in the context of three fundamental issues facing Indonesia today: widespread corruption, stalling bureaucratic reform and the need for greater religious freedom. Yudhoyono often prefers the ‘middle way’ in order to avoid conflict, even if this means making no decision. In light of this demeanour, it is not surprising that his approval rating has plummeted from as high as 90 per cent to as low as 40 per cent.

When approval ratings are low, a cabinet reshuffle can be an effective tool to improve public standing. In his first term, Yudhoyono reshuffled the cabinet twice when his approval rating was low, each time resulting in increased public approval. Still, the public’s renewed hope cannot last if this latest reshuffle is not followed by significant changes to the government’s day-to-day activity.

The sheer length of the reshuffle process is seen by critics as emphasising the president’s inability to deal with political pressure. But the problem lies not only in the conduct and the outcome of the reshuffle, but in the reshuffle itself. Of Yudhoyono’s 19 deputy ministers, 13 are new in their posts, and 12 of his 34 ministries will also see new leadership. This significantly changes the cabinet — and shows Yudhoyono’s lack of anticipation, his failure to consider the outcome of possible scenarios, and his inability to put the right people into the right jobs. This is even clearer considering he had already replaced Sri Mulyani Indrawati due to political pressure.

When a president establishes his cabinet for a five-year term, he should expect the cabinet to hold for this entire period. Five years is not a long time to implement reforms in a country as big and as problematic as Indonesia. Such reform requires massive effort, planning and coordination, so a major reshuffle is something any president should avoid. In reality, the working period of any ministry is four rather than five years, as in a competitive political atmosphere there are many distractions as election time approaches. Or in other words: establishing a strong, highly qualified cabinet in order to avoid major changes in the future is crucial to the success of any government.

When Yudhoyono formed his initial cabinet in 2009, the political environment was such that he was forced to negotiate with other parties to fill these positions. But he only negotiated the number of ministries and posts to cede: each party then provided Yudhoyono with its preferred names — and he did not reject them. In light of this questionable backdrop, it is not surprising that the cabinet failed to satisfy both Yudhoyono and the public who gave him such a strong mandate.

Each of the new ministers will now have to deal with at least five challenges: political interests which persistently attempt to penetrate government resources; the political and ineffective nature of the current bureaucracy; the coordination problem across ministries; time limitations; and structural factors, such as a lack of public confidence, intense public scrutiny and high public expectations. Not to mention the uncertainty of the current global economic situation.

Under these conditions, and considering Yudhoyono’s weak leadership style, one can only sympathise with the new ministers — and look forward to minor, if any, breakthroughs in the next 2-3 years.

Sunny Tanuwidjaja is a Research Fellow at the Department of Politics and Social Change at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.

1. Indonesia’s cabinet reshuffle: how low can it go?
2. Indonesia’s new cabinet: A boost for economic policy and reform
3. Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s second term cabinet

The Indonesian cabinet reshuffle of 18 October has ended in an anti-climax.

The Indonesian people — and even their ministers — were hoping for a more effective cabinet to support Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration: they were instead left shocked and clueless about the criteria on which he based his decisions.

The cabinet reshuffle was selective, and seemed to largely serve the coalition parties’ political interests. The strongest indication of this ‘transactional’ political flavour was the lack of courage shown by Yudhoyono in replacing party leaders who held ministerial positions. Suryadharma Ali, the Minister of Religious Affairs, whom the public viewed as a non-performing minister, kept his position, as did Minister of Labour and Transmigration Muhaimin Iskandar, whose department was recently hit by corruption scandals. Yudhoyono’s close allies were guaranteed to stay on as his ‘entourage’: Andi Mallarangeng, the Minister for Youth and Sports, kept his position despite his poor — if not shameful — performance in preparing for the upcoming Southeast Asian Games in November. Perhaps most controversial was the reshuffling of former Minister of Culture and Tourism Jero Wacik — an ally of Yudhoyono and a member of his Democrat Party — who, with no relevant expertise, was appointed as Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources. Meanwhile, Mari Elka Pangestu, former Trade Minister and a technocrat with international recognition, became the new Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy.

Hardly any ministers associated with political parties were reshuffled, except cabinet members of the Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), who were seen as playing off both the government and the opposition. And add to a veneer of seriousness, Yudhoyono added 10 new deputy ministers, bringing the total number to 19. But with the reshuffle based largely on transactional politics, Yudhoyono’s promises — to change leadership style, to have an effective government and to eradicate corruption — remain for many mere political rhetoric. For example, to convince the public of his dedication to combatting corruption, Yudhoyono stated during the new cabinet’s inauguration that the public funding had been ransacked and robbed, but as president, he should have investigated those involved and had them impeached. But this fighting language appears little more than empty rhetoric.

The challenges facing Yudhoyono’s administration cannot be overcome by the cabinet reshuffle alone; the issues he faces are far too complex. For one, the national government’s effectiveness is curtailed by the decentralised local governance system. Regulations produced by local parliaments often conflict with higher regulations and remain in place even while they should be withdrawn. And in around 60 per cent of the 524 Indonesian districts, the local government is hamstrung by conflicts between Mayors/Regents and their Vice Mayors/Regents. There are three reasons for this. First, district heads and their deputies often come from different political parties. Second, political and financial contributions by deputies are often bigger than those of the district heads. And third, the deputies’ scope of authority is not clearly delineated.

Many national and local regulations pertaining to development also overlap and conflict with each other. For example, regulation on national development conflicts with state budget regulations on fiscal transfers from central to local governments. And because government regulations are not cohesive or coherent, Yudhoyono’s administration will not to be able to make significant changes by only reshuffling the cabinet — if anything, the administration is likely to be slower and less capable of fulfilling public expectation. Furthermore, the new cabinet has no clear agenda or goal to work toward.

There is no shortcut to solving the problems that Yudhoyono’s administration currently faces. Instead, strong political will is needed from Yudhoyono to build consensus with coalition parties in order to issue clear national laws. Every regulation that is passed must have a clear purpose and align with existing regulation. But, instead of establishing a structure of power based on Indonesia’s reform priorities, the cabinet reshuffle was informed by political transactions. As a result, the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration will worsen.

Maria Monica Wihardja is a Researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, and a Lecturer at the Department of Economics, University of Indonesia.

Josef Kristiadi is Senior Political Analyst at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.

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The Indonesian province of Aceh is due to hold its gubernatorial elections in December 2011.

These elections highlight the significant contribution democracy has made to the maintenance of peace since Aceh’s 2006 elections — which were held a year after the peace agreement between the Freedom Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government. Many Acehnese have welcomed this new sense of democratisation, with approximately 78 per cent of voters participating in the 2009 presidential elections, the largest turnout for direct elections in any Indonesian region. But as the December elections approach, flaring tensions among Acehnese leaders — especially between former elites of GAM — have observers concerned over potential threats to the continuation of peaceful democracy in Aceh. A number of former GAM combatants were killed recently and local Acehnese see this as closely related to the tensions and rivalries evident among political groups in the province.

But the international community has invested billions of dollars in supporting Aceh’s transition toward peaceful democracy. At the ASEAN Leaders’ Special Summit held in Jakarta on 6 January 2005, two weeks after the Indian Ocean tsunami, the leaders of 26 nations and international organisations agreed to donate US$4 billion in aid to further rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh. Australia also contributed AUD$1billion over five years through the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development. Of this aid, millions of dollars were targeted at the support and reintegration of former GAM members. The programs associated with this funding will help to ensure the continuation of rehabilitation and integration by overcoming any inequitable distribution of resources, supporting stability and peace, and rebuilding communities.

The Multi-Stakeholder Review, a partnership between the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Legal, Political and Security Affairs, the National Development Planning Agency and the Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency, reports that the total amount of funds committed to the process of reintegration and peace building is Rp9 trillion (US$895 million) — one-seventh of the tsunami reconstruction funds. And the Acehnese government will receive close to US$7.9 billion in special autonomy funds between 2008 and 2027 as a result of the Law on the Governing of Aceh.

Adequate funding is of crucial significance in maintaining the peace building process in Aceh and the progress of reconciliation; decentralisation and democratisation have positively affected the transition toward peace. But for the current positive momentum to continue, area-specific institutions will need to be strengthened and, where necessary, created. The importance of institutions for supporting peace in post-conflict regions cannot be understated. In Aceh, strong institutions in local government, parliament and civil society are still needed.

But the ongoing dispute between the winning Aceh Party and the incumbent governor’s camp over regulations pertaining to the 2011 elections now threatens to destabilise Acehnese efforts to implement further reforms. The Aceh Party’s threat to boycott the elections is counterproductive to the party and the democratisation process in Aceh. If this dispute is not resolved it will overshadow more pressing issues in the Acehnese development and peace building program. These include capacity building for rural Acehnese so they can revitalise important agricultural initiatives, such as the region’s high quality coffee plantations. Another issue is the high unemployment rate. Law enforcement training for members of parliament is also important if they are to work out effective regulations for Aceh’s development and reconciliation. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission regulation, which was keenly anticipated by human rights organisations and victims of conflict, is still pending due to the ‘political negotiation process’ and is another issue which needs prioritising.

The World Bank reports that investors still perceive Aceh as a risky place to conduct business, meaning that growth in Aceh will be limited and efforts to reduce poverty will likely lose their effectiveness. This must be remedied. The Acehnese government must change the perception of the region so it is seen as a secure and safe business environment. Providing high quality infrastructure will be a big part of this. These challenges will not be overcome unless Aceh’s political parties and leaders give priority to the broad interests of local inhabitants rather than their own narrow interests.

The current precariousness of Acehnese politics has not had a positive effect on the media, civil society organisations and the Acehnese people in general. The fear of political violence is rising after the death of local leaders and other violence suspected of being closely related to rivalries among local political groups. If these political elites and civil society groups cannot manage their political conflicts it will destroy a great deal of important investment in the region.

Badrus Sholeh is a PhD student at the School of International and Political Studies, Deakin University.

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Indonesia has taken consistent steps to rebuild its international image since emerging from the political turmoil of 1998–1999.

The country has focussed on re-establishing its leadership role within ASEAN, and has demonstrated a desire to assume a global role by promoting itself as the world’s third largest democracy, largest moderate Muslim-majority country, and as a ‘bridge-builder’ and a ‘problem-solver’ in the wider global community. Whether or not Indonesia is able to maintain this momentum in its international relations will depend largely on the extent to which it can manage three key domestic issues: democratic consolidation, the impact of internal nationalism on foreign policy and the Islamic dimension.

As a significant element of domestic political change since 1998, democracy inevitably figures as a central element of Indonesia’s foreign policy. There is widespread public support — especially among academics, activists, NGOs and parliamentarians — for the inclusion of democratic values and a democracy-projection agenda into foreign policy. Such support and encouragement is strongly reflected in the nation’s stance on the ASEAN Charter, the promotion and protection of human rights in ASEAN, and Myanmar. Many Indonesian parliamentarians, such as Eva Sundari of the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, believe the Indonesian government should have supported the US proposal for a UN commission to investigate alleged crimes against humanity in Myanmar. Another parliamentarian, Budiman Sudjatmiko, even believes that ‘Indonesia needs to encourage ASEAN to evaluate Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN’. But critics often point out that Indonesia must still prove its own democratic credentials before projecting such values abroad. Persistent problems of corruption, terrorism, communal tensions and weak law enforcement all complicate efforts at influencing the political course of neighbouring countries.

This said, Indonesia’s democratisation has affected foreign policy formation by replacing the old, highly-centralised authoritarian structure with a more pluralistic and competitive policy making milieu. Foreign policy is no longer the exclusive domain of a few elites; it must now be formulated within complex power structures where the role of public opinion and non-governmental actors has increasingly become pivotal. But with foreign policy more open to the public, in some ways it is now more difficult for Indonesia to forge closer relationships with other nations.. It has been noted, for example, that ‘democratisation has provided new opportunities for … US opponents to influence Indonesian foreign policy, making it costly for Indonesian leaders to cooperate with the United States’.

This last example hints at the impact of domestic nationalism on Indonesia’s foreign policy. Nationalism has been at the heart of Indonesia’s politics and foreign policy since independence; only now, its expression is no longer controlled by an authoritarian government and is thus being injected into foreign policy by many actors, in many forms and for different purposes. Perhaps the most striking manifestations of this is Indonesia’s acute sensitivity to the question of territorial integrity and the preservation of the country’s political and economic autonomy in the international arena. Segments of Indonesia’s elite and general public still harbour the view that major powers — especially the US — will try to subjugate Indonesia by keeping the country economically weak and politically divided. Despite obvious humanitarian purposes, for example, Indonesia was initially wary of American and other foreign troops’ presence in tsunami-hit Aceh, and remains suspicious of Australia’s policy toward Papua. The recurring emotional expression of nationalism over the issue of overlapping territorial claims with Malaysia has also puzzled many of Indonesia’s regional partners.

Nationalist sentiment is also seemingly expressed in a growing anti-foreign attitude, especially by politicians. It has even become difficult for the government to provide favourable business terms to attract foreign investors without the risk of being accused of selling the country to foreigners. More recently, Indonesia’s parliamentary leaders backed the government’s plan to evaluate and ‘discipline’ foreign and foreign-funded NGOs operating in Indonesia, for fear that outside assistance would compromise the integrity and independence of NGOs and ‘provide an opportunity for foreign parties to intervene [in Indonesia’s internal affairs] and advance their own interests in Indonesia’. But while this might look like anti-foreign sentiment on the rise, it merely reflects Indonesia’s aspiration to self-reliance and desire to deny any opportunity for foreign countries to reap unfair advantages at the expense of Indonesia’s own interests.

A final variable in Indonesia’s foreign policy is Islam, which figures prominently due to its self-promotion as a moderate Muslim country. By defining Indonesia’s Islam as a force for peace, tolerance and harmony, Indonesia’s government seeks to articulate its brand of Islam as a moderating voice between the Muslim world and the rest, and within the Muslim world itself. In order to project such an image, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs embarked upon a series of initiatives by which it sought to incorporate Islam into foreign policy. For example, Indonesia tried to play a mediating role in conflicts in the Muslim world by hosting the Sunni-Shiite Conference in Bogor to help foster dialogue and peace between the two factions of Islam in Iraq. Similarly, Indonesia participated in the UN Peacekeeping mission in Lebanon.

The entrance of Islam into Indonesia’s foreign policy now necessitates a delicate balancing act, as segments of the Muslim community have demanded that Indonesia identify itself with the Arab-Muslim world. When the government voted in favour of the UNSC Resolution No. 1747 in order address the issue of non-proliferation, domestic constituents understood the vote — which sanctioned Iran — as a betrayal of another Muslim country. But despite Islam’s growing importance in Indonesia’s domestic politics, its influence on foreign policy should not be exaggerated. Indonesia has never expressed its foreign policy in terms of co-religionist solidarity and its policy toward international Islamic issues remains governed by the principle of non-interference. Rather, Indonesia’s aspiration to become a global player has been expressed clearly in its desire to play a role as a ‘problem-solver’ and a ‘bridge-builder’ at the international level. It remains to be seen whether it has the ability to translate this global aspiration into the actual conduct of foreign policy and effect serious change on the global stage.

Dr Rizal Sukma is Executive Director at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta. 

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