Having ruled Japan for the better half of a century, it is no surprise that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has found it difficult to adapt to its role as Japan’s major opposition party.

But with the prospect of further political gridlock, it may be time for the LDP to reconsider its strategy.

At the LDP National Convention last month, Sadakazu Tanigaki, the party’s president, criticised Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) for their handling of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and labelled the proposed increase in Japan’s consumption tax rate ‘an empty cheat’. In order to return the LDP to power, Tanigaki has also vowed to pressure Noda to dissolve the lower house and call a snap election.

This uncompromising stance is largely in line with the obstructionist attitude adopted by the LDP when Noda’s predecessor, Naoto Kan, was in power, and is likely to continue throughout Noda’s term. Given that the government lacks an upper-house majority, the LDP can effectively block any of the government’s bills, but there are several reasons why this strategy is unlikely to pay strong electoral dividends in the long run.

First, Noda’s major policy agenda is ambitious in scope. He has proposed bills to raise the consumption tax rate from 5 per cent to 10 per cent by 2015, reform independent administrative institutions, reduce the salaries of government employees and advance Japan’s position in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. Regardless of whether it can be achieved, Noda’s vow to break with ‘the politics that can’t decide’ and push forward with reform clearly puts the LDP on the defensive. Tanigaki has repeatedly warned that ‘Japan could experience an irreversible national crisis’ in pursuing Noda’s policies. But his party’s unwillingness to reach a compromise with the government exposes the LDP to criticisms of not acting in the national interest. If the prospect of a national crisis does not spur the LDP to enter negotiations with the government over the consumption tax, then what will?

Second, a number of Noda’s policies were either previously supported by the LDP, or overlap with the party’s traditional support base. Tanigaki has rejected talks with the ruling party on the grounds that there is no mention of the proposed consumption tax increase in the DPJ’s 2009 manifesto, but the LDP strongly pushed for the very same proposal in the 2010 House of Councillors election. Further, the DPJ’s support for Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations, comprehensive reform of the social security system and the reduction of government employees’ wages leaves little room for the LDP to carve out a viable policy alternative. If the DPJ now represents the party of fiscal austerity, trade liberalisation and administrative reform, where exactly does the LDP fit into Japan’s party system, and how can it distinguish itself from the ruling party?

Third, despite declining electoral support for Noda’s cabinet, the LDP has failed to make the most of recent political events and increase its own standing. According to a recent Yomiuri Shimbun poll, support for the DPJ has risen from 22 per cent to 25 per cent, while the LDP’s popularity fell from 19 per cent to 17 per cent. Although one would expect the opposition to benefit in light of the planned austerity measures, this has not been the case; however unpopular a tax increase might be, 73 per cent of respondents still agree that the LDP-Komeito coalition should participate in policy deliberations with the government. It might seem obvious, but opposition for opposition’s sake is unlikely to return the LDP to power.

But with Tanigaki at the helm, the LDP’s current strategy of obstruction may be the best the party can hope for. Tanigaki’s term as LDP president expires in September (while Noda can delay calling an election until August next year). So failure to force an early election may seriously undermine Tanigaki’s prospects for re-election as party president, particularly as the current LDP secretary-general, Nobuteru Ishihara, has expressed interest in replacing Tanigaki.

Failure to match Noda’s policy agenda with sensible counter-proposals, added to the LDP’s refusal to debate the government’s key initiatives, may only further weaken the LDP’s electoral position at a time when smaller opposition parties are merging and forging new cooperative strategies in order to court the conservative vote. The People’s New Party and Stand Up Japan! have agreed to launch a new political party in March with Tokyo’s governor, Shintaro Ishihara. And Your Party, a centre-right party made up of former LDP members, also announced that it will be cooperating with Osaka’s increasingly popular mayor, Toru Hashimoto, and his party (Osaka Restoration Association) in the next election.

Still, a much larger problem is that for the LDP to only engage in policy-based discussions once in power belies the opposition’s role in a parliamentary system. It also offers little hope for the majority of Japan’s independent voters that the current LDP would govern any differently from the LDP that lost in the general election of 2009.

Kevin Placek is a recent graduate of the University of Melbourne, where he completed a Master of International Relations specialising in Japanese prime-ministerial politics.

1. The next Democratic Party of Japan prime minister
2. The Democratic Party of Japan’s credibility crisis
3. Japan must support liberal international order

After North Korea tested its Taepodong I missile in 1998 over Japanese airspace, Japan made the decision to develop its ballistic missile defence (BMD) system in cooperation with the US.

The system comprises a mid-course phase (upper-tier) Standard Missile 3 Bloc IA system loaded onto four Aegis ships, and a 16-unit terminal phase (lower-tier) Patriot PAC-3 defence system, which has been deployed to four sites on Japanese soil.

The Japanese government has put forward several reasons for establishing its own missile defence system. First, the significant international proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represents an emerging threat. Second, Japan currently has no system that can defend its territory and people in the case of a ballistic missile attack, and there is currently no viable alternative to missile shield systems such as the BMD system. Third, the government has claimed that Japan’s missile program is purely for defensive purposes, emphasising that the BMD system will not pose any threat to other states due to its defensive posture in line with Japan’s senshu boei (exclusively defence-oriented defence) policy.

Aside from these three considerations, some have argued that the development of a BMD system will promote defence and security cooperation with the US, while others contend the system’s development will have positive spin-off effects for the Japanese economy.

Whatever the justifications, Japan’s strong bureaucracy is the most significant factor promoting the country’s BMD program. It has played a key role in maintaining the long-term consistency of the government’s policy toward BMD throughout Japan’s frequent regime transitions. More specifically, the government’s long-term position on the BMD program can be attributed to Japan’s security policy-making process, in which bureaucrats from the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs take charge in making concrete decisions and crafting policy. The government maintains that the missile defence issue is an operational-level matter in the MOD and Self-Defence Forces, and thus claims it is not necessary to consult the Diet or seek its approval.

Still, there are numerous debates in Japan centring on the BMD program. The first debate focuses on interpretations of the Japanese constitution’s article 9 peace clause. The Japanese government currently interprets the constitution as prohibiting Japan’s participation in ‘collective self-defence’ and justifies the maintenance of the Self-Defence Forces by limiting their mandate to ‘individual self-defence’. The most obvious scenario of ‘collective self-defence’ would be Japan participating in US military operations abroad as an ally. The second debate centres on the possibility of Japan transferring its BMD technology to South Korea or Taiwan, potentially violating the Three Principles on Arms Export, which prohibits the export of weapons. And the third debate centres on the deployment of an upper-tier defence system and its potential to violate the 1969 Diet resolution on the peaceful use of outer space.

In any case, these inhibiting factors will not slow down the momentum toward building missile shields, especially with Japan’s formidable bureaucracy throwing its weight behind the project. Developing the cutting-edge technology necessary for the BMD program also requires significant financial resources, and it appears that not even the economy’s long-term stagnation or the 2011 disasters are stalling the development of Japan’s BMD program.

Despite the government’s claim to possess only self-defence-oriented intentions, its BMD program could be considered an offensive ‘double-edged sword’. That is, the development of Japan’s BMD program may still be seen as a threat to neighbouring states and cause a regional arms race that could lead to conflict. Also, because Japan and the US are close allies, critics may connect Japan’s BMD system with the offensive capabilities of the US, thus building on the impression that combined Japanese and US forces could constitute a significant war-fighting capability in the region. The Chinese government has repeatedly objected to the BMD program, which it regards as a revival of Japanese militarism and as part of the strategic enlargement of US forces in East Asia.

But Japan’s BMD system could potentially lead to regional arms control and possibly nuclear disarmament if neighbouring states trust that it is a logical continuation of Japan’s senshu boei (exclusively defence-oriented defence) policy. To promote this perception, Japan must make a careful distinction between offence and defence, and clearly emphasise the program’s defence-oriented intentions. Japan should also promote its cooperation with the US as a means to move toward a global reduction of offensive weapons, including nuclear weapons. And finally, Japan should take the lead in establishing a global arms control regime that emphasises defence. Australia should be a significant partner in this, as it too is an important ally of both the US and Japan, having cooperated with the US in its missile defence program and deepened its security cooperation with Japan.

Norifumi Namatame is Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University, and Associate Professor at Tohoku Fukushi University, Japan.

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2. China’s new anti-ship missile: a Pacific nightmare for the US?
3. What the new Hatoyama government means for the US-Japan alliance

High-level political contacts between India and Japan since the year 2000 have produced a multitude of political documents.

And as Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda wrapped up his official visit to India on 27–29 December, following the annual meeting between the Indian and Japanese prime ministers, the countries’ respective policy establishments unveiled the Vision for the Enhancement of India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership. The document marks the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Japan.

Documents like this are an indication of progress in bilateral relations. From a bilateral standpoint the most noteworthy and tangible improvement in India-Japan relations is in the economic sphere; with Japan’s domestic economy in distress, India’s economy has continued to grow, and this reality has provided the former with a strong imperative to engage with the latter in a substantial manner. Noda’s recent visit reaffirmed this view.

The key announcements during the visit included a revised bilateral currency swap arrangement from US$3 billion to US$15 billion, and Japan’s intention to make available funding for Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) projects — a major initiative to enhance infrastructure and industry between the two cities. The Japanese government pledged public and private finance totalling US$4.5 billion over the next five years for this initiative. The DMIC project also forms an integral part of India’s recently announced National Manufacturing Policy, which aims to create 100 million jobs within a decade and increase the share of manufacturing in the country’s GDP to 25 per cent by 2022.

This development is especially important given that many Japanese companies have concerns about inadequate infrastructure in India. The joint statement on enhanced relations also singled out infrastructure development between Chennai and Bengaluru in India’s south, where an increasing number of Japanese companies have established their presence. Additionally, Prime Minister Noda conveyed Japan’s intention to extend financial and technical support to the preparation of India’s Comprehensive Integrated Master Plan. This support will allow for the expeditious development of infrastructure — such as ports, industrial parks and their surrounding facilities — in Ennore, Chennai and the adjoining areas.

Total trade between the two countries in 2010–11 amounted to US$13.8 billion, and cumulative FDI inflows from Japan between April 2000 and April 2011 totalled around US$5.5 billion — 4 per cent of total inflows to India. These figures are not very impressive when India’s share in Japan’s total global trade and investment is considered. Total trade between the two countries is only about 1 per cent of Japan’s global trade. In contrast, trade with China, Japan’s top partner, totalled US$163.2 billion in the first half of 2011, setting a new record on a first half-year basis. Also, Japanese FDI inflows to China in 2010 alone topped US$22 billion.

Still, total trade between India and Japan had already reached US$13.2 billion during the first nine months of 2011, indicating an increase of 23.9 per cent over the same period in 2010. Japan’s exports to India also witnessed an increase of 26.1 per cent between January and September 2010, reaching US$8.11 billion, while its imports from India rose by 20.6 per cent to US$5.09 billion.

Further, the number of Japanese companies with business operations in India has doubled in three years. As of October 2011, 812 Japanese companies were operating in India, with 1422 establishments across the country. The automobile and electrical equipment industries, trading, the services sector (financial and nonfinancial), and telecommunications are all attracting Japanese investment. India has also been the largest recipient of Japanese official development assistance loans for seven consecutive years since 2003.

Many factors have contributed to the changing Japanese perception of the Indian economy. These include India’s economic growth through the global downturn; the vast potential of domestic demand; the projected expansion of India’s working population over the long term; and India’s geographically strategic position, which should allow it to develop as a production and export base for growing markets in the Middle East and Africa — not to mention its growing ties with other East Asian economies.

The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, which came into effect in August 2011, also provides an institutional framework to further accelerate and consolidate business activities between India and Japan. As part of the agreement, India will eliminate tariffs on 90 per cent of its imports from Japan, and Japan will remove tariffs on 97 per cent of Indian imports on a trade-value basis within 10 years. With tariffs slashed on more than 8000 products — including generic drugs, apparel, agricultural products and machinery — bilateral trade between both countries is expected to reach US$25 billion by 2014.

What does not help is the slow pace of progress in high-visibility flagship projects like the DMIC. The 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Japan would be an apt opportunity for the Indian policy establishment to visibly show its resolve to enlist Japan as an important partner in India’s long-term growth strategy.

Sanjana Joshi is a Consultant at the Japan Project, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi.

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2. How the earthquake strengthened the Japan-US alliance
3. India and Japan: poised to enter a new era

In selecting his first cabinet and party executive line-up in September 2011, the most important motivation for Japan’s Prime Minister Noda was intra-party harmony.

His ministers were largely selected to appease political strongman Ichiro Ozawa, who maintains a well-deserved reputation for either running parties or destroying them. Noda’s approach contrasted with his predecessor, Naoto Kan, who followed a ‘datsu Ozawa’ line and sought to exclude Ozawa’s influence from his administration. The result was a series of furious internecine disputes. Ostensibly the fights were about policy; in reality they arose from Ozawa’s grievances about the distribution of power within the party.

If Noda’s first cabinet was selected to keep Ozawa at bay, his recently appointed second cabinet aims to placate the opposition by getting rid of offending ministers. Defence Minister Yasuo Ichikawa and Consumer Affairs Minister Kenji Yamaoka, against whom the upper house passed censure motions last year, were both demoted. By these actions, Noda has kept alive the possibility of constructive negotiations with the opposition on a proposed consumption tax and social welfare-reform legislation. But the opposition will find it hard to agree on any legislation unless they see direct political advantage in doing so. Their primary objective is to bring down the Noda government and force a general election.

Noda paid the price for intra-party harmony the first time round. He appointed Ichikawa and Yamaoka not on the basis of their policy experience or political nous but because of their strong political connections to Ozawa. He also went for political balance in the party, choosing not only Azuma Koshiishi — one of Ozawa’s major supporters and defenders — as DPJ secretary-general, but also anti-Ozawa stalwart Seiji Maehara as chairman of a strengthened DPJ Policy Affairs Research Council.

Noda has also continued the trend begun under Kan toward decentralising the policy-making process, thus strengthening the role of the party as a separate policy organ. These changes reversed earlier reforms instituted under the Hatoyama administration, which sought to centralise policy making in the cabinet and reinforce the prime minister’s executive powers by establishing entities such as the National Policy Unit. By prioritising consensus within the government and the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Noda successfully undercut the executive policy-making power of the Kantei and the cabinet. Unfortunately, Noda soon realised that his administration needed more executive power to carry out difficult tasks such as increasing the consumption tax and engineering Japan’s membership of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Ozawa’s cronies had begun using the consumption tax issue as an excuse to jump ship and form another political party (New Party Kizuna), in addition to another new party led by former Diet member and convicted felon Muneo Suzuki (New Party Daichi-True Democratic Party), which has enlisted two key ex-DPJ Ozawa supporters to its ranks. All the while, Ozawa’s previously muted criticisms have been growing louder and his behind-the-scenes machinations for possible party realignment more apparent.

Now Noda has sought to swing the pendulum back the other way with the appointment of Okada as Deputy Prime Minister and simultaneously to a whole host of other ministerial positions. Okada’s selection signals that Noda feels the need to buttress his policy leadership, but his elevation may also be a sign that Noda recognises his own policy leadership is weak. Okada is the DPJ’s Koizumi — someone who acts on the basis of policy conviction, rather than from the careerist mentality of so many other Japanese politicians.

Okada will certainly add some ballast to the Noda administration, but the downside is that Okada’s policy convictions can lead him to act unilaterally, without clearance from fellow members of the government. Moreover, Ozawa is implacably opposed to Okada given their past dealings: Okada was the principal architect of Ozawa’s suspension from the DPJ in 2011. And even though Ozawa is engaged in a long-drawn-out trial over an alleged money–politics misdemeanour, a wounded lion can still be dangerous. His criticism of the Noda administration may now become stronger after the reshuffle, although it is unlikely to reach the intensity with which he sought to bring down the Kan administration.

It is possible that Noda has repeated his earlier mistake in appointing Naoki Tanaka to replace Yasuo Ichikawa as Minister of Defence. Both Tanaka and Ichikawa have strong connections to Ozawa. Noda made both appointments to appease Ozawa, but Ichikawa’s incompetence on the job came back to bite him. Tanaka has had a singularly undistinguished political career, with his biggest claim to fame being his connection to the Tanaka family — his father-in-law is a former prime minister and his wife Makiko also has a long career in politics. And though Tanaka’s most recent position was as a member of the Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Problems, he is completely untried and untested in dealing with security issues involving the US.

Normally, cabinet reshuffles are undertaken to breathe new life into governments. It remains to be seen whether Noda’s new line-up achieves this objective. The overwhelming impression is that both Noda and his cabinets are only temporary. The new cabinet is not going to save the Noda government, just extend its life briefly. Its effect will be palliative rather than curative.

Aurelia George Mulgan is Professor at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

1. Noda’s cabinet reshuffle: does it give him a stronger hand?
2. Indonesia’s cabinet reshuffle: how low can it go?
3. Japan: Hatoyama delivers an impressive cabinet

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda reshuffled his cabinet on 13 January, prior to the 24 January opening of the Diet’s regular session.

The reshuffle was preordained; the opposition-dominated House of Councillors censured two of Noda’s cabinet ministers on the last day of the extraordinary session last year. But the Prime Minister went beyond the replacement of these two ministers by adding three new faces to his cabinet — presumably in order to strengthen it in advance of what will be an extremely fractious session of the Diet.

At the heart of the coming battle are bills to raise Japan’s consumption tax from its current level of 5 per cent to 10 per cent by 2015. This move is widely viewed as an economic hammer blow to the Japanese economy and is likely to send retail sales plummeting and worsen Japan’s deflation. It is also seen as pure electoral poison. Each time the consumption tax comes up as an election issue, the ruling party is severely punished at the following election. Rank-and-file members of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) are understandably sceptical of Prime Minister Noda’s conviction that the Japanese public will appreciate the need for an increased consumption tax. Noda sees it as necessary to prepare for the immense social welfare costs associated with the coming massive increase in the number of retirees and the elderly over the next few decades.

In order to provide a spokesman for the government’s tax reform plans and to establish a go-between with the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Prime Minister named Katsuya Okada, a former leader of the DPJ, as his Deputy Prime Minister and state minister for tax reform and government revitalisation. That Okada was named the point man on tax reform, and given the rarely bestowed title of Deputy Prime Minister, makes explicit the Prime Minister’s doubts as to the ability of the current chief cabinet secretary, Osamu Fujimura, to defend the Noda government’s plans. But Okada is already ruffling feathers by announcing, without prior consultation with the DPJ leadership, a plan to reduce legislators’ stipends by 8 per cent to make the proposed rise in the consumption tax more palatable.

In addition to causing confusion as to who is the real spokesman for the government, the Okada appointment is also failing to provide a bridge to the opposition. One of the supposed advantages to having Okada as a part of the government is his ability to call upon a pre-existing working relationship with LDP Secretary-General Nobuteru Ishihara and New Komeito Secretary-General, Yoshihisa Inoue.  But Ishihara and New Komeito’s leader, Natsuo Yamaguchi, are refusing to accept the idea of a rapprochement on a point of protocol: that as a member of the cabinet rather than the DPJ secretary-general, Okada is no longer the proper interlocutor for Ishihara and Inoue. It is a petty, artificial barrier to communication between the ruling party and the main opposition parties on the tax issue. But as the opposition holds a majority of seats in the House of Councillors and can stymie the passage of any legislation save the national budget, the LDP and the New Komeito leaderships feel comfortable in rebuffing government overtures, no matter who the messenger may be.

The other appointments in the cabinet reshuffle are not nearly so portentous as the Okada appointment. Naoki Tanaka replaced Yasuo Ichikawa as Minister of Defence, with the appointment being solely attributed to his seniority in the House of Councillors. But Tanaka has already stumbled in his comments about the contentious plan to construct a replacement facility for the US Marines Corps Air Station Futenma. Tanaka’s statement that his ministry will definitely move forward on constructing a replacement facility at Henoko in northern Okinawa — a plan the Okinawan people and prefectural government oppose — comes just as portions of the US suddenly seem to be wavering in their support for the rebasing plan.

Meanwhile, Jin Matsubara was appointed Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission and state minister for dealing with the 1970s North Korean abduction issues, and Hirofumi Hirano was appointed Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.

The reshuffled cabinet has no members in it closely associated with Ichiro Ozawa, the DPJ’s former leader and a major power broker. This is an ominous state of affairs given Ozawa’s considerable pull among a significant fraction of the DPJ Diet membership. Loyalists to Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama — a former DPJ prime minister — nearly joined hands with the opposition in a no-confidence motion that would have unseated Prime Minister Naoto Kan in June of last year. Kan was only able to parry this attack through an unprecedented promise made to Hatoyama to step down from the premiership ‘after a certain interval’.

With an uncertain standing within his own party, a stonewalling opposition and an economic program featuring painful and controversial tax increases, Prime Minister Noda faces a very severe test of his power and popularity in the upcoming Diet session. A passing glance at his recent cabinet reshuffle does not inspire confidence that the Prime Minister will be able to pass this test.

Michael Cucek is a Research Associate at the MIT Centre for International Studies and the author of the Shisaku blog on Japanese politics and society.

1. Japan’s cabinet reshuffle: a futile gesture?
2. Indonesia’s cabinet reshuffle: how low can it go?
3. The Aso cabinet is in free fall

The Taiwanese presidential election is due to be held on 14 January. As the election draws near, analysts in Taiwan are avidly sifting the tea leaves to predict what the future holds — will the incumbent leader, Ma Ying-jeou, of the Kuomintang (KMT) gain a second term and continue his rapprochement with the PRC mainland?

Or will Tsai Ing-wen, his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) opponent, unseat Ma and seek to reinforce Taiwan’s distinct identity? At present, polls show almost an even split in support for the two candidates.

Another avid tea-drinking country, Japan, will also be closely watching the contest’s outcome. Though Tokyo is excruciatingly circumspect in keeping aloof from Taiwan’s electoral politics and foreign policy so as not to provoke Beijing, indicators are that they might quietly favour a DPP victory. Indeed, on 4 October 2011 Mrs Tsai visited Tokyo to give a speech at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, in which she highlighted her superior democratic credentials, her attachment to close ties with Japan and her determination not to disrupt the stable nature of cross-strait relations achieved under President Ma.

Though the main competition will be fought on the domestic battleground of Taiwan, Mrs Tsai’s visit was a strong signal of her party’s commitment to the Tokyo-Taipei bilateral relationship. As Beijing continues to press on Taiwan’s international space, Taipei has traditionally looked to Tokyo for support — viewed as second only to the US as an ‘ally’ of the beleaguered island nation.

Taiwan and Japan have long enjoyed a close, though unofficial, diplomatic relationship. Japan, like most countries, withholds recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. But this has not prevented deep economic collaboration and tacit support for Taipei’s international position. For Tokyo, it is also an inescapable fact that Taiwan is geostrategically located so as to be vital to Japan’s territorial security.

But the main pillar of the relationship is economic; the two countries enjoyed bilateral trade worth US$70 billion in 2010. Their supply chains are quite interdependent, as demonstrated after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, which disrupted Taiwan’s production lines. Further, Japan has been a major contributor in the field of technology transfer and infrastructure in Taiwan. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between Taiwan and China provides further opportunities to deepen this linkage. Indeed, President Ma called for Taiwan and Japan to enter China as partners. There have also been calls for an FTA by advocates in both Taiwan and Japan.

Underwriting this close economic cooperation are political, historical and cultural ties. Japan’s commitment to Taiwan is demonstrated through experienced diplomats in residence at Japan’s unofficial embassy and the frequent visits of former Japanese prime ministers to Taiwan. Taiwanese leaders from both parties have also long maintained a friendly disposition toward Japan. President Ma has recently been compelled to quash rumours of being ‘anti-Japanese’ and proclaimed himself ‘Japan’s best friend’. He acted mildly during the 2010 Senkaku fishing trawler collision crisis, refusing to cooperate with Beijing and keeping censure of Japan to a minimum. This welcome restraint did not go unnoticed by Tokyo as its leaders dealt with hostile rhetoric and economic reprisals from the mainland.

Yet while all of this is heartening for Taiwan’s policy makers, it is no substitute for a firm Japanese commitment to the maintenance of the ROC’s security. At present it is impossible to build an explicit bilateral military alliance. With this goal out of reach, Tokyo and Taipei could seek instead to develop their cooperation on ‘non-traditional’ security issues, such as pandemic diseases, transnational crime or natural disasters. The vulnerability of Taiwan and Japan to extreme weather systems would make potential bilateral cooperation in this sector highly appealing and serve to consolidate their ties.

How might this relationship evolve as a result of the January elections? Japan will remain a priority for both the KMT and DPP, though the latter will seek to avoid entering further into China’s embrace and should see Japan as a useful counterweight to this. Yet, despite its unspoken preference for a DPP government, Tokyo has learnt to live with President Ma and will continue to cooperate. Should Tsai lead the DPP to victory, she may use the time between her appointment and the Chinese Communist Party leadership transfer in late 2012 to effect modest improvements in bilateral relations with Japan. Excepting any radical initiative, Beijing will likely tolerate this, since they will not want any crisis to disrupt the smooth leadership transition. Washington will undoubtedly be satisfied with either candidate. Beijing, on the other hand, has a clear preference for Ma; they are comfortable with him and the KMT, and correctly see him as more committed to faster reconciliation between the two Chinese territories. Still, Tsai has been at pains to reassure Beijing (and Washington) that she will not do anything to rock the boat.

No one can precisely forecast what the respective contests and potential leadership transfers in Taiwan, China and the US will entail for East Asian security. But we can be sure that none of the relevant parties will deliberately seek confrontation at a sensitive time in domestic politics. Moreover, whichever party wins the Taiwanese election, it will likely remain committed to consolidating, or even expanding, the strong bilateral relationship with Tokyo. 

Thomas Wilkins is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney. 

1. North Korea: Why is Seoul and Tokyo Cooperation Necessary?
2. US, China await Taiwan elections with apprehension
3. China–DPRK’s special relationship of convenience

A Japanese prefectural governor does not usually resign to run for office as city mayor — with significantly less authority, power and prestige.

But these are not usual times in Osaka and flamboyant, media-savvy, highly popular Osaka Governor, Toru Hashimoto, has taken this unusual move. He resigned as governor of Osaka prefecture a few months before completing his first term of four years and ran for the less-prestigious, less-influential position of Osaka mayor, while supporting the campaign of his close ally Ichiro Matsui for the vacated gubernatorial position. Both defeated their nearest rivals by huge margins in the November elections.

Hashimoto’s decision to run against the incumbent mayor of Osaka city while choosing his ally to run for the safe gubernatorial position he had vacated was a masterful strategic move. Incumbent Osaka Mayor, Kunio Hiramastu, had strongly opposed Governor Hashimoto’s proposal to make Osaka’s administrative structures similar to those of Tokyo, through forming ‘Osaka Metropolis’. Under this plan the governments of Osaka prefecture and its two largest cities — Osaka city and Sakai city — would be reorganised from three administrative units into one. Hashimoto argued that, especially under the current financially difficult conditions, the overlapping functions, administrative inefficiencies and duplication of the current structure should be ironed out through reorganising Osaka into one metropolitan government with a small number of special administrative wards each with an elected head. This restructuring would enable Osaka to act as a single entity, leading to consolidation of revenues and efficient economic decision making to help stimulate Osaka’s economy overall.

Osaka’s economy, like Japan’s national economy, has been stagnant for many years and is significantly lagging behind its traditional rival, Tokyo. Historically, the Osaka region was the main centre of Japan’s trade and commerce. But Tokyo took commercial advantage in the postwar period with most corporate headquarters locating in the nation’s political capital, making Tokyo also the financial and commercial capital. Osaka prefecture still boasts a total gross domestic product several times larger than some of the world’s industrialised nations and is well-endowed with large industrial and business houses competing in global markets. Osaka city has the third largest population after Tokyo and Yokohama cities, both in the greater Tokyo Metropolitan region.

To make Osaka a more attractive commercial centre and rebuild its financial health, Hashimoto, in alliance with the new governor of Osaka, has vowed to restructure the current administrative units of Osaka. He enjoys a firm popular mandate as he fought and overwhelmingly won the election on this platform.

This administrative reorganisation needs support from prefectural and city assembly members and amendments to the Local Autonomy Law through a national parliamentary process. Hashimoto is confident that he will achieve his declared aim. To this end, in 2010 he formed a local party called Osaka Ishin no kai (Osaka Restoration Association, or One Osaka). A successful local party in Japanese politics is a rare phenomenon, as most local leaders are supported by the major national political parties during local elections. But Osaka Ishin no Kai ran many candidates at this year’s unified local elections in the Osaka region and gained a majority in the prefectural assembly and more than one third of seats in the Osaka city assembly. This is a solid outcome for a nascent political party.

Moreover, Hashimoto has high-placed allies including the fourth-term governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, and some other governors and mayors around the country. He also has support from some leaders in national-level political parties including the Liberal Democratic Party, the party that ruled Japan post-war for over half a century and is now the main opposition party. Even some ministers of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan are receptive to Hashimoto’s proposal and indicated that they would have meetings with him after he took office (which occurred on Monday, 19 December).

In one sense Hashimoto is a maverick politician who began his political career when he stood successfully for the Osaka gubernatorial position in 2007. Yet he is a highly-popular leader and although a city mayor, he is already a national figure and both the media and national leaders are watching him closely. Many have dubbed him ‘Hascist’ (Hashimoto style fascism) because of his populist political style and lack of policy substance, but obviously he has strong following in the Osaka region and straw polls elsewhere suggest many outside Osaka endorse his ideas and reformist agenda.

Hashimoto is not the only sub-national politician challenging central authority and traditional power structures that seem unable to function in an economically-recessed Japan operating in the contemporary globalised world. For years Tokyo Governor Ishihara has locked horns with the national government and more recently a similar trend is visible in Aichi Prefecture and its main city, Nagoya. Earlier this year, Aichi prefecture elected as governor Hideaki Omura, and Nagoya returned Takashi Kawamura as mayor. The Kawamura–Omura team is oriented much like the Hashimoto–Matsui team in Osaka. They all seek greater policy autonomy, cost-cutting, efficiency from streamlining local bureaucracies and ultimately improvement of local economies.

Localities have raised the challenge because national political paralysis and policy deficits have deepened the people’s dissatisfaction with mainstream parties and national leaders. In the immediate post-war period the Tokyo–Nagoya–Osaka belt led national recovery through industrialisation and swift economic growth. Will this Tokyo–Nagoya–Osaka revolt usher in a new political culture in Japan? Certainly, these developments must be watched closely.

Purnendra Jain is Professor in Asian Studies at the University of Adelaide and currently Visiting Professor at Tokyo University.

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Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiro Noda has finally announced that his country will seek to participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations.

His government was poised to enter the talks earlier in the year, but the decision was postponed in the wake of Japan’s earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster — and even Noda’s announcement this week was delayed multiple times as he tried to shore up support within his own party.

Despite the controversy, the choice is the right one for both Japan and the TPP.

Japan’s decision to join the TPP makes sense for two key reasons. First, the current structure of the Japanese economy, especially the agricultural sector, is not sustainable. As Japan’s Council to Promote the Revitalisation of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries made clear in its October report, these sectors are under severe strain. Problems include declining incomes, shortages of farmers and an aging population. Addressing these issues will require a reorganisation of the country’s agricultural sector — whether Japan enters the TPP or not.

Second, Japan’s export sector is increasingly suffering from trade diversion, as key trading competitors like South Korea benefit from their various FTAs. For example, the EU-Korea FTA and the EU-US FTA mean that Korean cars will enter the EU and US markets more cheaply than those from Japan. This will make life increasingly difficult for Japanese car manufacturers seeking to export their goods. And while Japan does have a network of economic partnership agreements, most are not with major trading partners.

Fixing this problem on a bilateral basis by signing agreements with trading partners one-by-one is time consuming and often quite difficult. Joining the TPP will allow Japan to fix some of its trade-diversion problems in one stroke. It also sets Japan up for future gains if the TPP expands to include new members.

Japanese membership of the TPP is also important for the partnership itself. Until now, the agreement has included nine mostly small trading partners: Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam. A dense web of existing bilateral FTAs already links these nine partners, and the TPP was not going to engender a great deal of additional market access to most partner countries — with the important exceptions of the US-Vietnam and the US-New Zealand relationships, where no current FTAs exist.

Japan is the world’s third-largest economy. It has some links to other TPP member countries, but the market-access commitments involved here are weaker than those anticipated under the TPP negotiations. Hence, the negotiations should create significant scope for markets to open, with the current absence of a US-Japan FTA of greatest economic significance. The TPP will represent the first attempt to bring together the world’s first- and third-largest markets into one coherent agreement.

This will not be an easy task. Those with long memories might recall the near-trade wars between the US and Japan in the 1990s over cars and car parts, insurance, postal services, retail services and delivery, construction and various agricultural products. Many of these disputes have been simmering, largely unresolved, for decades. They will resurface in the TPP negotiations and must be addressed once and for all.

But the Prime Minister’s announcement suggests that Japan is now prepared to take the task of liberalising markets seriously. The government is apparently planning to use the TPP as a mechanism for pushing through necessary domestic reforms in the agricultural sector. Since this sector has — until now — been seen as the primary obstacle to broader efforts at liberalisation, clearing this hurdle is critical.

While the commitment to open all agriculture markets, at least in the long run, is going to be important to current TPP members, they will also be asking Japanese negotiators about their willingness to discuss other issues on the TPP agenda. These include at least some opening up of services, telecommunications, e-commerce, investment, government procurement contracts and labour markets to firms from other TPP member states.

The TPP aims to be a high-quality agreement. It requires an ambitious level of commitment from its members across a much broader range of topics than most existing bilateral agreements. Getting Japan involved will further this ambition and bring benefits to both Japan and other TPP members.

Dr Deborah Elms is Head at the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade and Negotiations, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.

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Geopolitical tensions continue to simmer in the South China Sea after the Obama administration’s declaration last year of a US ‘return to Asia’ stirred up regional dynamics.

Now, non-claimant states India and Japan are entering into the fray. There are various reasons for this activity.

First, the South China Sea is home to some of the world’s busiest sea lines of communication (SLOCs), which would be disrupted should an armed conflict break out. Second, there is the potential for non-claimant states to get involved in the exploration of oil and gas in the region through joint ventures with claimant states. Third, having a voice in a major regional security issue confers prestige commensurate with regional power status. And last, involvement in the South China Sea issue could have implications on other territorial disputes.

For India and Japan, the South China Sea dispute provides additional indicators to gauge the assertiveness of China’s foreign policy. India and Japan have unsettled borders with China in the Himalayas and the East China Sea, respectively. India also has territorial disputes with Pakistan, who in turn is supported by China. To Japan, the safety of its SLOCs are a vital security interest, and over 80 per cent of her oil imports from the Middle East pass through the South China Sea.

The ‘rise of China’ is also bringing India and Japan closer together. The two countries signed the ‘Joint Statement Vision for Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade’ and a ‘Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement’ in October 2010. No doubt India’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, will also provide an important component for Indo-Japanese maritime cooperation.

Security interests opposite China are also leading the two countries to more strategic engagement with ASEAN states.

Recently, India’s state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) signed a deal with Vietnam’s PetroVietnam to purchase BP’s stakes in oil and gas development in waters off the Vietnamese coast (following a naval confrontation between India and China in the area). While China protests the deal as violating its sovereignty, ONGC and PetroVietnam claim the area in question is within Vietnamese territorial waters. And on 12 October this year, Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi, with both sides pledging to maintain peace and security in the South China Sea while expanding the contents of their strategic partnership.

As for Japan, it held talks in September with Filipino diplomats on resolving the disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. It was proposed that the two countries set up a ‘permanent working group’ to regularly tackle disputes and other Asian maritime issues. Even more importantly, military and security ties were tightened with the elevation of the relationship to a ‘strategic partnership’. Japan also signalled its willingness to play a bigger role in regional security issues when the Japanese Vice Minister of Defence met with senior defence officials from the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand in late September.

The Philippines will also be putting forward a proposal for avoiding future conflicts in the Sea at the upcoming ASEAN summit. This would see claimant countries determine which areas are in dispute and which are not so as to allow for the exploration and exploitation of resources, potentially in joint ventures.

But while outside involvement can guarantee some degree of protection for ASEAN states against China, this could be a dangerous game to play — one that risks a strong reaction from Beijing. Indeed, Chinese media are already calling for such a reaction following Philippine President Aquino’s recent talks with the US and Japan on the one hand and China on the other. These talks secured US$60 billion of infrastructure investment from China but also the purchase of two Hamilton class cutters from the US.

It would be easy for China to interpret the events over the last year as tantamount to a strategic encirclement by the US, India and Japan. And this will only make the disputes more complicated than ever. Now that ASEAN claimant states have a more favourable strategic position vis-à-vis China, all the states involved should turn their attention to the negotiating table, adding substantive content to the agreement reached at this July’s ASEAN Regional Forum to resolve the dispute peacefully. The 12 October signing of a six-point agreement between China and Vietnam to contain the South China Sea dispute, including the opening of a hotline to deal with potential conflicts and the promise of holding border negotiations twice a year, is one welcome development toward this.

Andy Yee is a writer and translator based in Hong Kong. He has worked at the Political Section of the EU Delegation to China in Beijing and blogs at Global Voices Online and China Geeks. 

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Public debate surrounding Japan’s proposed entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) remains as heated and confused as ever.

The rhetoric is far-ranging: while some maintain that Japan risks being permanently left behind economically should it fail to negotiate entry into the TPP, others suggest that Japan’s government is agreeing to effectively cede sovereignty and sacrifice its agricultural sector for the sake of diplomatic cordiality. No one really knows what the TPP will mean for Japan, but little recognition is given to this fact.

Despite this, anti-TPP rhetoric in particular has been problematic. It has been trading on a subtle implication that Japan will be forced to make concessions while other nations maintain their respective status quo(s?). This ignores the fact that the TPP will involve multilateral negotiations where Japan is likely to find many willing partners to balance against the potentially more intrusive aspects of this ‘comprehensive’ partnership.

There is also little awareness that the country’s main sponsor, the US, may well be the biggest obstacle to any eventual TPP deal. The US has traditionally been committed to a certain kind of liberal trade order, but many see it as having a chequered history in its commitment to the liberal political and trade order in general. In fact, there are numerous countries involved in negotiations that are extremely sceptical about any deal negotiated by an American administration.

It is important to remember in this context that Australia signed an FTA with the US which did not liberalise the US agricultural market nearly as much as Australia originally hoped. And due to the same range of interests and stakeholders, a NZ-US FTA is not even a realistic consideration.

Some countries face the additional problem of potentially aggravating their own key political constituencies while trying to meet US requirements. For instance, a wide range of agricultural interests and service-industry associations came out against the TPP in Japan over the last fortnight. And it is not just these sectors that remain unconvinced. Japanese officials beyond the immediate environs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while supportive of TPP negotiations in principle, find the urgency and black-and-white rhetoric of the TPP debate at home, and from abroad, somewhat disconcerting.

Perhaps a cause of such unease is the lack of discussion about the need for rhetorical balance in the broader diplomatic context. Nagashima Akihisa’s comment to the effect that a positive of the TPP would be that China would see the strategic environment aligning against it, are precisely the kind of comments that confuse Japan’s economic and security interests. Australia and New Zealand have already felt the need to caution against such ‘confusion’ in their own cases. In fact top Australian and New Zealand political figures concerned at some of the external rhetoric floating around the TPP in Washington have had to communicate to key figures supporting the TPP in no uncertain terms that the moment NZ and Australia smell a China containment policy, they are ‘gone’ from the negotiations.

What does this all mean for Japan? The signals emanating from the Noda government about the exact meaning of the TPP are somewhat curious. In one simplistic sense, Japan has little to lose from joining negotiations; if it withdraws because the negotiations ultimately conflict with the country’s national interest, it is very unlikely the Japanese will be the only country with such problems. The time scales are also of the order that Japanese agriculture and the government would have ample time to respond to any changes. These sorts of dynamics and time scales have not been well communicated in the Japanese media. Rather, the narrative started with Kan’s concept of a ‘third opening’ for Japan — which now looks to be a somewhat unhelpful over-exaggeration — and the TPP has thus taken on more symbolism in Japan than it perhaps deserves. The partnership could be especially significant for Japan, but there is a long way to go — and the ‘opening’ of Japan will be about much more than the TPP.

There is also the question of whether the TPP’s importance matches that of various other developments in global finance, investment and trade. It has not escaped Japan’s attention that South Korea has already signed an FTA with Europe — and bilateral agreements with the US and Australia appear to be just around the corner. Consequently, South Korea seems only somewhat interested in the TPP.

But for Japan, the negotiations may be a good way to diplomatically placate the US and relieve pressure over the Futenma military-base disagreement. It may also be a valuable way to draw domestic fire away from Japan’s other trade projects, namely, the already signed agreement with India, continued and redoubled trade agreement efforts with the EU and Australia, and the start of discussions with China and South Korea about trade liberalisation. Activities surrounding these trade initiatives have caused almost no ripples of controversy in Japan over the last year or two.

The Japanese concern with China’s rising power as a military actor has certainly become more palpable in the last two years. But ultimately it is important to remember that Japan also fundamentally shares concerns along with New Zealand, Australia and likely many others about the TPP turning into not just an economic hedge against China, but into a larger piece of an explicit and comprehensive ‘anti-Chinese’ project. Trade diversification east and west makes great strategic sense, for different reasons, for Japan. A pragmatic appraisal of Japan’s national economic and security interests should however lead the US to be feel secure enough in its relationship with Japan and recognize that the pursuit of simultaneous trade agreements with key Asian neighbours is actually a very good idea for Japan in terms of how it affects its long-term ability to manage diplomatic, economic and security tensions in East Asia. Japan faces several challenges with regards to the TPP negotiations. Its relationship with the US is under scrutiny, while Japan is also well aware of China’s rising influence and is attempting to determine how it should respond. Ultimately, it appears Japan needs more certainty from its TPP negotiations regarding the nature and effects of such a partnership, and a clearer idea of the role it wants to play within the East Asia region going into the future.

Corey Wallace is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, the University of Auckland.

An earlier version of this appeared here on σ1.

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