The death of Kim Jong-il, though not entirely unexpected given the state of his health following a debilitating stroke in August 2008, has had a powerful psychological impact both domestically and globally.

His death leaves a huge vacuum not only in the North Korean psyche, but in the system that he embodied.

As North Korea comes to grips with his death, the new government headed by Kim Jong-un — Kim Jong-il’s youngest son and successor — must begin navigating the grave challenges that North Korea faces at home and abroad.

The Kim Jong-un regime now stands at a crossroads, and the country’s future depends on whether it looks to the past or to the future in searching for the solutions to its enormous and pressing problems.

Perhaps the most serious challenge facing the new regime is the ongoing, deep-rooted economic problems that have led to chronic energy and food shortages. While North Korea rebounded from economic collapse in the late 1990s, its economy continues to be grossly insufficient in meeting the people’s basic needs. With a quarter of its population starving, the regime presides over a country where the lives of ordinary people are consumed by an ongoing struggle for subsistence.

Private markets sprang up during the 1990s as a mechanism to cope with the food shortage caused by the collapse of the Public Distribution System, and were it not for these markets, the suffering of the people would be even worse today. To make up for the shortfall of its moribund economy, North Korea is still dependent on external food and energy aid, of which China remains the majority provider.

The North Korean regime can continue to muddle through by restricting private markets and foreign investment while relying on external aid to keep the economy afloat. Or it can address the root cause of the economic problems by fundamentally changing its system through reform and opening up to foreign trade and investment. As this is the only way the regime can resolve its economic problems over the long term, the policy of muddling through will exacerbate the suffering and continue to erode the regime’s legitimacy.

The second challenge is the ongoing nuclear conflict. In the face of growing external pressure to abandon its nuclear program, North Korea has upped the ante over the past few years by engaging in ever-more serious provocations. These include conducting nuclear and missile tests in 2009; the sinking of a South Korean warship, Cheonan, in March 2010 (killing 46); and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 (killing four including two civilians).

These provocations are intended to escalate tension in order to break the deadlock pervading the Six-Party Talks, as well as to bolster the legitimacy of the regime and the leadership succession. But they have led to growing confrontation among all parties to the talks, and this, in turn, has increased the danger of the situation spiralling out of control into a wider conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

As such, the North Korean regime is faced with another stark choice. It can continue to muddle through by fostering conflict and tension in order to neutralise external pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, thus raising the stakes on the Korean Peninsula to an intolerably dangerous level. Or it can make a strategic choice to give up its nuclear program in return for economic aid, diplomatic ties and security guarantees, laying a solid foundation for creating a viable and secure North Korean state.

Lastly, the regime is faced with the North Korean people’s increased exposure to the outside world. Through a variety of channels — such as cross-border traffic with China, foreign radio broadcasts, expatriate North Korean communities, increasing access to mobile phones and a greater availability of foreign DVDs — the once hermetically sealed society is slowly being pried open. As North Koreans become more knowledgeable about the outside world, the more dissatisfied they will become with their own lives and the North Korean state. The regime can continue its futile effort to control information, or it can harness the increasing flow of information to help develop the country as part of a broader effort to open up North Korean society to the outside world.

While the death of an important historical figure usually marks the end of one era and the beginning of a new one, the death of Kim Jong-il has only increased the urgent need for his successor to make difficult choices. Either the regime must be willing to take the country in a new and bold direction or it must suffer the consequences of maintaining an unsustainable status quo.

Steven Kim is Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu.

1. North Korea: Kim Jong-il snubs Jimmy Carter in lead up to succession
2. North Korea: strategic thinking, strategic response
3. North Korea’s succession gets twisted

After the death of Kim Jong-il in December, Kim Jong-un has officially become the supreme leader of North Korea and the supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army.

This is in addition to his position as the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Korean Workers’ Party, which was announced in September 2010. These appointments demonstrate that the succession system, with Kim Jong-un as the core person, has been stabilised.

Currently, there are three major powers that are adjuvant to the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea.

First is the Kim family system, which is now headed by Kim Jong-un’s uncle, Jang Sung-taek, and aunt, Kim Kyong-hui. Jang serves as the Vice Chairman of the National Defence Commission, and as a Chief Minister of the Party Central Committee. Together they control the major power of the Korean Workers’ Party, the government and the military — and have established a broad political power base within the Korean government and military systems.

Second are the old-guard politicians. They could be represented by Kim Yong-nam, the chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly Committee. They have been trusted by the three generations of leaders (Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un), and they also have high national prestige. They will continue to support the Kim Jong-un regime.

Third are the military forces, which could be represented by the chief of staff, Ri Yong-ho, and the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Kim Yong-chun. They have all shown loyalty to the Kim Jong-un regime. After the death of Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un publicly issued his ‘first orders’ as supreme commander, proving his actual control over the army.

The support of the above three powers will help guarantee the smooth transition of power to the Kim Jong-un regime.

However, Kim Jong-un still faces a series of challenges.

First, Kim Jong-un has to build his own team. This will potentially enable a group of young politicians to enter the power centre. But this will also conflict with the old political system.

Second, the Kim Jong-un regime will initially continue the ‘military-first’ politics of the Kim Jong-il regime. Yet, once the Kim Jong-un regime gains stability, it will have to face up to economic development pressures, improving people’s livelihoods and opening up foreign economic cooperation, which may force the regime to modify the ‘military-first politics’ line, and weaken the military’s power. This will inevitably lead to a backlash and challenges from the armed forces.

Third, after the Kim Jong-un regime fully consolidates its grip on power, it might adjust the power structure of the Korean government and military. That is, the Kim Jong-un regime may strengthen the core of the Korean Workers’ Party’s leadership system and shift emphasis to the political path of the ‘party leader’ in order to gradually replace the ‘military-first’ politics. Therefore, if Kim Jong-un takes on the position of chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Commission, there is a possibility that he will manoeuvre to replace the powers of the National Defence Commission with the Central Military Commission. He also might not install anybody as chairman of the National Defence Commission.

However, the current situation in North Korea will not necessarily trigger significant changes. After all, Kim Jong-un suffers from a lack of experience in governance, military leadership and political power. If Kim Jong-un attempts to make changes too quickly, to further the implementation of domestic and foreign policy adjustment — such as restructuring North Korea’s military and political power system and shifting from the ‘military-first’ politics to a ‘party leader’ political line — he will inevitably invite conflict or power struggle into the restructuring process.

With regard to the role of outside powers, China and US share common strategic interests in avoiding chaos and maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. After the death of Kim Jong-il, ROK-US summit telephone talks declared that the US has no intention to interfere in the succession process. This indicates that the US will not put pressure on North Korea to promote its collapse and hopes to avoid conflict on the peninsula and to achieve peace and stability.

The US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, visited China recently in order to further exchange views with China concerning the situation in the DPRK and to coordinate policies toward North Korea. China’s strategy has been to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula, and to build a harmonious and stable strategic environment in Northeast Asia conducive to national development. Kim’s death has not changed the basic strategy of China toward the Korean Peninsula. The main basis of China’s Korean Peninsula policy is to comprehensively strengthen and support Kim Jong-un’s new North Korean regime. The main purpose of the US’ ‘return to Asia’ strategy is to strengthen its strategic influence in the Asia Pacific region, including the Korean Peninsula. It also includes preventing military provocation or possible war in the East Asia region through the strengthening of US-ROK, US-Japan and US-Australia military alliances, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

Therefore, China and the US have common strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula issue. They do not want chaos in the North Korean situation, the collapse of the regime, or a large-scale military conflict between the North and South. In resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, the missile crisis and other issues, there is a wide range of cooperative space that China and the US can utilise. The two parties should strengthen their strategic coordination and communication with the DPRK in order to cope with any future crises and deal with the current challenges concerning the Korean Peninsula, and act to safeguard the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

Wei Zhijiang is Professor and Director of the Institute of South Korea Studies at the School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Sun Yat-sen University.

1. Kim Jong-il’s visit to China: What should we expect?
2. Kim Jong-il dead: apocalypse now or a new dawn?
3. Death of Kim Jong-il: the rise of the Party

After North Korea’s sinking of a South Korean frigate, Cheonan, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, inter-Korean relations did not improve much in 2011.

There was limited official contact between the South and the North and between the US and the North to discuss the possible resumption of Six-Party Talks or food aid. Pyongyang also continued to decline the request from South Korea and the US to stop uranium enrichment before resuming the Six-Party Talks, a major stumbling block to the process. But the South Korean news agency Yonhap reported on 16 December that North Korea finally agreed to suspend enrichment activities. It was around that time that the US government indicated its decision to provide North Korea with nutritional assistance. These contacts and exchanges seemed to mark the end of acute tension between the two Koreas and between the US and North Korea.

Yet this small progress was overwhelmed a few days later by Kim Jong-il’s sudden death. The news shook the world and attracted great international attention, particularly regarding North Korea’s future under its new leader, Kim Jong-un. Unlike his father, Kim Jong-un — believed to be in his late twenties — received only two years of training before he inherited power.

The world may have to wait at least a year to ascertain the likely future stability of Kim Jong-un’s regime. There may be some short-term stability in a crucial period of power transition like this, but nobody knows whether Kim Jong-un will be able to build his own charisma and solidify his power base by successfully handling the many challenges which face North Korea. These issues include poor economic performance, international isolation, food shortages and changing perceptions of ordinary residents due to an ever-increasing inflow of information from the outside world. Both South Korea and the US delivered a carefully prepared message of condolence to North Korea in the hope of establishing more constructive relations following Kim Jong-il’s death. Predictably, China was the first country to express strong political support for the new leader.

The year 2011 was also an important period of change in domestic politics. South Korean voters sent a strong message of dissatisfaction to politicians from both the ruling and the opposition parties. Though South Korea’s economy performed relatively well compared to other countries in the West, many middle- and lower-class Koreans began to feel the negative impact of widening economic polarisation, convinced that the successful economic performance of big businesses had nothing to do with their own lives. Voters became frustrated by the government’s inability to handle problems such as youth unemployment due to jobless growth, an increasingly poor welfare system for low-income groups and the weakening of small- and medium-size enterprises — not to mention the opposition’s inability to offer viable alternatives.

A political backlash against the Lee government’s pursuit of neo-liberal economic policies could clearly be felt in the recent mayoral election in Seoul, held on 26 October. For the first time in history, a civic activist, Park Won-soon, defeated the ruling-party candidate and was elected as mayor.

Another political surprise for most Koreans in 2011 was the sudden appearance of a medical doctor-turned-software businessman, Ahn Chul-soo, as a very popular political figure. His influence was so substantial that the announcement of his support for Park Won-soon boosted Park’s popularity greatly and helped bring him the election victory. Nobody knows yet whether Ahn, currently a dean at Seoul National University, will run for presidency in 2012. But the phenomenon indicates how much Korean voters are dissatisfied with the political establishment.

Despite the political backlash, South Korea does not seem to have an alternative strategy to the utilisation of economic globalisation to underwrite domestic growth. For example, after a few years of delay and heated political debate in both countries, the US Congress finally ratified the Korea–US FTA in October, with the South Korean National Assembly following suit in November. Conclusion of this FTA has significant implications — not only economically, but also politically. This may be why the Chinese government, too, has been eager to conclude an FTA with South Korea in recent years.

In conclusion, the year 2011 marked an important watershed in inter-Korean relations, domestic Korean politics and Korea’s external economic strategy, but many risks and surprises still appear on the horizon.

Yoon Young-kwan is Director at the Center for International Studies, Seoul National University, and served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade for the Republic of Korea from 2003–04.

This article is part of a special feature: 2011 in review and the year ahead.

1. Russia-North Korea: Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula
2. Military spending and the arms race on the Korean Peninsula
3. Blow-out in inter-Korean relations

North Korea’s leadership succession from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un has gone according to script.

The Korean Workers’ Party and the Korean People’s Army are supporting Kim Jong-un as North Korea’s new leader and North Korea’s propaganda machine has not missed a beat in announcing new titles, manufacturing accomplishments and portraying Kim Jong-un as a Great Successor worthy of the name. But despite these efforts, there are two notable missing pieces: Kim Jong-un’s brothers Kim Jong-nam and Kim Jong-chul. The failure of these brothers to publicly appear at the funeral clarifies that they are excluded from power, but their apparently differing fates raise important questions about Kim Jong-un’s power and the sustainability of his leadership.

Kim Jong-chul, in his thirties, is Kim Jong-il’s second son (the first son of Kim Jong-il’s second wife, Ko Yong-hee, who is also the mother of Kim Jong-un). Although Kim Jong-chul is Kim Jong-un’s elder brother, he is rumoured to have been dismissed by his father as a potential successor for being too effeminate. Kim Jong-chul’s absence is disturbing because it raises questions about how far Kim Jong-un might go to squelch even perceived contenders for power. North Korean purges have historically been ruthless, but family members have usually been exiled rather than executed. Kim Jong-il’s half-brother Kim Pyong-il was assigned to decades of diplomatic service abroad in Europe rather than eliminated. Kim Jong-chul’s fate may hold telling clues to the character of leadership under Kim Jong-un.

If Kim Jong-chul’s silence raises questions, Kim Jong-nam’s visibility poses even more serious challenges. Kim Jong-nam, aged 40, is Kim Jong-il’s child with his first wife, Sung Hae-rim. As Kim Jong-il’s eldest son, Kim Jong-nam is reported to have been groomed for succession until he fell out of favour in 2001, after being detained at Narita Airport in Japan with a fake passport. Since that time, he has lived in apparent exile in Macao and Beijing. Kim Jong-nam has emerged as a surprisingly voluble critic of North Korea’s leadership succession, directly challenging the legitimacy and capability of Kim Jong-un as a leader. Tokyo Shimbun journalist Yoji Gomi quoted an e-mail from Kim Jong-nam received on 3 January, in which Kim Jong-nam states that ‘I expect the existing ruling elite to follow in the footsteps of my father while keeping the young successor as a symbolic figure . . . It’s difficult to accept a third-generation succession with normal reasoning’, he added. He also said he doubted that a young successor ‘with some two years of training can retain the absolute power’. (Gomi’s book, based on several years of e-mail exchanges with Kim Jong-nam, was published a few days ago in Japanese.)

This forthright public assessment of North Korea’s succession makes Kim Jong-nam the foremost external critic of Kim Jong-un’s succession and a direct challenger to the viability of Kim Jong-un’s leadership. It directly contradicts North Korean efforts to burnish Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy, and raises questions about whether sibling rivalry might be a sign of discord among Pyongyang’s elites.

External public criticism of the succession cannot be viewed as helpful to Kim Jong-un’s efforts to consolidate power, and it is presumably in Kim Jong-un’s interest to prevent his older brother from providing ongoing commentary regarding his succession, if for no other reason than that quieting Kim Jong-nam would be one means of proving that Kim Jong-un is not a puppet or ‘symbol’ of the North Korean elite.

Kim Jong-nam’s public criticisms of the succession from his base in China also raise the question of who is Kim Jong-nam’s protector, especially given rumours last year that Kim Jong-un had instigated purges against leading supporters of Kim Jong-nam in Pyongyang. China presumably sees utility in protecting Kim Jong-nam — as a reform-minded Kim family member who is indebted to China — as a potential alternative leader if Kim Jong-un’s leadership fails. A more complicated factor is that in 2002 and 2003, shortly following his exile from Pyongyang, Kim Jong-nam appeared to have an open line of communication from Beijing with his uncle Jang Sung-taek and his aunt Kim Kyong-hui, who are now critical supporters of Kim Jong-un.

It is ironic that Kim Jong-nam is able to robustly exercise his freedom of speech from his home base in China despite his presumed dependence on China to allow him permanent residency in that country. This circumstance complicates Kim Jong-un’s ability to silence Kim Jong-nam as compared to Kim Jong-chul, but it also raises a potentially awkward situation for China at a time when North Korea’s leadership surely seeks assurances that China is not hedging its support for Kim Jong-un.

Scott A. Snyder is Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on US–Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.

This article was first published here on the Council on Foreign Relations Asia Unbound blog.

1. North Korea: new opportunities in a post-Kim Jong-il landscape
2. North Korea: Kim Jong-il snubs Jimmy Carter in lead up to succession
3. Power, lies and secrecy in North Korea

The grand funeral ceremony for Kim Jong-il was completed earlier this month, and North Korea’s new leader, Kim Jong-un, was officially sworn in.

The event clearly opened a new chapter in North Korea’s history.

The mass expressions of grief in North Korea witnessed throughout this time have considerable meaning — while they may seem shocking to foreigners, the displays cannot be written off as insincere. Collectivism is pervasive in North Korea, and this affects the way emotions are displayed. But to deny that North Koreans widely perceive their country’s leader as its father — in line with the Confucian tradition — and that people are indeed mourning Kim Jong-il would be unfair.

The phenomenon has its roots in the original North Korean political culture, which ascribes a special role to the country’s leader, and has a legitimising impact on Kim Jong-un’s claim to power. It is true that Kim Jong-un is very young, has a limited record of involvement in state affairs, and has only held the status of official successor for slightly over a year. Still, he learned a lot over this time, acting as his father’s apprentice, and has made no blunders in the process. Importantly, the nation actually sees him as the successor.

Obviously, both Kim Jong-un and North Korea face tough challenges. Kim’s elder peers — the stalwarts from his father’s inner entourage — will certainly do their best to help him during the initial phase of his rule, but this interaction should not be interpreted as evidence that Kim is only the nominal leader. For North Korea, combining the leader’s singular status with collectivism in top-level decision making is a long-standing tradition, though the balance between the two elements fluctuates.

Predictions that North Korea will shortly plunge into chaos and that a tide of infighting will sweep over its leadership are completely groundless. North Korea watchers are fully aware of the country’s robust political stability, and the development of organised opposition or public protests of considerable proportions are nowhere in sight.

It is natural that divisions over individual issues exist in North Korea’s administration, but the country’s constant external threats help to further cement its administration. Pyongyang is mindful of its opponents’ strategy — which focuses on inducing regime change in North Korea — and monitors the emergency military planning of the US–South Korea alliance. The two countries certainly had special plans to set in motion in the event of Kim Jong-il’s sudden death. The North Korean political elite have no illusions as to their chances of survival in the case of a regime change. And more than any ideological directive, such concerns make the elite maintain full cohesion, stay loyal to the country’s leader and ruthlessly suppress any tendencies toward internal discord.

At least in the mid-term, we should see complete continuity in North Korea’s foreign and domestic policies, with its young leader likely to emphasise allegiance to his father’s legacy. Pyongyang’s approach to key foreign policy issues, including its involvement in the Six-Party Talks over the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear problem, will therefore remain unchanged.

It should also be noted that the recent developments in North Korea opened up new opportunities for its opponents, and time will tell how these opportunities might be seized. No doubt, the US could assume the main role in rebuilding bridges with Pyongyang. The switch from a condition bordering on war to one of fruitful cooperation in the wake of Kim Il-sung’s death and the signing of the 1994 Agreed framework provide a vivid example of such flexibility. The Bush administration made a similar manoeuvre in 2007.

Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Burma was a bold initiative, and an analogous breakthrough in relations with North Korea may yet be brewing (the precedent being Madeleine Albright’s 2000 visit to Pyongyang). In any case, the current situation offers unique opportunities to break the stalemate in US-North Korean and inter-Korean relations.

In sum, North Korea’s domestic situation remains stable, with Moscow and Beijing firmly encouraging peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean approach to key foreign policy issues, including its relations with Russia, will remain unchanged. The last foreign visit paid by the late Kim Jong-il was a tour of Russia, during which he met with Russian President Dimitry Medvedev in August 2011. It is a safe bet that cooperation between Russia and North Korea will continue, and that the key bilateral and multilateral economic projects — including the Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipe line and railroad construction — will be implemented in this same framework, as planned. 

Alexander Vorontsov is Head of the Korean and Mongolian Studies Department, the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.

1. Power, lies and secrecy in North Korea
2. Russia-North Korea: Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula
3. Russia-North Korea trade

One of the more momentous changes in Asia that heralded in the New Year was the sudden death of North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, and the succession by his son, Kim Jong-un.

Kim Jong-il’s death had long been seen by some outside observers as portent for the collapse of the North Korean regime and the announcement encouraged much comment that reflected these forebodings, including calls for calm from political leaders who should have been in the know.

Anything seemed possible.

Certainly there were anxieties about whether the assumption of the North Korean leadership by a relatively untried and youthful Kim Jong-un would be accompanied by a power struggle in the North and political instability. Cooler heads saw little immediate sign of that.

In this week’s lead Chung-in Moon and John Delury at Yonsei University urge focus on the realities that face North Korea itself and the rest of the world in dealing with the isolated state, not imagined contingencies surrounding the leadership change. Their injunction is timely. Moon was a key adviser to former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung on North Korean affairs and heavily involved in negotiations between the North and the South that saw the Sunshine policy put in place. But he is a hard-headed realist.

Delury and Moon point out that there are no signs of political ferment in North Korea. For the moment, the system is quite stable. The regime is ‘unified around the new face of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, the son of Kim Jong-il and, most importantly, the grandson of founding father Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-un does not need charisma. In North Korea’s hierarchic ‘big leader’ suryong system, the young Kim is born to authority. His Baekdu bloodline is sufficient to endow his rule with legitimacy. And his power base is solid’. This is an hereditary system of rule as much as an authoritarian one.

Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy is secured by three inner circles. The first is the ruling family. The key sign of unity within the family is that Kim Jong-un’s aunt and her powerful husband Jang Song-taek both received promotions along with the heir-apparent at the historic Party conference last year. The second is the Korean Worker’s Party itself, which has been going through a period of resuscitation. The revitalised network of Party members — who now carry cell phones and are eager to travel abroad — see their prospects very much linked to the success of the grandson. The third is the military — the Korean People’s Army — which is the logical competitor in the power succession. But even in the army there is no sign of high-level disaffection like that seen in many Middle Eastern states. ‘The military’, Delury and Moon point out, ‘has been the primary beneficiary of the North’s ”military first politics” campaign initiated by Kim Jong-il in 1995′. The military has been co-opted through numerous incentives, and controlled through close confidants. The military has pledged loyalty to Kim Jong-un, whose highest title is Vice Chair of the Central Military Committee of the Korean Worker’s Party.

As for the 20 million or so North Koreans not in the Party, they are likely to take a wait-and-see approach to the new leadership group. Kim Jong-un bears a striking physical resemblance to his grandfather, evoking nostalgia for North Korea’s halcyon days, and people may hope his rule will see a new, better chapter for their country. Whatever the case, those who may wish to rebel have no networks or organisations through which to do so. For now, all signs confirm the state media slogans: Kim Jong-un is the ‘outstanding leader of our party, army and people’ and ‘great successor’ to his father.

In the near term, the chances of political crisis, let alone regime collapse, are remote. In the longer term, however, North Korea faces the same perennial hard choices: the dilemma, Delury and Moon call it, of mutually conflicting goals.

Pyongyang proclaims to its citizens that 2012 marks the year of North Korea’s emergence as a ‘strong and prosperous great nation’ [Gangsong Daeguk]. ‘If Kim Jong-il could claim nothing else’, say Delury and Moon, ‘he did achieve at least one thing for North Korea — the ultimate ”strength” of nuclear deterrence’.

What most outside observers of North Korean affairs miss is the importance of the goal of world standard prosperity. It was set out again post-succession in the New Year’s joint editorial in North Korea’s three main newspapers. There are unmistakable signs of a push to improve the national economy — from growing trade with and investment from China, revived plans for special economic zones and official propaganda promising to improve the people’s welfare.

The issue at stake is whether Kim Jong-un can enhance North Korea’s prosperity without undermining the source of its strength — its nuclear weapons program. ‘Comprehensive economic development will also require foreign investment, trade, and financing; all of which would require negotiation of loosening, and eventual lifting, the sanctions which surround the North Korean economy like a barbed wire fence. Getting that sanctions regime lifted will require substantive nuclear concessions on Pyongyang’s part’.

This, of course, opens opportunity for dealing between Pyongyang, Washington, Beijing and Seoul. As Delury and Moon observe, it will be in that moment, the transition from security-first to security-plus-prosperity, when the unity of the North Korean political system would come under strain. It was perhaps ever thus. ‘Elements in the military might oppose sacrificing their prize possession — nuclear weapons capability. Hardliners will argue it would be a fool’s errand to give up the ultimate weapon, leaving their country exposed to an Iraqi or Libyan fate’.

The path to getting the North over that hump needs to start now, with building constructive relationships with their new leadership, and avoiding the risk of playing into the hands of hardliners, and above all investing in the capacities now that North Koreans will need to run a prosperous and open economy and society. There are signs that this is recognised in Washington and Seoul, though unfortunately not in Canberra which had earlier played a helpful role in prosecuting just this interest — and again is positioned, because of the importance of being unimportant, to do so now.

Peter Drysdale is the Editor of the East Asia Forum.

1. North Korea’s transition: do not let contingencies distract from realities
2. North Korean quagmire a failure of analysis
3. Russia-North Korea: Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula

Kim Jong-il’s sudden death spurred yet another round of fevered speculation over the DPRK’s imminent demise.

Some analysts gave the North Korean state only a matter of months to live, and renewed calls on Beijing to engage in ‘contingency planning’ with Washington and Seoul to pre-empt catastrophe when collapse finally comes. This scepticism is not without foundation. The new leader, Kim Jong-un, is young and inexperienced. He does not yet project his father’s power, let alone his grandfather’s charisma. His policy preferences are unknown, but his grooming period witnessed ill-advised initiatives on the economic and political fronts — from the botched currency reform to the tragic shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Despite these shortcomings and questions, the succession process seems to be going smoothly. There is no evidence of near-term political crisis, confusion as to the new pecking order, popular revolt or systemic breakdown.

Why is near-term crisis unlikely? For the simple reason that the country’s political system is unified around the new face of North Korea, Kim Jong-un. He does not need to build charisma; his Baekdu bloodline is sufficient to endow his rulership with legitimacy. And his power base is solid.

Think of Kim Jong-un surrounded, and protected, by three inner circles. The first circle is the ruling family. The second is the Korean Workers’ Party itself, which has been going through a period of resuscitation in recent years. The revitalised network of Party members, who now carry cell phones and who are eager to travel abroad, see their prospects linked to the grandson’s success. The third circle is the military, which would be the logical competitor for power. But here, too, there is no sign of high-level disaffection, like that seen in many Arab Spring states. The military has been the primary beneficiary of the North’s ‘military-first politics’ campaign that Kim Jong-il initiated in 1995. And so far, the military has pledged its unfailing loyalty to Kim Jong-un.

But what, then, of the outer circle — the 20 million or so North Koreans not in the Party? Kim Jong-il was not beloved like his father, and pragmatic North Korean civilians are likely to take a wait-and-see approach to the new leadership group. Even those who may wish to rebel have no networks or organisations through which to do so.

Consequently, the chances of political crisis in the near term appear remote. But in the medium to longer term, the new leadership is likely to face a dilemma, and this should be the focal point of international responses to the transition process. It is a dilemma created by two mutually conflicting goals the regime has set for itself.

Pyongyang has been loudly promising its citizens that 2012 marks the year of North Korea’s emergence as a ‘strong and prosperous great nation’ (Gangsong Daeguk). Kim Jong-il managed to achieve at least one thing for North Korea — the ultimate ‘strength’ of nuclear deterrence. Now, it is up to his son to achieve the other half of the equation: prosperity. There have certainly been unmistakable signs of a push to improve the national economy over the past few years — from growing trade with and investment from China to revived plans for special economic zones.

But the issue at stake is whether Kim Jong-un can enhance North Korea’s prosperity without undermining the source of its strength — its nuclear weapons program. Food aid and foreign economic assistance are urgently needed to ensure a smooth path through the first year of Gangsung Daeguk. Comprehensive economic development would also require foreign investment, trade, and financing — all requiring an initial loosening and eventual lifting of the sanctions regime that surrounds the North Korean economy. Achieving this will require substantive nuclear concessions on Pyongyang’s part.

This transition from security-first to security-plus-prosperity will pose the greatest challenge to the unity of the North Korean political system. Elements in the military might oppose sacrificing their prize possession. Hardliners will argue it would leave their country exposed to an Iraqi or Libyan fate. Therefore, the path to getting the North over that hump must start now.

So, the essential question is, what should the international community do? The most prudent course for key regional players is to re-open or expand channels with Pyongyang. The better we know the new leadership, the better we can respond to events as they unfold. Seoul, Washington and Beijing should focus energies on drawing out North Korean officials as the leadership consolidates around its new core, Kim Jong-un.

Fortunately, the US has some modest positive momentum to build on in crafting this kind of proactive diplomatic outreach. The US and DPRK were engaged in substantive bilateral talks on humanitarian aid and denuclearisation on the eve of Kim Jong-il’s death. The timing is fortuitous, and Washington should make the most of these revived channels, signalling readiness to work with the new powers. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seems to be taking a measured, constructive approach to Kim Jong-il’s passing — an encouraging sign that the US will be persistent and proactive.

Seoul’s reaction is even more crucial, and delicate. The South Korean public is divided over inter-Korean relations, and President Lee Myung-bak takes a hit whichever way he steps. But there have been increasing signs of fatigue with a hard-line approach, and this president, who has proven his conservative credentials, is uniquely positioned for a kind of ‘Nixon-in-China’ moment. In fact, President Lee has sent a New Year’s message to Pyongyang, noting the South’s willingness to reopen talks and foster cooperation with the North. Nonetheless, Pyongyang’s response has been quite hostile.

Beijing may have the best model for handling North Korea, as Chinese realists spend less time thinking about scenarios of North Korea’s collapse, and instead keep diplomatic channels open while supporting economic engagement. China also has military-to-military ties with the North, and can exert some leverage when it comes to moderating military behaviour.

In an optimistic scenario, China, South Korea and the US could use this changing of the guard to embark on a coordinated engagement policy to normalise, and denuclearise, the Korean Peninsula. For years, political analysts and military planners have discussed ‘contingency plans’ in the event of Kim Jong-il’s death. But now, with no sign of chaos or collapse, we need prudent and realistic diplomacy that lays the foundations for progress.

John Delury is Assistant Professor of East Asian Studies at Yonsei University, Seoul, and a book-review editor for Global Asia. Chung-in Moon is Professor of Political Science at Yonsei University and Editor-in-Chief at Global Asia.

1. North Korea provokes again
2. North Korean realities
3. Dangers lurk in North Korea’s leadership transition

The sudden death of Kim Jong-il changes North Korea, in Donald Rumsfeld’s useful phrase, from a known unknown to an unknown unknown.

With Kim senior we knew where we were — to some extent: the old trickster liked to keep us guessing. But his son is a blank — so far.

Anything is now possible. The range of possible scenarios runs from benign to apocalyptic. The world wants North Korea to come in from the cold and embrace peace and reform. That seems unlikely, alas. The Kim regime is heavily invested in an avowed military-first policy, and in continuity — despite marching down a cul-de-sac. The mighty Korean People’s Army (KPA), whose clout grew under Kim Jong-il, has much to lose from any outbreak of peace.

China is the key power. It could have been South Korea, had not President Lee Myung-bak’s hard line eclipsed the former sunshine policy of engagement. That was ill-advised, for it left Seoul with no influence in Pyongyang — which retaliated viciously, sinking a Southern ship and shelling an island last year. And it left a vacuum, which Beijing hastened to fill.

The Chinese will press for economic reforms, and probably get them — at long last. Boosting a broken economy is one way for Kim Jong-un to make himself more popular. But the fear is that he, or the generals behind him, may instead choose to make a splash with a provocation.

That could be a fresh nuclear test or long-range missile launch. More risky, as hopefully they realise in Pyongyang, would be another attack on South Korea. That would be third time unlucky. With two elections upcoming, President Lee cannot afford to look weak. This time Seoul would strike back, hard — with the risk of hostilities escalating out of control.

Another dilemma for South Korea, and its US and Japanese allies, is what to do in the event of instability in the North. Kim Jong-un’s succession might not succeed. Will Pyongyang’s elite really entrust their future to an untried youth, with only his genes to recommend him?

Aidan Foster-Carter is Honorary Senior Research Fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University and a freelance consultant, writer and broadcaster on Korean affairs.

This article first appeared here in The Telegraph, UK.

1. North Korean apocalypse avoided?
2. North Korea: new opportunities in a post-Kim Jong-il landscape
3. North Korea: Kim Jong-il snubs Jimmy Carter in lead up to succession

Kim Jong-il is no more. The state news agency KCNA reported that he died on his train on Saturday 17 December 2011. This is the official version (now doubted internationally) that observers of North Korea have actually seen under preparation for quite a while, including in works of art that were discussed here.

The public was informed rather quickly, less than two days later. Kim might in fact have died much earlier. In a system where the death of a living dictator is a taboo topic, it is questionable that all necessary arrangements had been made in advance. It takes time to agree on a detailed funeral list with 250 names in strict hierarchical order, an obituary praising the right aspects of his rule, and a precise schedule of instructions for the immediate period after the ruler’s demise. Most importantly, a far-reaching decision had to be made on how to proceed — and how to announce the successor.

The matter was complicated by the fact that Kim Jong-il himself had failed to finish the succession process. This was most likely to happen next year, when the country would celebrate the 100th birthday of its founder Kim Il-sung in April 2012. The status of Kim Jong-un would have been elevated at the yet unannounced 7th Party Congress. It is fair to assume that Kim Jong-il’s death at this point in time came as a surprise for the North Korean leadership, too.

In this situation, the Worker’s Party took over. In a highly symbolic move, it acted like the Church in medieval Europe: it crowned the Emperor. The obituary, published in the Party newspaper and signed by the Central Committee, devotes its latter part to the introduction of Kim Jong-un as the next leader — as the ‘great successor’ (widaehan kyesungja). This is the first time he has been explicitly named as such. Note also that the complete sentence says he is the great successor to the revolutionary cause of chuch’e — not son’gun (Military First Policy). This is an emphasis on ideology, the realm of the Party.

The resuscitation of the Party’s leading role in society has been visible for a few years. Among the last hints was a group picture taken on 13 December 2011 during one of Kim Jong-il’s last field guidance trips. It shows a banner reading: ‘Let’s defend the Central Committee with Great Leader Kim Jong-il at its top with our lives!’

This is a remarkable deviation from earlier versions, according to which soldiers were supposed to defend only Kim Jong-il. Now it’s the Central Committee — a collective, symbolising the Party. The order of institutions signing the official obituary published by the Central News Agency supports this analysis. It lists the Central Committee of the KWP first, followed by the Central Military Commission of the KWP, the National Defence Commission, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly (the parliament), and the Cabinet of the DPRK. How more obvious can the real power structure be?

The big question now is will the North Korean elite and population accept the Central Committee’s decision, and will they welcome Kim Jong-un as the new leader? History teaches us that things do not always proceed according to plan or conventional wisdom. We cannot exclude the possibility of ambitious individuals testing the opportunities. With Kim Jong-il’s death, North Korea lost the Secretary General of the Worker’s Party and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, but there still are an official Head of State; a Standing Committee of the Politburo, of which Kim Jong-un is not a member; and a National Defence Commission, also without Kim Jong-un. There are powerful individuals like Choe Yong Rim, Prime Minister; Kim Young Nam, Head of State; Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law and alternate member of the Politburo, and his wife and Kim Jong-il’s sister Kim Kyong Hui who is a regular Politburo member and a General. Ri Yong Ho is a Vice Marshal. Will they back up Kim Jong-un, or try to manipulate and sideline him?

What comes next? As quickly as possible, every space on propaganda posters, in the media, and in people’s minds will be filled with Kim Jong-un until there is no other choice but to proceed with him, lest the dangerous impression of potential for change will be risked. According to Gregory Henderson, Korean politics is all about competition for control of the centre — not about competition against the centre. In other words, the key question regarding domestic politics in North Korea now is not whether Kim Jong-un will be the next leader, but what type of leader he will be.

It would also be fair to expect a wave of purges against actual or potential opponents. This happened in the past, too. In the coming months, continuity and consolidation will be the name of the game. We will see Kim Jong-il being placed next to his father — in propaganda, and probably even physically in the Kumsusan memorial palace. Kim Jong-un will emphasise how he will govern in the spirit of these two immortal leaders. To show his filial piety, he will award a posthumous title to his father and show proper mourning by not accepting any title for himself for three years. This mourning period will give the elite time to figure out how to deal with the young Kim without triggering impatience among the population. If everything remains quiet, the 7th Party Congress would be held after three years and further cement the rule of Kim Jong-un by making him the Secretary General.

In an ideal case, this will mean that Kim Jong-un becomes a leader of the Chinese type. Reform and opening Chinese style — a one Party dictatorship together with a market economy — could be the consequence. However, the risk in Kim Jong-un’s case is his young age. He will not die naturally anytime soon, and he is unlikely to give up his post easily after a few years. As he gets used to power and more experienced in the power game, his ambitions will grow. The old generation will make room for handpicked younger officials who depend entirely on Kim Jong-un. The Party is strong now; it might get weaker in the future. The classical power struggle between worldly and spiritual leaders in medieval Europe fills many volumes of books. So the Party in North Korea now has the crucial task to ensure that enough checks and balances are provided to prevent the young ruler from becoming another Kim Il-sung. This is what we will have to look at when we observe North Korea in the next months.

Many open questions remain. But one thing is obvious: North Korea, a nuclear state, now stands at a major juncture in its development.

Ruediger Frank is professor of East Asian Economy and Society at the University of Vienna.

This post first appeared here in 38 North.

1. Kim Jong Il’s death: continuity plus opportunity to engage
2. Kim Jong-un’s regime: facing up to domestic challenges, China and the US
3. Kim Jong-nam and the question of North Korea’s leadership stability

At the moment of his accession to power, Kim Jong-il inherited the devastating impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent trade shock to North Korea’s economic output, the onset of the worst famine in modern history, and a humanitarian crisis that required a direct appeal to the outside world for help.

By the late 1990’s, he was forced to accept the realities of dependence on international aid, the rise of farmers markets as a grassroots response to the famine, and the introduction of capitalist notions such as ‘profits’ in the Constitution itself. Kim even briefly entertained the notion of establishing relationships with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, attracted by the prospects for international finance, but balking at requirements for transparency, conditionality, and rules-based relations. Throughout his leadership tenure he only half-heartedly and grudgingly accepted the growing role for markets in the North’s economy and maintained a deep ambivalence to the prospect of economic empowerment of the North Korean people. His desire to maintain highly-centralised control over all aspects of North Korean society was sharply at odds with the decentralisation of information and decision-making needed for a market economy to replace a failed socialist economic management system. As a result, economic policy in the Kim Jong-il era was more shaped by events and forces for change than used as a tool to guide a managed process for national development.

Experiments in economic reforms were not accompanied by policies or the institution-building that would have been needed for recreating the economic success stories of China and Vietnam. Rather, the guiding light of economic policy for Kim Jong-il was mobilising resources for his purse from both domestic and foreign sources.  He was quite creative in devising ways to achieve this, such as demands for ‘loyalty’ payments, structuring of foreign exchange earning activities to send the cash to the top, negotiating with foreigners to get goodies for concessions, and pursuing illegal and internationally-sanctioned revenue-raising ventures.  At the end of the day, the North Korean economy under Kim Jong-il remains highly vulnerable to shortages of food, energy, and foreign exchange, with pressures for transformation of the economic system coming from both internal and external dynamics of change at work in North Korea.

Looking ahead, the key question is not whether there will be changes in economic policy but whether changes will be in the direction of building a market economy or governed by a new dynamic of competition for resources among contending parties for power.  The more the new regime leans towards the Worker’s Party, the more likely it will follow Chinese supported policies of developing a market economy under the guidance of the Party and gradually shift to funding defence needs from a centralised budget rather than the military having its own economic organs such as trading companies and banks that service them. The more the regime tilts towards the military, the more likely that competition for resources will trump incentives for pursuing systemic change.

While there may be an inclination to perpetuate the patronage practices of the elites by the Kim family, it is not likely that loyalties will transfer simply to the new leadership through such patronage alone. New incentives for supporting the regime will need to be pursued.  Key metrics of such changes will be in: 1) the ownership and transferability rights of assets; 2) the restructuring of the financial system including banking supervision, monetary-management policies, and development of the tax system and public expenditure policies to accommodate a market economy; 3) the support for decentralisation of economic decision-making and empowerment of traders and entrepreneurs; 4) the willingness to follow rules-based international practices in commerce and finance; and 5) the legal reforms to protect rights of parties in a market economy. This is a tall order, but one that might lead to a new dawn for North Korea.

Bradley O. Babson is a consultant on Asian affairs with a focus on Korea and Northeast Asia economic cooperation. He is retired from a career at the World Bank, with a concentration in East Asia. In the early 1990s he worked on the opening up of Vietnam and was the first World Bank Resident Representative in Hanoi.

This article first appeared here in 38 North.

1. Kim Jong Il’s death: continuity plus opportunity to engage
2. Kim Jong-il dead: apocalypse now or a new dawn?
3. Kim Jong-nam and the question of North Korea’s leadership stability